FOREIGN AFFAIRS

AN AMERICAN QUARTERLY REVIEW

INDEX

VOLUME 15

Nos. 1-4

October 1936 - July 1937

FOREIGN AFFAIRS
45 East 65th Street
New York

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA ILLINOIS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

INDEX TO VOLUME 15

NO. 1 – OCTOBER 1936

Why We Went to War . . . . . *Newton D. Baker* 1
Back of the Spanish Rebellion . . . . . *Lawrence A. Fernsworth* 87
Alternatives Before the League . . . . . *A. Lawrence Lowell* 102
Aims of the Japanese Army and Navy *William Henry Chamberlin* 112
The World Crisis of 1936 . . . . . *The Marquess of Lothian* 124
French Fascism . . . . . *Alexander Werth* 141
Reforming the Bank of France . . . . . *Georges Boris* 155
The Inter-American Treaties of Pacific Settlement
Manley O. Hudson 165
German Austria and Nazi Germany . . . . . *Joseph Redlich* 179
The Soviet Union and the Industrialization of Asia *Violet Conolly* 187
The Straits after the Montreux Conference . . *Harry N. Howard* 199
Some Recent Books on International Relations 203
Source Material . . . . . *Denys P. Myers* 219

NO. 2 – JANUARY 1937

Germany's Colonial Demands . . . . . *Hjalmar Schacht* 223
The Armies of Europe . . . . . *Liddell Hart* 235
The Changing Balance of Forces in the Pacific . . . . . *Hu Shih* 254
The Spanish Rebellion and International Law . *Philip C. Jessup* 260
Neutrality and Peace: The View of a Small Power *Halvdan Koht* 280
British Experiments in State Intervention . *Raymond Gram Swing* 290
Prerequisites to Monetary Stabilization . . . *O. M. W. Sprague* 303
Charting America's News of the World War *H. Schuyler Foster, Jr.* 311
The American and British Munitions Investigations
William O. Scroggs 320
The Jews of Eastern Europe . . . . . *Desider Kiss* 330
Wars Within Wars . . . . . *A. L. Conger* 340
How Sanctions Failed . . . . . *M. J. Bonn* 350
British and French Colonial Technique in West Africa
Derwent Whittlesey 362
The Future of Portugal's Colonies . . . . *Robert Gale Woolbert* 374
Japan's Trade with the Netherlands Indies . . *John C. Le Clair* 381
The Balearic Islands in Mediterranean Strategy 384
Some Recent Books on International Relations. 386
Source Material . . . . . *Denys P. Myers* 401

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA ILLINOIS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

NO. 3 – APRIL 1937

A Requisite for the Success of Popular Diplomacy . . *Elihu Root* 405
(Reprinted from Vol. 1, No. 1)
On the Eve of the Imperial Conference . . . . . *L. S. Amery* 413
Canada's Future in the British Commonwealth . . . *F. R. Scott* 429
The New Era in Pan American Relations . . . . *Sumner Welles* 443
Why Czechoslovakia? . . . . . *Stefan Osuský* 455
China Prepares to Resist . . . . . *Lin Yutang* 472
Naval Bases in the Pacific . . . . . *William Henry Chamberlin* 484
Choices Before the Baltic States . . . . . *Benjamin Akzin* 495
The Modern Diplomat . . . . . *H* 509
France and the Outbreak of the World War *Bernadotte E. Schmitt* 516
The Great New Migration . . . . . *Countess Waldeck* 537
Repercussions of the Spanish Crisis in Latin America *Enrique Gil* 547
Fascism in Belgium . . . . . *Harold Callender* 554
The Perennial Kamchatka Discord . . . . . *Bruce Hopper* 564
Some Recent Books on International Relations 568
Source Material . . . . . *Denys P. Myers* 583

SUPPLEMENT

The Results and Significance of the Buenos Aires Conference
Cordell Hull i

NO. 4 – JULY 1937

Rough-hew Them How We Will . . . . . *Walter Lippmann* 587
The Destruction of Capitalism in Germany . . . . . *V* 595
The Front Populaire in Difficulties . . . . . *Alexander Werth* 608
A Year of the Canadian Trade Agreement . . . . *Herbert Feis* 619
Europe Versus the United States in Latin America *Gaston Nerval* 636
Tribulations of Empire: The Mediterranean Problem
William L. Langer 646
British Policy Towards Spain . . . . . *D. Graham Hutton* 661
Revolutionary Forces in Catalonia . . . *Lawrence A. Fernsworth* 674
The Prospect of Inflation . . . . . *Frank D. Graham* 685
Spencer's Horrid Vision . . . . . *Crane Brinton* 695
Oriental Competition in World Trade . . . . *John E. Orchard* 707
The Nazis in Scandinavia . . . . . *Joachim Joesten* 720
Supervising the American Traffic in Arms . . . *Joseph C. Green* 729
China Still Waits the End of Extraterritoriality *Ching-Chun Wang* 745
Australia in the Changing East . . . . . *R. L. Curthoys* 750
Some Recent Books on International Relations 757
Source Material . . . . . *Denys P. Myers* 773

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

AN AMERICAN QUARTERLY REVIEW

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

OCTOBER 1936

Why We Went to War . . . . . *Newton D. Baker* 1
Back of the Spanish Rebellion . . . . . *Lawrence A. Fernsworth* 87
Alternatives Before the League . . . . . *A. Lawrence Lowell* 102
Aims of the Japanese Army and Navy *William Henry Chamberlin* 112
The World Crisis of 1936 . . . . . *The Marquess of Lothian* 124
French Fascism . . . . . *Alexander Werth* 141
Reforming the Bank of France . . . . . *Georges Boris* 155
The Inter-American Treaties of Pacific Settlement *Manley O. Hudson* 165
German Austria and Nazi Germany . . . . . *Joseph Redlich* 179
The Soviet Union and the Industrialization of Asia *Violet Conolly* 187
The Straits after the Montreux Conference . . *Harry N. Howard* 199
Some Recent Books on International Relations 203
Source Material . . . . . *Denys P. Myers* 219

HAMILTON FISH ARMSTRONG
Editor

Editorial Advisory Board

NEWTON D. BAKER
ISAIAH BOWMAN
GEORGE H. BLAKESLEE
JOHN W. DAVIS
STEPHEN DUGGAN
HARRY A. GARFIELD
EDWIN F. GAY
WALTER LIPPMANN
A. LAWRENCE LOWELL

Published quarterly by Council on Foreign Relations, Inc. Printed at 10 Ferry Street, Concord, N. H. Editorial and Business Offices, 45 East 65th Street, New York, N. Y. Cable address, Foraffairs, New York. Subscriptions, $5.00 a year, post free to any address. The Editors will consider manuscripts submitted, but assume no responsibility regarding them.

Vol. 15, No. 1. © 1936, Council on Foreign Relations, Inc. Printed in U. S. A.

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS ISSUE

NEWTON D. BAKER, Secretary of War under President Wilson, 1916–1921 * * * *LAWRENCE A. FERNSWORTH*, for some years correspondent of the London *Times* in Barcelona * * * *A. LAWRENCE LOWELL*, President Emeritus of Harvard University; author of "The Government of England" and other works * * * *WILLIAM HENRY CHAMBERLIN*, former Moscow correspondent of the *Christian Science Monitor*, now stationed in Tokyo; author of "Russia's Iron Age" and "The Russian Revolution: 1917–1921." * * * *ALEXANDER WERTH*, Paris correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian;* author of "France in Ferment" * * * *THE MARQUESS OF LOTHIAN*, Editor of *The Round Table*, 1910–1916; Secretary to Prime Minister Lloyd George, 1916–1921; former Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster and Under-Secretary of the India Office * * * *GEORGES BORIS*, Editor of *La Lumière;* author of "La Révolution Roosevelt" and other works * * * *MANLEY O. HUDSON*, Professor of International Law in the Harvard Law School; one of the American advisers at the Paris Peace Conference; author of several works on international legal and political subjects * * * *JOSEPH REDLICH*, long a Professor in the University of Vienna, until recently Professor of Comparative Public Law in the Harvard Law School; former member of the Reichsrath, the last Finance Minister of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and for a time Finance Minister of the Austrian Republic in 1931 * * * *VIOLET CONOLLY*, author of "Soviet Economic Policy in the East" and "Soviet Trade from the Pacific to the Levant" * * * *HARRY N. HOWARD*, of the History Department of Indiana University; author of "The Partition of Turkey, 1913–1923" and co-author of "The Balkan Conferences and the Balkan Entente, 1930–1935."

The articles in FOREIGN AFFAIRS *do not represent any consensus of beliefs. We do not expect that readers of the review will sympathize with all the sentiments they find there, for some of our writers will flatly disagree with others; but we hold that while keeping clear of mere vagaries* FOREIGN AFFAIRS *can do more to guide American public opinion by a broad hospitality to divergent ideas than it can by identifying itself with one school. It does not accept responsibility for the views expressed in any articles, signed or unsigned, which appear in its pages. What it does accept is the responsibility for giving them a chance to appear there.*

The Editors.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Vol. 15 OCTOBER 1936 No. 1

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

WHY WE WENT TO WAR

By Newton D. Baker

ON THE second day of April, 1917, President Wilson addressed to the Congress, called in extraordinary session, what has come to be known as his War Message. He advised "that the Congress declare the recent course of the Imperial German Government to be in fact nothing less than war against the Government and people of the United States; that it formally accept the status of belligerent which has thus been thrust upon it; and that it take immediate steps not only to put the country in a more thorough state of defense but also to exert all its power and employ all its resources to bring the Government of the German Empire to terms and end the war."

On April 4 the United States Senate passed the resolution declaring war by a vote of 82 to 6; on April 5 the House of Representatives passed the resolution by a vote of 373 to 50; and on April 6 President Wilson signed the resolution formally declaring the war.

The scene in the hall of the House of Representatives on April 2 when the President read his War Message will not be forgotten by anyone who was present. Every available seat in the gallery was occupied. The diplomatic corps, in official dress, with the ladies of their households and the more important members of their staffs filled the diplomatic gallery, while all the places usually reserved for officials, and those ordinarily available to the public, were occupied by persons eminent in the official, political and intellectual life of the nation. The floor seated not only the senators and representatives, but was crowded with people specially admitted because of their scholarship in international law or their leadership of public opinion. Members of the Cabinet attended in a body and in a row of seats specially placed immediately in front of the speaker sat the entire membership of the

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PUBLIC L
AURORA, ILL

Supreme Court of the United States, headed by the venerable Chief Justice White. In the newspaper gallery were packed the highly trained Washington representatives of the press associations and the great papers, and with them editors, publishers and editorial writers representing every phase of public opinion. As the President proceeded in his address, the tension of suppressed excitement grew until it burst all bounds at the delivery of the sentence quoted above. As the President recommended the declaration of war, applause, which seemed universal, rolled through the whole assembly from floor to gallery. The audience rose to cheer when Chief Justice White waved his hands in the air as he, in effect, led the expression of unanimous approval.

It would have been impossible to have assembled a more complete representation of the statesmanship, intellect, or character of the country, or to have found anywhere people better informed about the European War or America's relationship to it. It is safe to say that nobody in that audience had the least doubt about what was being done or why it was being done. From August 1914, until that hour, practically everybody in that audience had studied constantly the causes and the course of the European conflict. As the contest overseas impinged upon American rights or threatened American interests, the President from time to time delivered messages to Congress or made addresses to the American people, which for clarity and candor, as well as eloquent restraint, are among the most remarkable official publications of our times. As each incident or crisis arose during this period, it was discussed in the newspaper and magazine press, debated in the meetings of learned societies, and became the theme of sermons in every pulpit. Public opinion was never better informed, and while the ultimate causes of the war in Europe were still to be revealed by the publication of foreign office archives, there was no secret about any aspect of America's relations to any of the belligerent countries or of the rights of America, as a neutral, and the injuries inflicted upon those interests by the belligerents.

Immediately after the declaration of war, the newspaper and periodical press editorially reviewed the course of events which had led to American participation. A review of the files of these publications shows that without political or geographical distinction, the country understood and accepted the statement of the case made by the President.

Twenty years later it has become the fashion to suggest that our

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

entry into the war was not in fact for the reasons then stated and generally accepted, but was either the result of the pressure of special interests of one sort or another, which imagined that they would be advantaged by our country's becoming involved, or that we were beguiled by propaganda which came from overseas and entangled us in other people's quarrels for their benefit. All such suggestions strain the imagination to the breaking point. So gigantic an imposition upon, or self-deception by, the people of the United States on a subject of such importance and so long and thoroughly debated is inherently improbable. In addition to that, the known facts upon which our action proceeded were in themselves adequate to explain it and afford so matter-of-fact an explanation as to make it wholly unnecessary to take romantic improbabilities into account. That these speculative doubts should be suggested and that they should confuse the uninformed is not strange. We have the authority of Pericles for the fact that men rarely adhere to the same views during the course of a war which they had upon entering it, and are likely to change their beliefs as to its causes when they look back from the consequences of their actions.[1] In the examination which follows I propose to review the state of official and unofficial opinion in America from the beginning of the war until our entry into it. So far as the records are available, I shall examine the effect of propaganda by belligerent nations and the cause and extent of domestic attempts, if any, to influence either public opinion or official action. I believe the result will be to demonstrate that no covert influence affected the nation's course, but that on the contrary the course of the World War as it unfolded and finally came to infringe upon vital rights of the United States inescapably led to our entry into the conflict.

Mr. Justice Holmes once said, "The vindication of the obvious is sometimes more important than the elucidation of the obscure." This is plainly such a case. From many points of view it is of the highest importance that we should see the history of this episode clearly and justly. This is true not only because it is always important to be just in our judgments of the actions of others, but because the future policy of our country is certain to be guided by what we believe to be its past. Santayana says, "Men are constantly being made dupes of by the things they think they know." We, as a people, cannot afford to be duped in future efforts to

[1] "Thucydides," Book I, Chapter CXL.

PUBLIC L
AURORA,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

protect national interests and to preserve harmonious relations with international neighbors by false beliefs as to the real springs of our action in the great international crises of the past.

It is worth while to reread the case as stated by the President in his War Message:

> On the 3d of February last I officially laid before you the extraordinary announcement of the Imperial German Government that on and after the 1st day of February it was its purpose to put aside all restraints of law or of humanity and use its submarines to sink every vessel that sought to approach either the ports of Great Britain and Ireland or the western coasts of Europe or any of the ports controlled by the enemies of Germany within the Mediterranean. That had seemed to be the object of the German submarine warfare earlier in the war, but since April of last year the Imperial Government had somewhat restrained the commanders of its undersea craft in conformity with its promise then given to us that passenger boats should not be sunk and that due warning would be given to all other vessels which its submarines might seek to destroy, when no resistance was offered or escape attempted, and care taken that their crews were given at least a fair chance to save their lives in their open boats. The precautions taken were meager and haphazard enough, as was proved in distressing instance after instance in the progress of the cruel and unmanly business, but a certain degree of restraint was observed. The new policy has swept every restriction aside. Vessels of every kind, whatever their flag, their character, their cargo, their destination, their errand, have been ruthlessly sent to the bottom without warning and without thought of help or mercy for those on board, the vessels of friendly neutrals along with those of belligerents. Even hospital ships and ships carrying relief to the sorely bereaved and stricken people of Belgium, though the latter were provided with safe conduct through the proscribed areas by the German Government itself and were distinguished by unmistakable marks of identity, have been sunk with the same reckless lack of compassion or of principle.
>
> I was for a little while unable to believe that such things would in fact be done by any government that had hitherto subscribed to the humane practices of civilized nations. International law had its origin in the attempt to set up some law which would be respected and observed upon the seas, where no nation had right of dominion and where lay the free highways of the world. By painful stage after stage has that law been built up, with meager enough results, indeed, after all was accomplished that could be accomplished, but always with a clear view, at least, of what the heart and conscience of mankind demanded. This minimum of right the German Government has swept aside under the plea of retaliation and necessity and because it had no weapons which it could use at sea except these which it is impossible to employ as it is employing them without throwing to the winds all scruples of humanity or of respect for the understandings that were supposed to underlie the intercourse of the world. I am not now thinking of the loss of property involved, immense and serious as that is, but only of the wanton and wholesale destruction of the lives of noncombatants, men, women, and children, engaged in pursuits which have always, even in the darkest periods of modern history, been deemed

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

innocent and legitimate. Property can be paid for; the lives of peaceful and innocent people cannot be. The present German submarine warfare against commerce is a warfare against mankind.

It is a war against all nations. American ships have been sunk, American lives taken, in ways which it has stirred us very deeply to learn of, but the ships and people of other neutral and friendly nations have been sunk and overwhelmed in the waters in the same way. There has been no discrimination. The challenge is to all mankind. Each nation must decide for itself how it will meet it. The choice we make for ourselves must be made with a moderation of counsel and a temperateness of judgment befitting our character and our motives as a nation. . . .

. . . There is one choice we cannot make, we are incapable of making: we will not choose the path of submission and suffer the most sacred rights of our nation and our people to be ignored or violated. The wrongs against which we now array ourselves are no common wrongs; they cut to the very roots of human life.

Upon that basis the President advised the declaration of war. His message then proceeded to discuss the practical steps to be taken. This was followed by a reference to his addresses to the Senate on January 22, 1917, and to the Congress on February 3 and 26, and a statement of "our motives and objects" as follows:

Our object now, as then, is to vindicate the principles of peace and justice in the life of the world as against selfish and autocratic power and to set up amongst the really free and self-governed peoples of the world such a concert of purpose and of action as will henceforth insure the observance of those principles. Neutrality is no longer feasible or desirable where the peace of the world is involved and the freedom of its peoples, and the menace to that peace and freedom lies in the existence of autocratic governments backed by organized force which is controlled wholly by their will, not by the will of their people. We have seen the last of neutrality in such circumstances. We are at the beginning of an age in which it will be insisted that the same standards of conduct and of responsibility for wrong done shall be observed among nations and their governments that are observed among the individual citizens of civilized states.

After outlining activities in the United States aimed to disrupt peace, dislocate our industry, and incite an attack upon us by Mexico, the President proceeded to say:

We are accepting this challenge of hostile purpose because we know that in such a government, following such methods, we can never have a friend; and that in the presence of its organized power, always lying in wait to accomplish we know not what purpose, there can be no assured security for the democratic governments of the world. . . . We are glad, now that we see the facts with no veil of false pretense about them, to fight thus for the ultimate peace of the world and for the liberation of its peoples, the German peoples included:

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

for the rights of nations great and small and the privilege of men everywhere to choose their way of life and of obedience. The world must be made safe for democracy. Its peace must be planted upon the tested foundations of political liberty. We have no selfish ends to serve. We desire no conquest, no dominion. We seek no indemnities for ourselves, no material compensation for the sacrifices we shall freely make.

This is the statement which is now questioned. Does it speak the truth, and the whole truth, or is it rather a partial statement used to rationalize a hidden purpose and to justify a concealed intention?

To arrive at an answer to these questions, it is necessary to go back to the beginning of the war in Europe and to reconstruct the atmosphere through which we Americans viewed it. It will then be possible for us to examine the conduct of the Administration with regard to American rights, affected by the actions of the belligerents, and the fluctuations of informed American opinion between August 1914 and April 1917.

II. THE UNITED STATES AND PREWAR EUROPE

Before August 1914 the official foreign policy of the United States may be said to have centered around three principles: the Monroe Doctrine, abstention from entangling foreign alliances, and the preservation of the Open Door in the Far East. Each of these policies had been variously interpreted, as to their implications, in our diplomatic history; each had its own interesting history; and no one of them had been adhered to with formal rigidity. In general they were accepted by public opinion as policies which gave us an academic rather than a practical interest in European controversies. Our newspaper and periodical press, correctly representing public interest in such questions, treated European diplomatic entanglements rather casually, and even great conferences like those at The Hague, which attempted to deal with the rights of neutrals, limitations upon the actions of belligerents, and constructive agencies for the preservation of peace, attracted little general attention.

From the time of the Franco-Prussian War, Americans generally realized that European peace was kept by a so-called balance of power and that from time to time the balance was exceedingly unstable, but there was no single book available in English which gave any comprehensive view of the political relations which had grown up in Europe after 1815.[2] A few

[2] "Europe Since 1815," by Charles D. Hazen, appeared only in 1910.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

American scholars kept themselves informed in this field and occasional magazine articles appeared, but until the outbreak of the first Balkan War there was little appreciation in America of the strains to which the European system was constantly subjected. From that time on, a constantly increasing number of Americans began to realize that the peace of Europe was threatened by a number of situations roughly characterized as Austro-Hungarian Balkan pretensions; the Baghdad Railway as evidencing Germany's thrust to the East; the emerging naval rivalry between Germany and England; and the possible menace to England's empire from Russia on the one hand and Germany on the other — all of which seemed to result in the possibility that the balance between Germany, Austria and Italy on the one side, and France and Russia on the other, was constantly threatening to be disturbed acutely by an incident growing out of a dramatic assertion of some one of these nationalistic aspirations. We Americans knew something about the military and naval budgets of the European Powers, of their land and sea armament races, but very little indeed about the consequences of the outcome of the conflict in the German Foreign Office between those who would face German policy toward England and those who would face it toward Russia.

The very limited successes of The Hague Conferences ought, perhaps, to have alarmed us more than they did. The caveats in favor of purely nationalistic military power, interposed by some of the most civilized nations of the world, showed plainly enough the tendency to subordinate the desire for peace to a very practical assurance, by each participant, that nothing should be done to its own military disadvantage in the event of possible conflict. But American public opinion was not disposed to be either particularly informed or particularly disturbed, and maintained an attitude of academic composure throughout the Balkan Wars, the Morocco crisis, and the annexation of Bosnia, Hercegovina, and the Sanjak of Novi-Pazar as though these were events which could have no possible American consequences. Indeed, if we Americans envisaged at all the possibility of a world war, it was confined to a world of which we were not a part, and interested us chiefly as a ground for self-congratulation that a wide Atlantic and an unambitious foreign policy isolated us from any occasion for alarm.

Our people comprised representatives, in several generations,

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

from practically all the countries in Europe. The problem of our melting pot had nothing whatever to do with any traditional antagonisms in the home lands but concerned itself solely with the reconciliation of alien racial habits to our own institutions. To the extent that European countries were governed by more or less despotic rulers, we were against their forms of government, and we were disposed to judge the major part of Europe by broad generalizations of their temperament and culture based, at least in part, upon the conduct of such of their representatives as had come to cast their lots with us.

Because of Germany's extraordinary development, she constituted a special case in American public opinion. Her universities began sixty years ago to attract an increasing number of American students. The fame of her scholars, in all branches of human learning, was attested by epoch-making scientific discoveries and a new school of philosophical speculation and historical research. The content and technique of higher education in America was profoundly affected and our own colleges and universities were filled with men who had studied in Germany or with German scholars brought over to start on American soil the processes of research and the spirit of a new scholarship there developed. There were thus among us a large number of highly intellectual persons who knew Germany and who watched her development with admiration not unmixed with grave concern.

The military tradition of Prussia was a commonplace in our books of elementary history. Its revival, after Waterloo and up to the Franco-Prussian War, resulted in a unification of Germany under Prussian direction and thus made the tradition of Scharnhorst and Von Clausewitz the drill book of a united German people. The lessons to Germans from the weakness of their disunion affected quite naturally the speculations of her philosophers as well as the plans of her military leaders, and there grew up in Germany an identification of Germany's destiny with her military power which dominated every other element of her national growth. It was instinctively felt in Germany that the Minnesingers would be inappropriate leaders for a militarized people, and German philosophy developed a theory of the state to meet the needs of the case. Accepting Kant's doctrine of the obligations of "duty," Fichte added the doctrine of the "great destiny" of the Germans as a people and directed them to find in "unconquerable will" the sources of power. To this Hegel added the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

concept of the state as the representative of the divine on earth and the consequent moral obligation of all to yield to the state unquestioned obedience. Thus we came to have in Germany an all powerful state, speaking through an All Highest War-Lord in command of the greatest military machine the world had ever seen, and sustained by a people who had been taught to believe by their philosophers, their historians, and their religious leaders, both in the cultural supremacy of the Germans as a people, and the morality of their imposition of that culture on the rest of mankind, if necessary by the sword.

If it seems improbable that the recondite speculations of philosophers could thus become a part of the consciousness of a people, or that the outside world should form its judgment of the aspirations and probable conduct of a nation upon such a basis, it is only necessary to recall Treitschke. Under his eloquent leadership the superb scholarship of Germany became a vast system of apologetics for German supremacy stated in terms of military power. There grew up in Germany a popularization of this philosophy of life which distorted everything to its main objective and summoned the German people to prepare for immediate war "in 1915 or at the latest in 1916" according to Colonel H. T. W. Frobenius. The literature of German chauvinism became so vast that anthologies and summaries of it began to be published.[3] The most amazing popular expositions of this state of mind were "The German Empire's Hour of Destiny," by Frobenius, published just after the war started, and "Germany and the Next War," by General von Bernhardi, published in 1911 and immediately widely translated and generally discussed.

The phrase "der Tag," which before the war figured in America as a summary of Germany's military aspirations, vaguely connoted a war for naval supremacy with Great Britain. The consequences of German victory, however, were rarely elaborated. After the outbreak of the war in 1914, there began to appear in Germany a series of proclamations by commercial and patriotic societies, and elaborate disquisitions by publicists which made the whole subject very much more definite and menacing.

On October 28, 1917, the *New York World* published a map of the world under the caption "Here are the Kaiser's War Plans." Thirty-six areas of German dominance were marked on the map and in the margin there were numbered references to the German

[3] "Der deutsche Chauvinismus," Professor Doctor O. Nippold, Stuttgart, 1913.

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LIBRARY
ILLINOIS

sources sponsoring the inclusion of the various areas as parts of the ultimate aspiration of Germany toward territorial domination of the earth. These aspirations, the map said, were not those which Germany's enemies might ascribe to her but are those ascribed by her own leaders of thought and action. The map included Norway and Sweden, the whole of the middle Europe project drawn to include the Channel coast of France, all of Switzerland and Italy, the Baltic provinces of Russia, all of the Balkans, Turkey, and parts of Persia. It showed German dominance from Cairo to the Cape in Africa, and included roughly two-thirds of Africa as German. China, Sumatra, Borneo, Java and New Guinea in the Orient, and the whole of South America from Panama were shown as either German, German colonies, or spheres of German dominance.

Obviously no such comprehensive plan of world conquest was ever adopted by responsible German statesmen. As a matter of fact, five rival ideas competed for German popular favor. They centered around:

(1) Sea power plus annexations on the west, which in general meant the French Channel coast and the mining districts of Briey and Longwy.

(2) "Mitteleuropa," which contemplated the constitution of a central European bloc of Powers allied politically and economically, and, of course, under German military direction and, therefore, German control. This plan underwent constant expansion, starting with Germany, Austria-Hungary, the Polish lands, and Bulgaria, and, with an appetite which grew by what it fed upon, looked ultimately toward the inclusion of Belgium, Holland and the Scandinavian countries, the Baltic provinces and the Balkans, with great sections of western Russia.

(3) The aspiration known generically as "Berlin to Baghdad," which started with German control of the Ottoman Empire and knew no eastward limitation.

(4) A vast African colonial empire, sometimes pictured as running east and west from the Indian Ocean to the Atlantic, and sometimes as running north and south from Cairo to Capetown.

(5) Annexations of Russian territory, such as Courland and Lithuania, which would provide room for expansion for German agriculture.

These five plans were not regarded as in conflict with one an-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

other but rather as successive steps toward the ultimate world objective, and the disputes among their partisans had to do rather with the order in which the steps should be taken than the desirability of any of the plans as a part of the general design.[4] (Incidentally, the actual behavior of the German Government when later on it was in a position to impose its will was in harmony with this design, as witness the terms of the Treaty of Bucharest and the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk.)

Though part of the detailed substantiation came later, American public opinion at the time the World War began already had a very definite conception of the German theory of life and generally disapproved of it. Nobody understood this situation more clearly than Ambassador Bernstorff and it is a great tribute to his diplomatic skill as well as a conclusive evidence of the genuineness of American neutrality that American public opinion did not force decisive action earlier. At every stage, when Germany acted in complete harmony with its theory of life, as in the "Scrap of Paper" episode, the invasion of Belgium, the sinking of the *Lusitania*, and the proclamation of unrestricted submarine warfare, it not only ran counter to the American theory of life, but seemed to Americans to be following the schedule laid down by Bernhardi of the march toward "world supremacy or downfall." When Ambassador Bernstorff testified before the

[4] The literature on this subject, both of a temporary and a permanent kind, is very large. See: R. G. Usher, "Pan-Germanism" (1913); Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, "Diplomatic Documents Relating to the Outbreak of the European War" (1916, 2 v.), quoting many Germans, official and unofficial, upon various aspects of German war aims; Evans Lewin, "The German Road to the East" (1916); T. G. Masaryk, "Pangermanism and the Eastern Question" (*New Europe*, 1916, p. 2–19); T. G. Masaryk, "Literature of Pangermanism" (*New Europe*, 1916, v. I, *passim*), a comprehensive study citing many authorities; Edwyn Bevan, "German War Aims" (1917); A. Chéradame, "Pangerman Plot Unmasked" (1917); S. Grumbach, "Germany's Annexationist Aims" (1917); H. J. Mackinder, "Democratic Ideals and Reality" (1919); G. L. Beer, "African Questions at the Paris Peace Conference" (1923), p. 1–67; Ebba Dahlin, "French and German Public Opinion on Declared War Aims, 1914–1918" (1933).

In the authorities cited, references are found to statements by leaders of German opinion, and group declarations by persons who associated themselves together to demand of the Government that it use its anticipated victory in the war to accomplish finally these vast objectives. The years 1915 and 1916 were particularly fruitful in the production of literature of this kind in Germany. Much of it, of course, was not known in detail in the United States until after our entry into the war, or, indeed, until the postwar period, but the existence of these aspirations and the confident assertion that their achievement justified entire ruthlessness in dealing with the rights of others was known; and as the war progressed in Europe and tentative peace suggestions made from time to time failed, the opinion of Germany which existed in 1914 was steadily strengthened and deepened. That the people of the United States shrank from contemplating the consequences of German victory is true. That they would have entered the war to prevent German victory is not true. That American opinion with regard to the submarine warfare was profoundly affected by this general feeling of dread is, of course, a part of the atmosphere in which the American decision was made.

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

AURORA, ILLINOIS

Second Sub-Committee of the Committee of Inquiry of the Reichstag in April 1920, he dealt with the subject of the failure of German propaganda in the United States and said:

"This brings us, of course, to the question of philosophy of life. If, in our propaganda in the United States, we had unqualifiedly found ourselves in agreement with the ideas which governed the American people, then of course we would have been much more successful with our propaganda. But since that was not the case — at least, no one believed that what we wanted was a peace of understanding, the natural result was that the propaganda fell to the ground." [5]

I shall have occasion later to refer to the fact that both President Wilson and Secretary Lansing are now discovered to have expressed in letters or diaries pro-Ally sympathies. That both the President and the Secretary of State shared the American view of life and wholly repudiated the philosophy of the "Knight in Shining Armor," or the pseudo-philosophy which justified him, merely means that they entertained personally the sentiments common to most Americans. The amazing thing, however, is not that they entertained such sentiments but that they were able, in spite of them, to maintain, through years of public sentiment repeatedly inflamed, a cold and chaste correctness in their diplomatic treatment of questions which challenged America's rights as a neutral and threatened her ultimate national interests.[6]

That the foregoing is an accurate account of the state of American public opinion about Germany at the outbreak of the World War can easily be verified by anyone who will take the trouble to examine the files of the great American newspapers for the early days of August 1914. In a powerful editorial in the *New York World* of August 4 of that year, Cobb, the most brilliant and perhaps the best informed editor in the country, describing the catastrophe which had overtaken Europe, assigned as its cause the military autocracy of Germany and predicted that what had been hastily begun as a war of autocracy was not unlikely to end

[5] "Official German Documents relating to the World War," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1923, v. 2, p. 928. Hereinafter referred to as German Documents.

[6] Much confusion arises from the use of such terms as "national honor" and "national interest." The terms are in themselves broad enough to cover every sort of national purpose, reasonable or unreasonable. When used by thoughtful people, however, these phrases cover not merely matters of prestige. National honor is an imaginative realization of ultimate national interests. When no immediate interest is threatened, there may well be a threat to create, by precedent, a situation which will in the future make it more difficult to protect national interests when they are called into question. Far-away possibilities of that sort may be spoken of as "national honor" which may not safely be permitted to be surrendered. In this view, national honor is about the equivalent of "enlightened selfishness" from a national point of view.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

as a war of revolution with thrones crumbling and dynasties in exile. Describing the progress of the Germans from the downfall of the Third Napoleon, he said:

> Out of a condition of general poverty they had arisen to great wealth and prosperity. They had become the leaders and teachers of all the nations in the development of scientific industry. Their commerce reached to every nook and corner of the globe. Their ships floated on every sea. Their victories were no victories of brute force, but triumphs of applied skill and trained minds. In many respects the Germans had touched the highwater mark of human civilization. There was not another country in the world but could learn something from them.
>
> Suddenly this vast fabric woven by peace and industry and skill and science is torn in two. All the machinery of progress is stopped by the hand of autocracy. The Kaiser plunges Europe into the most devastating conflict known to human history, and every civilized country reels under the shock. . . .
>
> . . . The enlightened opinion of the whole world has turned against the two Kaisers as it turned against Napoleon III when he sought to make himself the autocrat of Europe.

Our periodical press was immediately flooded with articles by our greatest publicists and scholars boldly questioning whether, in such a contest, America could rightly remain neutral and pointing out the conflict of principle between the American theory of life and that which the German Empire had accepted. Of these a conspicuous example was the interview by President Eliot of Harvard published in the *New York American* on Sunday, December 13, 1914.

Whatever may be our beliefs about the results of propaganda in this country by the respective belligerents, it must be clear that the opinion which existed at the outbreak of the war in Europe was not the result of any such propaganda, but was rather a settled state of mind formed by people who had not yet imagined the possibility of American involvement, but were too loyal to the historic ideals of their theory of life to be unconcerned at the growth of anything so ugly, so menacing, and so unchristian as a thoroughly militaristic nationalism among great and civilized peoples.

How far Germany's theory of life might be justified by experience or necessitated by her situation, it is not important for the present purpose to inquire. Postwar Europe is either giving us fresh demonstrations of the disaster inevitably inherent in such policies, or else it is ringing the knell of the cultural hopes of the race by proving them inescapable in the modern world. Time

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LIBRARY
ILLINOIS

alone can tell. It is enough for us now to realize that in 1914 America was more hopeful, more confident in the ultimate triumph of democracy as she understood it, and perhaps a little less tolerant of tyranny than she has since become. To understand the course of America's diplomacy from 1914 to 1917, it is necessary for us to realize the background of public opinion as it was, whether or not it represented the ultimate judgment of history upon the facts upon which it was based.

The war in Europe having begun, the Administration in Washington faced three great problems:

(1) The maintenance of American neutrality under unprecedented conditions.

(2) The safeguarding of so much of our domestic welfare as could be preserved in a world gone berserk.

(3) The leadership of American public opinion toward whatever salutary outcome could be achieved when the whirlwind of war died down.

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

III. NEUTRALITY

I shall not undertake to review the controversy which has arisen in the United States since the conclusion of the World War with regard to the subject of neutrality. It addresses itself to the problem of applying to future situations the experience of the past. On the one side we have the vigorous championship of Judge John Bassett Moore, the dean of our international lawyers and our greatest scholar in diplomatic history, who believes that the doctrine of neutrality, by wise and progressive administration, is the only sound basis of national policy. On the other side we have a group of younger scholars who believe that, under modern conditions, the far flung interests of nations have become so vital to the well-being of their domestic economy that the doctrine of neutrality, conceived of as isolation during the war and abstention from the protection of these outside interests, exacts the payment of an impossible price. Indeed, the latter school goes so far as to believe that the intensity and the scope of modern war are such that nations facing extinction will, in their desperation, resort to any encroachment upon neutral rights and interests which seems to afford even a last straw of hope in their desperation, and that, therefore, however correct and well disposed a neutral nation may try to be, its rights will be disregarded and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

its interests injured by any belligerent to whom their breach becomes a *tabula in naufragio*.[7]

In August 1914 there was such a thing as a doctrine of neutrality. It governed, by universal acceptance, definitions of the rights of blockade, search and seizure on the high seas, contraband, and the rights of neutrals to sell to belligerents supplies, including arms and ammunition, subject to definite limitations. Dating from Grotius and Puffendorf, but subjected in each generation to fresh examination and modification, with a wide border of uncertainty as to their implications, these rules nevertheless governed foreign offices and regulated, so far as anything regulated, the amenities of international relations. Serious efforts at restatement of this so-called international law were made from time to time. Thus at the two Hague Conferences in 1899 and 1907, projects were made and considered dealing with the rules of land and sea warfare both as affecting combatants and neutrals. These conferences, in the language of Elihu Root, "present the greatest advance ever made at any single time toward the reasonable and peaceful regulation of international conduct." [8]

As one reads the ambitious projects set forth in the proceedings of the Hague Conferences and then reads the modest Conventions which resulted from them, he realizes the extreme difficulty of concerted international action and the necessary slowness of any progress toward an international world government by law.[9] There were, however, some achievements, including a Convention comprising thirty-three articles dealing with rights and duties of neutral powers in naval war adopted at the second Conference. No principle of the law of neutrality was more firmly fixed than that it would be unneutral to change the rules after the beginning of a war. The policy, therefore, of any state which undertook to be neutral toward the European War of 1914 had to be fashioned

[7] See the excellent bibliography on American neutrality appended to "Can We Be Neutral?" by Dulles and Armstrong, 1936. Of especial importance are "American Diplomacy During the World War," Charles Seymour, Johns Hopkins Press, 1934; "American Neutrality, 1914–1917," Charles Seymour, Yale University Press, 1935; "International Law and Some Current Illusions," John Bassett Moore, Macmillan, 1924; "Neutrality — Its History, Economics, and Law," edited by Philip C. Jessup, Columbia University Press, 1935–1936, 4 v.

See also "An Appeal to Reason," by John Bassett Moore in FOREIGN AFFAIRS, July 1933, and articles by Charles Warren in FOREIGN AFFAIRS, April 1934; *Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science, 1934; Yale Review*, March 1935; *American Journal of International Law*, April 1935; and FOREIGN AFFAIRS, January 1936.

[8] Senate Document No. 444, 60th Congress, First Session, p. 62.

[9] "The Reports to the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907," edited by James Brown Scott, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1917.

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PUBLIC L
AURORA, ILL.

upon its own historic interpretation of its rights and duties as a neutral prior to the beginning of that conflict. A practice had also become well settled that disputes between belligerents and neutrals, arising in the area of disputed rules, would normally be made the basis of diplomatic correspondence ending in solemnly filed protests and leading to postwar adjustments either by negotiation or arbitration, but not leading to a forceful assertion of the rights claimed by the neutral unless the neutral was either in fact unneutral and was seeking an occasion to associate itself with one or the other of the belligerents, or interests which the neutral deemed vital and of which it could not postpone the vindication were thought to be invaded.

Accordingly on August 4, 1914, the President issued a proclamation declaring the neutrality of the United States and, in the usual form, prohibiting acts by citizens of the United States in violation of it. It is interesting to note that in this first official declaration the President said:

> . . . the laws and treaties of the United States, without interfering with the free expression of opinion and sympathy, or with the commercial manufacture or sale of arms or munitions of war, nevertheless impose upon all persons who may be within their territory and jurisdiction the duty of an impartial neutrality during the existence of the contest; . . .[10]

This proclamation was, of course, drawn in the State Department by experts; but the President's mind went much beyond an injunction of official propriety of action, and on August 19, 1914, he addressed the Senate on the subject of neutrality, pointing out that the effect of the war upon the United States would depend upon the behavior of the people of the United States. As our people were drawn from many nations, chiefly those involved in the war, the President foresaw that there would be the utmost variety of sympathy among them with regard to the issues of the conflict. He said, "Some will wish one nation, others another, to succeed in the momentous struggle. It will be easy to excite passion and difficult to allay it." He then pointed out that:

> Such divisions amongst us would be fatal to our peace of mind and might seriously stand in the way of the proper performance of our duty as the one great nation at peace, the one people holding itself ready to play a part of impartial mediation and speak the counsels of peace and accommodation, not as a partisan, but as a friend.
>
> I venture, therefore, my fellow countrymen, to speak a solemn word of

[10] "The Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson," Baker and Dodd, "The New Democracy," v. I, p. 151. Hereinafter referred to as New Democracy.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

warning to you against that deepest, most subtle, most essential breach of neutrality which may spring out of partisanship, out of passionately taking sides. The United States must be neutral in fact as well as in name during these days that are to try men's souls. We must be impartial in thought as well as in action, must put a curb upon our sentiments as well as upon every transaction that might be construed as a preference of one party to the struggle before another. (New Democracy, v. I, p. 157–8)

From the beginning of the war in Europe until our entry into it, the President continued in this attempt to instruct and lead public opinion. Sometimes he addressed the American people in the form of addresses to the Congress, sometimes in letters to individuals made public. He took occasion to address religious bodies and companies of almost every sort. These addresses are found in the public papers of the President as edited by Baker and Dodd, known generally as "The New Democracy," Volume I, and include such addresses as those to the Southern Methodist Conference, March 25, 1915; the Conference of the Methodist Protestant Church, April 18, 1915; the Daughters of the American Revolution, April 19, 1915; and the address to seven thousand foreign-born citizens made in Philadelphia May 10, 1915, which contained the much misunderstood phrase "too proud to fight," which, under the circumstances and with its real meaning, was at once one of the bravest and noblest of his utterances. I shall later have occasion to refer to the central theme of all these addresses by the President. In this connection, however, they are referred to merely as declarations of the most public kind in support of the officially proclaimed neutrality of the country, than which nothing could have been either more positive or more definite. However casually American public opinion may have dealt with these declarations, as their repeated statement afforded items of daily news, it is safe to say that there were two groups of people who not only read every word of them, but studied every action of the President, and of all his responsible advisers, to detect the least departure by act from the national policy thus verbally declared. These groups were the foreign representatives in this country of the belligerents. Both sets of countries were represented in Washington by diplomats of long experience and high intelligence and the situation made every word and act of the United States important to their countries, not only in the conduct of their warlike operations, but also in the mobilization of the moral sentiment of the world, which each side recognized as an imponderable but powerful force in the ultimate outcome.

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PUBLIC LIB
AURORA, ILLINO

The British Ambassador throughout this period was Sir Cecil Spring Rice. His letters were published in 1929.[11] Those who knew Sir Cecil were not surprised to discover the frankness, if not the indiscretion, with which he detailed to his friends from day to day his view of the American scene. He was, at least diplomatically, suspicious of everybody's professions and temperamentally impatient of idealisms. As a consequence, he had difficulty in concealing from Mr. Bryan what he revealed very fully in his letters to his friends — his impatience with Mr. Bryan's desire to discuss peace treaties and peace objectives in any general sense. With regard to the President, however, he formed two very definite opinions.

First, Ambassador Spring Rice believed that the President was extremely susceptible to public opinion and could be relied upon to take no decisive action until he was sure that it was in response to a strong preponderance of approval in the public mind. About this he was wrong. The President did realize the futility and difficulty of official action in the face of adverse public opinion and, therefore, often delayed official action until he could instruct and lead public opinion. Members of the President's Cabinet will recall many difficult moments, however, when the President said, in effect, "If what we are preparing to do is right, and public opinion is at the moment uninformed and wrong, our duty is to do what is right." Believing, however, as he did on this subject, Sir Cecil was especially alert to watch and gauge the ebb and flow of public opinion in the United States as between the Allies and the Central Powers. This observation he used as a guide in determining whether or not any deliberate propaganda in the United States by the Allies would be serviceable and, if so, what sort of propaganda was likeliest to make a strong appeal. Thus on October 21, 1914, he wrote to Lord Newton:

> Thank you for writing. On the whole it has seemed wisest to do nothing against the German propaganda which is conducted by hired agents backed with large sums of money. This seems to be more than met by the willing and unorganized correspondents who answer their articles in the newspapers. Public speaking would be fatal, because people here don't like to be preached at: they like to think they are neutral and make up their minds. First and foremost, we must fight our own battles, and fight them well. The rest will follow of itself. If you came out and talked to people, I am sure you would have

[11] "The Letters and Friendships of Sir Cecil Spring Rice," edited by Stephen Gwynn, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1929, 2 v. Hereinafter referred to as Spring Rice.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

an effect on them if you did it in the ordinary way of accidental conversation. But if they thought you came out to preach at them, they would immediately suspect you of imposing your opinions on their free and unbiassed minds.

About ninety per cent. of the English-speaking people, and half the Irish, are on the side of the Allies; and in the glorious annals of German achievements nothing is so remarkable as the fact that Germany has almost made England popular in America. . . . (Spring Rice, v. II, p. 239)

In a letter, dated November 13, 1914, to Sir Arthur Nicolson, he says:

Bryan spoke to me about peace as he always does. He sighs for the Nobel Prize, and besides that he is a really convinced peaceman. He has just given me a sword beaten into a ploughshare six inches long to serve as a paperweight. It is adorned with quotations from Isaiah and himself. No one doubts his sincerity, but that is rather embarrassing for us at the present moment, because he is always at us with peace propositions. This time, he said he could not understand why we could not say what we were fighting for. The nation which continued war had as much responsibility as the country which began it. The United States was the one great Power which was outside the struggle, and it was their duty to do what they could to put an end to it. — I felt rather cross and said that the United States were signatories to the Hague Convention, which had been grossly violated again and again without one word from the principal neutral nation. They were now out of court. They had done nothing to prevent the crime, and now they must not prevent the punishment. — He said that all the Powers concerned had been disappointed in their ambitions. Germany had not taken Paris. France had not retaken Alsace, England had not cleared the seas of the German Navy. The last month had made no appreciable difference in the relative positions of the armies, and there was now no prospect of an issue satisfactory to any Power. Why should they not make peace now, if they had to make peace a year hence after another year's fruitless struggle. It would be far wiser if each said what it was fighting for and asked the United States to help them in arriving at a peaceful conclusion. . . . (Spring Rice, v. II, p. 240)

Sir Cecil's second settled conviction was that the President had set his heart upon preserving the United States and himself, as its representative, in a position of such equal relationship to all the parties as would make us an impartial mediator when the belligerents were ready to consider peace. In a letter to Lord Grey of December 11, 1914, he says, narrating the position of the Government of the United States on the subject of contraband:

But here comes in a point on which the United States Government lays great stress. The sale and export of contraband is legal. The United States must not take any measure in order to prevent the export of contraband, because this would be an unneutral act. But if the exporter for his own convenience wishes that a foreign government should know what is contained on

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

board the ship, there is no reason why such an arrangement should not be carried out. And this is now being done with success. . . .

If there is any chance of the Administration agreeing to such a measure as the prohibition of the sale of arms and ammunition, it will become necessary to point out that such unneutral action would disqualify the government from the office of an impartial mediator. And this impartial mediation is the most cherished ambition of the President, who rightly thinks that he would thereby do an imperishable service to humanity. I have no doubt that this idea, to which prominence is given in his message, is dominant in his mind, although he fully understands that until the proper moment has come his impartial mediation would be worse than the most active and belligerent participation in the present war. (Spring Rice, v. II, p. 247)

In a letter to Sir Valentine Chirol of November 27, 1914, after discussing the partisan political criticism to which an American administration is necessarily subjected, and particularly the effect of the well-organized German vote, he says:

. . . Wilson and his Cabinet are accused of being pro-English, with the result that they are disposed if anything to be pro-German. They certainly studiously avoid any action which could possibly be interpreted as partial to us or unfriendly to Germany. . . .

. . . But at the present moment the larger part of the American people are with us or rather against our enemies, not from our merits but owing to the demerits of the antagonist. Their deeds are mightier than their words. . . . (Spring Rice, v. II, p. 248–9)

That Sir Cecil was right in his judgment that it was President Wilson's most cherished ambition that he might do an "imperishable service to humanity" by acting as an impartial mediator is borne out by all the evidence we have on that subject. The significant part of the Spring Rice letters at the moment, however, is that in spite of their racy candor and indiscretion, in spite of their hasty judgments and suspicions, and in spite of the fact that many of these letters were written to those Americans least likely to take a charitable view of any act or word of President Wilson, nevertheless, from beginning to end, there is no suggestion that Sir Cecil regarded the Administration as unneutral. On the contrary, all of the suggestions point to a disposition on the part of the British Ambassador to use the known desire of the Administration to preserve the severest neutrality as the most influential argument in controversies where it would be possible on behalf of the Allies to claim that a proposed action by the United States might be a departure from that attitude.

The most active, energetic, and intelligent representative of the Central Powers in the United States was, of course, Am-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

bassador Bernstorff. For a variety of reasons, controversies between the United States and Germany were, from the beginning, of a more disturbing kind than those created by seizures of alleged contraband on American ships in European waters out of which our controversies with the Allies grew. From the very beginning, there was an accumulation of alleged violations of our laws on our own soil by persons acting either as German agents, or out of German sympathy. The German Ambassador said that these incidents were a constant source of annoyance and embarrassment to him because, he said, ". . . nothing could be imagined more certain to militate against my policy, as I have here described it, than these outrages and the popular indignation aroused by them." In 1920, Count Bernstorff published a narrative entitled "My Three Years in America." In that he gives his final judgment of the subject of the Administration's neutrality:

> . . . President Wilson, therefore, on the 18th of August, 1914, issued a proclamation to the American people which is of special interest because *it lays down in a definite form the policy to which he logically and unwaveringly adhered until the rupture.* (Italics mine)
>
> In this proclamation the following sentences occur: "Every man who really loves America will act and speak in the true spirit of neutrality, which is the spirit of impartiality and fairness and friendliness to all concerned." And further: "The people of the United States . . . may be divided in camps of hostile opinion. . . . Such divisions among us would be fatal to our peace of mind and might seriously stand in the way of the proper performance of our duty as the one great nation at peace, the one people holding itself ready to play a part of impartial mediation and speak the counsels of peace and accommodation, not as a partisan, but as a friend."
>
> The policy outlined in these quotations from Mr. Wilson's proclamation won the approval of an overwhelming majority of the American people, for even among the supporters of the Entente there was only a small minority who desired an active participation in the war by the United States.[12]

The view thus expressed by Count Bernstorff was clearly the view of the German Government throughout the whole period under consideration. The German Foreign Office had many sources of information, receiving reports directly from the Ambassador and from various members of his staff, and in addition to that from a large number of special agents in the United States charged with independent missions and responsibilities here and reporting directly to Berlin.

[12] "My Three Years in America," Count Bernstorff, Scribner's, 1920, p. 58–9. Hereinafter referred to as Bernstorff.

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

In 1919 the German National Constituent Assembly appointed a committee to inquire into the responsibility for the war. The Second Sub-Committee conducted extensive hearings and had before it, as witnesses, all of the principal officials of the Foreign Office and of the foreign service. Testifying before that committee, in the presence of Dr. Helfferich, Bethmann-Hollweg and the principal experts of the Foreign Office, Ambassador Bernstorff said:

> Everyone knows that, in forming a judgment on American matters, the President alone is not the only one to be taken into consideration, but public opinion must also be taken into consideration. An American President is not at all in the position of accomplishing anything in the face of public opinion. He can influence it, perhaps, and perhaps stay it, but he can not accomplish anything against it. In order to form a judgment concerning dealings of the United States, it is essential, first of all, to be absolutely certain as to the condition of public opinion. I should like to emphasize this point particularly, because, during the first period, when public opinion in the United States was not neutral, so far as we were concerned, but unfriendly, it was not possible for the government to accomplish certain things. So far as I can judge, generally speaking, the government maintained a neutral standpoint. If my recollection is correct, the legal division of the Foreign Office has always been of the opinion that, formally speaking, the American Government was neutral. (German Documents, v. II, p. 725)

The opinion thus publicly expressed was not challenged by any of the representatives of the Foreign Office. Some of the witnesses expressed a rather naïve disappointment that the United States did not use its power to force Germany's views and interests upon the Allies. Indeed, there seems to have been a feeling that the President missed a good many opportunities to be helpful, but there is no suggestion that he failed to be neutral.

The record of the official relations of the United States to the belligerent countries confirms the view of its actions taken by these authoritative representatives of the belligerent countries who were in this country devoting themselves to observing and criticising the Government's actions.

IV. 1914

The Declaration of London, dated February 26, 1909, had never been ratified by the President of the United States, although the Senate, in April 1912, advised its ratification. The chapters dealing with blockade in time of war, contraband of war, unneutral service, destruction of neutral prizes, enemy

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

character, convoy, resistance to search, and compensation, and comprising 71 articles, was a practical attempt to restate the generally recognized principles of international law. It had not been unconditionally accepted by Great Britain or Germany, but the American Administration recognized its importance and upon the outbreak of the war at once proposed to the belligerent Powers that it should be adopted as applicable to naval warfare during the European conflict. Under date of August 6, 1914, Secretary Bryan instructed Ambassador Page to inquire whether the British Government would be willing to make such an agreement, providing the governments with whom Great Britain is, or may be, at war also agree to such application. In that dispatch Mr. Bryan said: "You will further state that this Government believes that acceptance of these laws by the belligerents would prevent grave misunderstandings which may arise as to the relations between belligerent and neutral powers. It, therefore, earnestly hopes that this inquiry may receive favorable consideration."[13] On August 22, 1914, the British Foreign Office replied to Ambassador Page's inquiry that Great Britain had "decided to adopt generally the rules of the Declaration in question subject to certain modifications and additions which they judge indispensable to the efficient conduct of their naval operations" (Maritime Commerce, v. II, p. 195). On September 26, 1914, Mr. Lansing, as Acting Secretary of State, sent to Ambassador Page a comprehensive note reciting that the Governments at Berlin and Vienna had "replied that the Declaration of London would be observed by them upon condition of a like observance on the part of their adversaries" (Maritime Commerce, v. II, p. 198); but Mr. Lansing's note then proceeds to discuss the keen disappointment of the Government of the United States that Great Britain had refused to accept the Declaration of London without amendment and again urging its acceptance, pointing out that the Orders in Council, already issued by the British Government, were unacceptable modifications of the Declaration of London. In concluding his note Mr. Lansing said:

> It is a matter of grave concern to this Government that the particular conditions of this unfortunate war should be considered by His Britannic Majesty's Government to be such as to justify them in advancing doctrines and advocating practices which in the past aroused strong opposition on the part of the Gov-

[13] "Policy of the United States toward Maritime Commerce in War," Carlton Savage, v. II, 1914–1918, p. 185. Hereinafter referred to as Maritime Commerce.

PUBLIC LIBRARY
ILLINOIS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LIBRARY
ILLINOIS

ernment of the United States, and bitter feeling among the American people. This Government feels bound to express the fear, though it does so reluctantly, that the publicity, which must be given to the rules which His Majesty's Government announce that they intend to enforce, will awaken memories of controversies, which it is the earnest desire of the United States to forget or to pass over in silence. This Government in view of these considerations ventures to suggest in no unkindly spirit and with the sole purpose of preserving the mutual good will which now exists between the people of the United States and the people of Great Britain, that the British Government may find it possible to modify their intention before it has been put into practice, as its realization seems fraught with possible misunderstandings which the United States desires at all times to avoid, and especially at the present when the relations of the two countries are so cordial and when their friendship rests upon the secure foundation of the mutual esteem and common ideals of their respective peoples. (Maritime Commerce, v. II, p. 205)

An active correspondence was kept up between the State Department and Ambassador Page in an effort to induce the British Government to change its position on this subject; but on October 24 the State Department abandoned further efforts in that direction and instructed American diplomatic representatives in Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Russia and Belgium that its suggestion was withdrawn "on account of the unwillingness of some of the belligerents to accept the Declaration without modification, . . ." This instruction then proceeded to say:

. . . therefore this Government will insist that the rights and duties of the United States and its citizens in the present war be defined by the existing rules of international law and the treaties of the United States, irrespective of the provisions of the Declaration, and that this Government reserves to itself the right to enter a protest or demand in each case in which those rights and duties so defined are violated, or their free exercise interfered with, by the authorities of the belligerent governments. (Maritime Commerce, v. II, p. 221)

Ambassador Page had already cabled to the State Department the result of the conferences between himself and representatives of Spain, Holland, and all the Scandinavian States, comprising the principal neutrals. These conferences were for the purpose of exploring the possibility of the assertion of neutral rights in view of new lists of contraband and conditional contraband issued by Great Britain. The only agreement reached apparently was that neutrals "can do nothing but acquiesce and file protests and claims." (Maritime Commerce, v. II, p. 214)

There was thus a general recognition, from the very beginning, of the policy of protest. All the neutral countries followed the same course. This did not mean any abandonment by the neutrals

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of their rights, but rather was a recognition of the fact that every violation of a nation's right is not necessarily a *casus belli*. Whether or not force shall be used to vindicate any particular right at a particular time must always be determined by considerations of the importance of the right and the adequacy of reparation later, under less disturbed conditions. Our own diplomatic practice afforded many examples of situations in which palpable and destructive violations of our rights came at a time when it was not convenient to enforce them, as for instance in the case of privateers, fitted out in English ports during the Civil War. Our Ambassador, Charles Francis Adams, lodged circumstantial and detailed protests with the British Government. These later became the basis of arbitration proceedings, in the matter of the Alabama claims, in which the United States received an award compensating it for the destruction of its commerce by the ships which Great Britain, as a neutral, should have prevented from fitting out in her ports. Where the damage is a mere compensable injury to commerce, the question always is whether the national patience will suffice to permit a postponement of redress.

The same kind of question arises with increasing frequency in the modern world where the domestic economy of nations is adjusted to depend, to some degree, upon fairly constant trade with neighboring countries. When one of these neighboring countries undergoes internal disturbance, its trade relations are broken. These disturbances sometimes last a long period of years and produce violence and disorder which overlap boundaries. No country would deny the right of revolution to the people of another country, yet each country must answer for itself, and in the light of surrounding conditions, the question as to how long a peaceful nation shall endure a disturbance of its own domestic situation, with infractions of the peace of its frontier, because one of its neighbors is unable to restore and maintain order among its own people. Our own last contact with the problem in this form came when Mexico began its series of revolutions after the overthrow of Diaz. Over a long period of years the disturbance of our economy and the violations of our rights created great agitation among us in favor of an assertion of power to compel peace, but under Presidents Taft and Wilson we inaugurated the policy of "watchful waiting" and avoided war. The wisdom of this course later became manifest when we were involved in a

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

RARY

much more serious war and Mexico began to find readjustment and peace for herself.

Two sorts of trouble sprang up at once. The British Government began to revise the list of contraband and conditional contraband to meet what is called the conditions of modern war, and business men in the United States began at once to flood the State Department with inquiries as to their rights and the extent to which the Government would assure them protection. Throughout the remainder of the year, controversies between the State Department and the British Government were constant and the expression of views by the United States was positive, definite, and unyielding. At the same time the State Department began a series of statements of America's claims of right to boards of trade and exporting companies, and on August 15, 1914, issued a Public Circular on neutrality dealing with the whole subject of American rights and German and English declarations on contraband over the signature of Cone Johnson, Solicitor of the State Department.[14]

An examination of the English declarations on contraband discloses that it no longer was restricted to things traditionally regarded as munitions of war but included, as conditional contraband, foodstuffs, clothing, precious metals, fuels, and a large number of other categories normally regarded as necessary for the support of civil populations.

ARY

v. 1915

The year 1915 reproduced, under more modern conditions, the struggle between Napoleon and Great Britain in which each set at naught the established rules and practices of international law and disregarded the rights of neutrals. The Berlin and Milan Decrees on the one side, and the British Orders in Council on the other, showed the extent to which desperate and determined nations will go. History, both before and since, has demonstrated that belligerents will respect neutral rights only so far and so long as they do not interfere with their chances of success in the war, and that whenever the danger of losing the war becomes sufficiently great, the right of the neutral will be sacrificed even to the point of adding an ally to the enemy. In like fashion, this experience demonstrates that neutral nations can rely upon their neutral rights only to the extent that they have the power and

[14] "Foreign Relations," 1914, Supplement, p. 274. Hereinafter referred to as F. R. S., 1914.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

disposition to enforce them when they become an inconvenience to one or the other of the belligerents.

The year opened with an attempt to live under the "working arrangement" which Ambassador Page had effected a month before. Meantime we conducted an active correspondence with the British Government through the American Ambassador in London attempting to limit extensions of the list of contraband and lodging protests against all actions of the British Navy in violation of the rights claimed by America as a neutral.

In February the German Government established a governmental control of the nation's food supply, and the British Government retaliated by replying that subsequent shipments of foodstuffs must be regarded as destined for the German Government. This led to a suggestion that Germany should agree that imported foodstuffs should not be diverted to its armed force; that Great Britain should in return not place food in the absolute contraband list; and that both countries should agree that they would not use submarines to attack merchant vessels, sow floating mines on the high seas or fixed mines, except for harbor defensive purposes, and that they should require their respective merchant vessels not to use neutral flags.[15] This suggestion was not accepted by the British, but in the German Foreign Office it was regarded as a helpful suggestion aimed at the solution of the whole problem and as an evidence of the State Department's wisdom and fairness.

Meantime, Great Britain had designated the waters between Scotland and Norway as a war area and Germany retaliated on February 4, 1915, by declaring that all the waters surrounding Great Britain and Ireland were a war area in which neutral ships might become victims of torpedoes aimed at enemy ships. As this marked the entry of the submarine into this tangle of controversies about neutral rights, it may be of interest to note that Secretary Bryan made it the occasion of two important communications — one to Ambassador Page deploring the use of the American flag as a *ruse de guerre* while in British waters, a practice which, in view of the German war zone declaration, imperiled the safety of all neutral ships approaching Great Britain; and a second communication to the German Government pointing out the danger of the course determined upon and the grave consequences likely to follow the sacrifice of American lives

[15] "Foreign Relations," 1915, Supplement, p. 119. Hereinafter referred to as F. R. S., 1915.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

involved. The following paragraphs from the message to Ambassador Gerard are highly significant:

The Government of the United States views those possibilities with such grave concern that it feels it to be its privilege, and indeed its duty in the circumstances, to request the Imperial German Government to consider before action is taken the critical situation in respect of the relations between this country and Germany which might arise were the German naval forces, in carrying out the policy foreshadowed in the Admiralty's proclamation, to destroy any merchant vessel of the United States or cause the death of American citizens.

It is of course not necessary to remind the German Government that the sole right of a belligerent in dealing with neutral vessels on the high seas is limited to visit and search, unless a blockade is proclaimed and effectively maintained, which this Government does not understand to be proposed in this case. To declare or exercise a right to attack and destroy any vessel entering a prescribed area of the high seas without first certainly determining its belligerent nationality and the contraband character of its cargo would be an act so unprecedented in naval warfare that this Government is reluctant to believe that the Imperial Government of Germany in this case contemplates it as possible. The suspicion that enemy ships are using neutral flags improperly can create no just presumption that all ships traversing a prescribed area are subject to the same suspicion. It is to determine exactly such questions that this Government understands the right of visit and search to have been recognized.

This Government has carefully noted the explanatory statement issued by the Imperial German Government at the same time with the proclamation of the German Admiralty, and takes this occasion to remind the Imperial German Government very respectfully that the Government of the United States is open to none of the criticisms for unneutral action to which the German Government believe the governments of certain other neutral nations have laid themselves open; that the Government of the United States has not consented to or acquiesced in any measures which may have been taken by the other belligerent nations in the present war which operate to restrain neutral trade, but has, on the contrary, taken in all such matters a position which warrants it in holding those governments responsible in the proper way for any untoward effects upon American shipping which the accepted principles of international law do not justify; and that it, therefore, regards itself as free in the present instance to take with a clear conscience and upon accepted principles the position indicated in this note.

If the commanders of German vessels of war should act upon the presumption that the flag of the United States was not being used in good faith and should destroy on the high seas an American vessel or the lives of American citizens, it would be difficult for the Government of the United States to view the act in any other light than as an indefensible violation of neutral rights which it would be very hard indeed to reconcile with the friendly relations now so happily subsisting between the two Governments.

If such a deplorable situation should arise, the Imperial German Government can readily appreciate that the Government of the United States would be con-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

strained to hold the Imperial German Government to a strict accountability for such acts of their naval authorities and to take any steps it might be necessary to take to safeguard American lives and property and to secure to American citizens the full enjoyment of their acknowledged rights on the high seas. (F.R.S., 1915, p. 98–9)

From the outset, the Government insisted upon a sharp distinction between damages to property and the sacrifice of life, and thus, three months before the sinking of the *Lusitania*, the State Department had warned the German Government that it would be held to "a strict accountability" for the acts of its naval commanders and that the American Government reserved the right to take any steps necessary to safeguard American lives.

From this time forward, the controversies between the United States and the British Government, about delays and damages to neutral cargoes, continued with unabated insistence by the Washington Government, but whenever this correspondence approached a crisis, a German submarine attack would intervene involving the loss of American lives and diverting American official attention and indignation to the German Government.[16] The tension in the English correspondence would consequently relax, not because of any abatement of vigor in the assertion of our rights but because both official and unofficial opinion in the United States had something very much more urgent, dramatic, and important about which to concern itself.

After the war zone declaration of February 4, events in the submarine controversy moved rapidly to a tragic climax. On March 28, the British ship *Falaba* was torpedoed and sunk and an American, Leon C. Thrasher, lost his life. Secretary Bryan, Mr. Lansing, then Counsellor of the State Department, and the President debated the proper course of action. Mr. Bryan took the view that Americans who entered the war zone did so at their own risk. Mr. Lansing's view is shown by his letter of April 7 to the Secretary which, in addition to pointing out the only alternatives to be considered, enumerated the multiplying difficulties which were beginning to beset American-German relations:

The great importance of the Thrasher case, to my mind, lies in the fact that a course of action must be adopted, which can be consistently applied to similar cases, if they should arise in the future. For example, suppose another British vessel should be sunk in the same way as the *Falaba* and ten Americans on board the vessel should be drowned. What would be done in that case? Or suppose a *neutral* vessel with Americans on board should be torpedoed and the

[16] "The World Crisis," Winston Churchill, 1923, v. II, p. 306.

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

Americans drowned. What then would be done? It seems to me that, for the sake of the future, we cannot afford to allow expediency or avoidance of the issue to control our action in the Thrasher case.

Either one of two courses seems to be open:

1. To warn Americans generally to keep out of the German war zone, if on board a merchant vessel, which is not of American nationality.

2. To hold Germany to a strict accountability for every American life lost by submarine attack on the high seas.

The adoption of the first course amounts to an admission of the legality of establishing a war zone, such as Germany has done, or at least to an admission that the illegality is open to question.

The adoption of the second course would be more nearly in accord with our position denying the legality of the war zone and holding Germany responsible for indiscriminate attack within that area of the high seas.

Expediency in the particular case of Thrasher would favor the adoption of a policy resulting in the first course suggested, but the dignity of the Government and its duty toward its citizens appears to demand a policy in harmony with the second course.

The difficulty with the second course is chiefly that our relations with the German Government are becoming increasingly strained, as shown by the questions pending, namely:

1. The Thrasher case. 2. The *Pisa* case. 3. The *Odenwald* case. 4. The Pinchot affair. 5. The *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* case. 6. The arrest of the German Consul at Seattle. 7. The withdrawal of our military observers from Germany. 8. The demand for an embargo on arms and ammunition.

If any other course can be found, which will relieve the present tension in our relations, and at the same time preserve American rights, so that in the future this Government will not be charged with indifference to the death of Americans, or with a failure to do its duty in supporting its rights, I would strongly favor such a course. I have given careful thought to the subject, but am unable to offer any suggestion which will meet these conditions. (Maritime Commerce, v. II, p. 296–7)

On April 22, in a letter to Secretary Bryan, the President restated the views, from which he never departed, as follows:

Although I have been silent for a long time about the case, I have had it much in my mind, as I have no doubt you have, to work out some practicable course of action with regard to the death of Thrasher; and I have the following to suggest as the outline of a note to the German Government:

(1) State the circumstances, as we have officially received them.

(2) We take it for granted that Germany has had no idea of changing the rules (or, rather, the essential principles) of international law with regard to the safety of non-combatants and of the citizens of neutral countries at sea, however radical the present change in practical conditions of warfare; and that she will, in accordance with her usual frankness in such matters, acknowledge her responsibility in the present instance.

(3) Raise in a very earnest, though of course entirely friendly, way the whole question of the use of submarines against merchant vessels, calling at-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tention circumstantially to the impossibility of observing the safeguards and precautions so long and so clearly recognized as imperative in such matters: the duty of visit and search; the duty, if the vessel proves to belong to an enemy and cannot be put in charge of a prize crew, to secure the safety of the lives of those on board; etc.

(4) On these grounds enter a very moderately worded but none the less solemn and emphatic protest against the whole thing, as contrary to laws based, not on mere interest or convenience, but on humanity, fair play, and a necessary respect for the rights of neutrals.

My idea, as you will see, is to put the whole note on very high grounds, — not on the loss of this single man's life, but on the interests of mankind which are involved and which Germany has always stood for; on the manifest impropriety of a single nation's essaying to alter the understandings of nations; and as all arising out of her mistake in employing an instrument against her enemy's commerce which it is impossible to employ in that use in accordance with any rules that the world is likely to be willing to accept. (Maritime Commerce, v. II, p. 299–300)

While this discussion proceeded, an aërial attack was made on the American steamship *Cushing*, the American steamship *Gulflight* was torpedoed and sunk with a loss of three American lives, and in the New York newspapers of May 1, 1915, the German Embassy inserted an advertisement warning prospective travellers against entering the war zone on ships of Great Britain or any of her allies:

Travellers intending to embark on the Atlantic voyage are reminded that a state of war exists between Germany and her allies and Great Britain and her allies; that the zone of war includes the waters adjacent to the British Isles; that in accordance with formal notice given by the Imperial German Government, vessels flying the flag of Great Britain or any of her allies, are liable to destruction in those waters and that travellers sailing in the war zone on ships of Great Britain or her allies do so at their own risk.[17]

Then came the sinking of the *Lusitania!* She had sailed from New York on May 1, the date the above warning appeared in the newspapers. On May 7 as she zigzagged homeward off the coast of Ireland, opposite Old Head of Kinsale lighthouse she was struck by a single torpedo and sank in eighteen minutes. Of the 1,959 persons aboard, 1,257 passengers and 702 crew, 1,195 were lost. Of the 159 Americans, 124 were lost, and of the 129 children, 94 were lost. Of the children 39 were babies and 35 of them drowned. Among the Americans lost were Elbert Hubbard and his wife, Charles Frohman, Alfred Gwynne Vanderbilt, and

[17] "Woodrow Wilson, Life and Letters: Neutrality, 1914–1915," Ray Stannard Baker, 1935, p. 322.

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

others who were widely known and whose loss gave an intimate quality to the tragedy.

The shock of this disaster literally overwhelmed America and public opinion never recovered from it. Then in truth began a process of "tramping out the vintage, Where the grapes of wrath are stored" which never let up. Claims were made that the *Lusitania* was armed and carried ammunition for the Allies. The circumstantial report of the Collector of the Port of New York proved conclusively that the *Lusitania* carried no armament, offensive or defensive. It equally proved, however, that a very substantial part of her cargo consisted of small arms ammunition for the Allies, and the attempt was made to justify the action of the submarine commander as an effort to prevent ammunition from reaching enemy hands. However, the export of arms and ammunition by a neutral, to any belligerent in a position to receive them, was legitimate under the rules of war as they then stood, and the presence of such contraband merely subjected the carrying vessel to the rules of cruiser warfare and did not justify its sinking without warning and without affording an opportunity to passengers to escape. Consequently the nature of the cargo did not weigh heavily in the popular judgment upon the sinking of the vessel. The incident was officially refrigerated in a succession of diplomatic notes, and remained unsettled when we entered the war, but it continued white hot in the public memory, exacerbated by ill-advised attempts at justification by German representatives in America and reports of rejoicing in Germany which treated the sinking of an unarmed ship full of non-combatants and children as a victory. Pulpit and press joined in horrified denunciation of the theory of frightfulness which made war on non-combatants, and leaders of public opinion like ex-President Roosevelt called for war as the only answer to a nation gone savage with all the perverted instrumentalities of science in its hands.

As the submarine finally won the war for the Allies by deliberately bringing America into the war, it is important to trace its history from the sinking of the *Lusitania* until April 1917 when we entered the conflict.[18]

[18] A full and vivid account of the effect of the sinking of the *Lusitania* on public opinion in America is given in "Road to War," by Walter Millis, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1935. Upon this subject, as indeed upon all subjects connected with the World War, or any other war, Mr. Millis can be trusted for accuracy in matters of fact. In interpretations of the facts, however, I feel sure that Mr. Millis is a man from Mars. His mind is brilliant and honest and the severe sincerity of his approach to the problem of war is beyond question, but he has disciplined his mind to be emotion-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

President Wilson in the face of this popular storm remained silent. It has sometimes been said that he was inaccessible to advice. This statement was completely disproved for me by my five years' intimate association with him, but it is true to say that his mind positively refused to be stampeded. He had the patience of a scholar coupled with the grimness of a covenanter, and while all the rest of the people of the United States were expressing their emotions according to their temperaments, he held his in leash, determined to know all the facts first and then to act. It must constantly be remembered that from the very beginning of the war in Europe, President Wilson held before himself as an ideal, toward the accomplishment of which almost every sacrifice must be made, a reconstructed and better world as the result of the suffering entailed by the war, and that he saw no prospect for such a better world unless it should be under the leadership of the United States as the disinterested and common friend of all the exhausted belligerents. There were limits beyond which that patience could not go even for the attainment of that ideal. Nevertheless he remained secluded and self-controlled for several days. On a visit to Philadelphia to address a gathering of newly naturalized citizens three days after the catastrophe, he first broke his silence. Not referring directly to the *Lusitania*, he again pled for the special mission which he conceived to have been providentially set aside for America, and in the course of that address he said, "The example of America must be a special example. The example of America must be the example not merely of peace because it will not fight, but of peace because peace is the healing and elevating influence of the world and strife is not." (New Democracy, v. I, p. 321) The President's critics and a frenzied public opinion took out of that speech a single phrase,

less and hence both as a matter of reason and a matter of taste he is mystified by emotional manifestations and seeks, sometimes very far afield, influences which will account for actions which were in fact produced by emotions which he declines to indulge and cannot believe that anybody ever really did indulge. Accepting the philosophy of that school of international lawyers which regards all humanitarian and ethical considerations as indeterminate and therefore irrelevant in the rough business of clashing international interests, Mr. Millis discards the obvious as unreasonable and embraces the unreasonable because it is not obvious. Such writing is an admirable discipline in the cool aftermath, but historians will have no trouble in showing that Americans as a people have persistently acted, or wanted to act, in response to just the humanitarian and ethical considerations which this school disregards. For the whole century and a half of our existence as a nation, we have meddled with and denounced and sometimes fought other people just because we were outraged by their treatment of the weak and helpless classes of their own populations. That our wars for "righteous causes" have been relatively few has perhaps been chiefly due to the physical remoteness of the oppressions which have aroused us. Surely if Armenia were as near us as Cuba, we would have fought Turkey as we did Spain.

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LIBRARY
ILLINOIS

"there is such a thing as a man being too proud to fight," as being a declaration on the President's part that even such a violation of American rights as was involved in the sinking of the *Lusitania* would not take America into the war. But those who examine the President's policy, as officially reflected in the documents, see quite clearly that the sentence belongs in its context and indicates no departure from the determination expressed in the "strict accountability" note with which the State Department had warned Germany of the inevitable consequences of the establishment of the war zone in British waters.

On May 13, 1915, the first *Lusitania* note signed by Secretary Bryan was telegraphed to Ambassador Gerard in Berlin. It adheres to the policy constantly announced and is a firm recital both of the sense of wrong and of the fixed policy of the United States in dealing with the submarine:

> In view of recent acts of the German authorities in violation of American rights on the high seas which culminated in the torpedoing and sinking of the British steamship *Lusitania* on May 7, 1915, by which over 100 American citizens lost their lives, it is clearly wise and desirable that the Government of the United States and the Imperial German Government should come to a clear and full understanding as to the grave situation which has resulted.
>
> The sinking of the British passenger steamer *Falaba* by a German submarine on March 28, through which Leon C. Thrasher, an American citizen was drowned; the attack on April 28 on the American vessel *Cushing* by a German aëroplane; the torpedoing on May 1 of the American vessel *Gulflight* by a German submarine, as a result of which two or more American citizens met their death; and finally, the torpedoing and sinking of the steamship *Lusitania*, constitute a series of events which the Government of the United States has observed with growing concern, distress, and amazement.
>
> Recalling the humane and enlightened attitude hitherto assumed by the Imperial German Government in matters of international right, and particularly with regard to the freedom of the seas; having learned to recognize the German views and the German influence in the field of international obligation as always engaged upon the side of justice and humanity; and having understood the instructions of the Imperial German Government to its naval commanders to be upon the same plane of humane action prescribed by the naval codes of other nations, the Government of the United States was loath to believe — it cannot now bring itself to believe — that these acts, so absolutely contrary to the rules, the practices, and the spirit of modern warfare, could have the countenance or sanction of that great Government. It feels it to be its duty, therefore, to address the Imperial German Government concerning them with the utmost frankness and in the earnest hope that it is not mistaken in expecting action on the part of the Imperial German Government which will correct the unfortunate impressions which have been created, and vindicate

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

once more the position of that Government with regard to the sacred freedom of the seas.

The Government of the United States has been apprised that the Imperial German Government considered themselves to be obliged by the extraordinary circumstances of the present war and the measures adopted by their adversaries in seeking to cut Germany off from all commerce, to adopt methods of retaliation which go much beyond the ordinary methods of warfare at sea, in the proclamation of a war zone from which they have warned neutral ships to keep away. This Government has already taken occasion to inform the Imperial German Government that it cannot admit the adoption of such measures or such a warning of danger to operate as in any degree an abbreviation of the rights of American ship masters or of American citizens bound on lawful errands as passengers on merchant ships of belligerent nationality; and that it must hold the Imperial German Government to a strict accountability for any infringement of those rights, intentional or incidental. It does not understand the Imperial German Government to question those rights. It assumes, on the contrary, that the Imperial Government accept, as of course, the rule that the lives of non-combatants, whether they be of neutral citizenship or citizens of one of the nations at war, cannot lawfully or rightfully be put in jeopardy by the capture or destruction of an unarmed merchantman, and recognize also, as all other nations do, the obligation to take the usual precaution of visit and search to ascertain whether a suspected merchantman is in fact of belligerent nationality or is in fact carrying contraband of war under a neutral flag.

The Government of the United States, therefore, desires to call the attention of the Imperial German Government with the utmost earnestness to the fact that the objection to their present method of attack against the trade of their enemies lies in the practical impossibility of employing submarines in the destruction of commerce without disregarding those rules of fairness, reason, justice, and humanity, which all modern opinion regards as imperative. It is practically impossible for the officers of a submarine to visit a merchantman at sea and examine her papers and cargo. It is practically impossible for them to make a prize of her; and, if they cannot put a prize crew on board of her, they cannot sink her without leaving her crew and all on board of her to the mercy of the sea in her small boats. These facts it is understood the Imperial German Government frankly admit. We are informed that in the instances of which we have spoken, time enough for even that poor measure of safety was not given, and in at least two of the cases cited, not so much as a warning was received. Manifestly submarines cannot be used against merchantmen, as the last few weeks have shown, without an inevitable violation of many sacred principles of justice and humanity.

American citizens act within their indisputable rights in taking their ships and in traveling wherever their legitimate business calls them upon the high seas, and exercise those rights in what should be the well-justified confidence that their lives will not be endangered by acts done in clear violation of universally acknowledged international obligations, and certainly in the confidence that their own Government will sustain them in the exercise of their rights.

There was recently published in the newspapers of the United States, I re-

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

gret to inform the Imperial German Government, a formal warning, purporting to come from the Imperial German Embassy at Washington, addressed to the people of the United States, and stating, in effect, that any citizen of the United States who exercised his right of free travel upon the seas would do so at his peril if his journey should take him within the zone of waters within which the Imperial German Navy was using submarines against the commerce of Great Britain and France, notwithstanding the respectful but very earnest protest of his Government, the Government of the United States. I do not refer to this for the purpose of calling the attention of the Imperial German Government at this time to the surprising irregularity of a communication from the Imperial German Embassy at Washington addressed to the people of the United States through the newspapers, but only for the purpose of pointing out that no warning that an unlawful and inhumane act will be committed can possibly be accepted as an excuse or palliation for that act or as an abatement of the responsibility for its commission.

Long acquainted as this Government has been with the character of the Imperial German Government and with the high principles of equity by which they have in the past been actuated and guided, the Government of the United States cannot believe that the commanders of the vessels which committed these acts of lawlessness did so except under a misapprehension of the orders issued by the Imperial German naval authorities. It takes it for granted that, at least within the practical possibilities of every such case, the commanders even of submarines were expected to do nothing that would involve the lives of non-combatants or the safety of neutral ships, even at the cost of failing of their object of capture or destruction. It confidently expects, therefore, that the Imperial German Government will disavow the acts of which the Government of the United States complains, that they will make reparation so far as reparation is possible for injuries which are without measure, and that they will take immediate steps to prevent the recurrence of anything so obviously subversive of the principles of warfare for which the Imperial German Government have in the past so wisely and so firmly contended.

The Government and the people of the United States look to the Imperial German Government for just, prompt, and enlightened action in this vital matter with the greater confidence because the United States and Germany are bound together not only by special ties of friendship but also by the explicit stipulations of the treaty of 1828 between the United States and the Kingdom of Prussia.

Expressions of regret and offers of reparation in case of the destruction of neutral ships sunk by mistake, while they may satisfy international obligations, if no loss of life results, cannot justify or excuse a practice, the natural and necessary effect of which is to subject neutral nations and neutral persons to new and immeasurable risks.

The Imperial German Government will not expect the Government of the United States to omit any word or any act necessary to the performance of its sacred duty of maintaining the rights of the United States and its citizens and of safeguarding their free exercise and enjoyment. (F.R.S., 1915, p. 393–6)

In the foregoing I have italicized the last two paragraphs which must be emphasized in our recollection as we pursue the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

subsequent events. The German reply to the first *Lusitania* note dated May 28, reached the United States on May 31. The second American note sent on June 9 was signed by Mr. Lansing, Mr. Bryan having resigned because he was unable to sign a note which he felt headed the country toward participation in the war. The last two paragraphs of the note of June 9 are as follows:

The Government of the United States therefore very earnestly and very solemnly renews the representations of its note transmitted to the Imperial German Government on the 15th of May, and relies in these representations upon the principles of humanity, the universally recognized understandings of international law, and the ancient friendship of the German nation.

The Government of the United States cannot admit that the proclamation of a war zone from which neutral ships have been warned to keep away may be made to operate as in any degree an abbreviation of the rights either of American shipmasters or of American citizens bound on lawful errands as passengers on merchant ships of belligerent nationality. It does not understand the Imperial German Government to question those rights. It understands it, also, to accept as established beyond question the principle that the lives of non-combatants cannot lawfully or rightfully be put in jeopardy by the capture or destruction of an unresisting merchantman, and to recognize the obligation to take sufficient precaution to ascertain whether a suspected merchantman is in fact of belligerent nationality or is in fact carrying contraband of war under a neutral flag. The Government of the United States therefore deems it reasonable to expect that the Imperial German Government will adopt the measures necessary to put these principles into practice in respect of the safeguarding of American lives and American ships, and asks for assurances that this will be done. (F.R.S., 1915, p. 438)

On July 8 Germany replied to the second American note, and the third American note was cabled to Germany by Secretary Lansing on July 21, 1915. It is enough to say of this correspondence that while it proceeded with the utmost dignity and restraint of expression, it relentlessly held the American view that the loss of American lives by submarine action, under the circumstances, would not only be in violation of rights which America declined to surrender, but would necessarily be regarded as "deliberately unfriendly."

On August 19, 1915, the British steamer *Arabic* was sunk and brought the United States and Germany to the brink of war. Ambassador Bernstorff applied himself with feverish activity to the problem and by October 5 was able to report to our State Department that the German Government had yielded. Instructions were reported to have been given submarine commanders not to sink merchant vessels without complying practically with the rules of cruiser warfare.

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PUBLIC LIBRARY
ILLINOIS

As will be later shown, President Wilson's real preoccupation throughout this whole period was his interest in the restoration of peace and the establishment of a world system in which peace would be possible. All of his actions are, therefore, to be read with that thought in mind. The German view of the American attitude toward the submarine controversy is thus described by Count Bernstorff:

> After the first danger of war on account of the *Lusitania* and the second scare on account of the *Arabic* had passed over, the American Government believed that it could begin to work out its program. It sent the first note to England, which, according to my recollection, bore the Washington date of the 18th of October and the London date of the 5th of November, in the terms of which the English blockade was denounced as illegal and indefensible. Soon after the sending of this note, negotiations were again taken up in Washington concerning the final settlement of the *Lusitania* question, which for the third time brought us to the verge of war, because the United States demanded that we should recognize the fact that the sinking of the *Lusitania* was illegal. This word "illegal" was unconditionally rejected on our part. We almost went to war again over this word. But finally Wilson gave in on this matter, and stated that without this it would be sufficient if we should state that, while reprisals were proper (for it was as such that the sinking of the *Lusitania* was characterized), at the same time neutrals should not suffer as the result thereof, and that recourse to reprisals was only justifiable if neutrals were not injured as the result thereof. This arrangement had just been concluded, and Secretary of State Lansing and I were just about to exchange the requisite documents, when the intensive U-boat war was declared. As the result, nothing came of this settlement of the *Lusitania* question. So it became absolutely impossible to further Wilson's greater plans to any extent.
>
> The Chairman: The intensive U-boat war is, of course, not the ruthless U-boat war?
>
> Witness Count v. Bernstorff: No, the intensive U-boat war was an intermediate phase whereby it was declared over here that armed merchant ships should be attacked without warning, but only armed ships. If they were armed, the principles of the unrestricted U-boat war were to be observed.
>
> Shortly thereafter occurred the torpedoing of the *Sussex*, and as the result of this occurrence a definite agreement was entered into by both governments, the result of which was that in the future the U-boat war should be conducted according to the principles of war on commerce. (German Documents, v. I, p. 231–2)

The *Sussex* incident to which Bernstorff refers arose from the sinking of the *Sussex*, an unarmed French steamer which was torpedoed on March 24, 1916, while crossing the English Channel. This reopened the whole subject. An immediate effort was made to determine whether or not the vessel had been torpedoed or had struck a mine. Again the two countries were brought face to

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

face with war, and on April 18 Secretary Lansing dispatched to our Ambassador in Germany a comprehensive note restating the entire case historically and practically issuing an ultimatum to the German Government. The following paragraphs from that note are especially significant:

(2) Information now in the possession of the Government of the United States fully establishes the facts in the case of the *Sussex*. . . . On the 24th of March 1916, at about 2:50 o'clock in the afternoon, the unarmed steamer *Sussex*, with 325 or more passengers on board, among whom were a number of American citizens, was torpedoed while crossing from Folkestone to Dieppe. The *Sussex* had never been armed; was a vessel known to be habitually used only for the conveyance of passengers across the English Channel; and was not following the route taken by troopships or supply ships. About 80 of her passengers, non-combatants of all ages and sexes, including citizens of the United States, were killed or injured.

(4) The Government of the United States, after having given careful consideration to the note of the Imperial Government of the 10th of April, regrets to state that the impression made upon it by the statements and proposals contained in that note is that the Imperial Government has failed to appreciate the gravity of the situation which has resulted, not alone from the attack on the *Sussex*, but from the whole method and character of submarine warfare as disclosed by the unrestrained practice of the commanders of German undersea craft during the past twelvemonth and more in the indiscriminate destruction of merchant vessels of all sorts, nationalities, and destinations. If the sinking of the *Sussex* had been an isolated case, the Government of the United States might find it possible to hope that the officer who was responsible for that act had wilfully violated his orders or had been criminally negligent in taking none of the precautions they prescribed, and that the ends of justice might be satisfied by imposing upon him an adequate punishment, coupled with a formal disavowal of the act and payment of a suitable indemnity by the Imperial Government. But, though the attack upon the *Sussex* was manifestly indefensible and caused a loss of life so tragical as to make it stand forth as one of the most terrible examples of the inhumanity of submarine warfare as the commanders of German vessels are conducting it, it unhappliy does not stand alone.

(5) On the contrary, the Government of the United States is forced by recent events to conclude that it is only one instance, even though one of the most extreme and most distressing instances, of the deliberate method and spirit of indiscriminate destruction of merchant vessels of all sorts, nationalities, and destinations which have become more and more unmistakable as the activity of German undersea vessels of war has in recent months been quickened and extended.

(10) The Government of the United States has been very patient. At every stage of this distressing experience of tragedy after tragedy it has sought to be governed by the most thoughtful consideration of the extraordinary circumstances of an unprecedented war and to be guided by sentiments of very genuine friendship for the people and Government of Germany. It has accepted the successive explanations and assurances of the Imperial Government as, of

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

course, given in entire sincerity and good faith, and has hoped, even against hope, that it would prove to be possible for the Imperial Government so to order and control the acts of its naval commanders as to square its policy with the recognized principles of humanity as embodied in the law of nations. It has made every allowance for unprecedented conditions and has been willing to wait until the facts became unmistakable and were susceptible of only one interpretation.

(11) It now owes it to a just regard for its own rights to say to the Imperial Government that that time has come. It has become painfully evident to it that the position which it took at the very outset is inevitable, namely, the use of submarines for the destruction of an enemy's commerce is, of necessity, because of the very character of the vessels employed and the very methods of attack which their employment of course involves, utterly incompatible with the principles of humanity, the long-established and incontrovertible rights of neutrals, and the sacred immunities of non-combatants.

(12) If it is still the purpose of the Imperial Government to prosecute relentless and indiscriminate warfare against vessels of commerce by the use of submarines without regard to what the Government of the United States must consider the sacred and indisputable rules of international law and the universally recognized dictates of humanity, the Government of the United States is at last forced to the conclusion that there is but one course it can pursue. Unless the Imperial Government should now immediately declare and effect an abandonment of its present methods of submarine warfare against passenger and freight-carrying vessels, the Government of the United States can have no choice but to sever diplomatic relations with the German Empire altogether. This action the Government of the United States contemplates with the greatest reluctance but feels constrained to take in behalf of humanity and the rights of neutral nations.[19]

Omitting intervening conversations and notes, it is sufficient to say that on May 4, 1916, the Secretary of State in Washington received the German reply to our note of April 18 definitely promising on behalf of the German Government that merchant vessels both "within and without the area declared as naval war zone, shall not be sunk without warning and without saving human lives unless these ships attempt to escape or offer resistance." (F.R.S., 1916, p. 259)

VI. 1916

The year 1916 thus opened with the submarine question brought to a standstill. It had been the only threatening question in German-American relations, although Count von Bernstorff's statement to the Second Sub-Committee on October 22, 1919, reminds us not to forget that throughout the whole period of our

[19] "Foreign Relations," 1916, Supplement, p. 232–4. Hereinafter referred to as F.R.S. 1916.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

neutrality the Belgian question was a dominant one in American public opinion. He said:

> Throughout the entire war, the Belgian question was the one which interested Americans most and which was most effective in working up American public opinion against us. Up to the time of the *Lusitania*, there was absolutely nothing else in the entire mass of anti-German propaganda in America, except what bore upon Belgium. (German Documents, v. I, p. 253–4)

In the same connection, Count von Bernstorff refers to "so-called German conspiracies in the United States" as incidents which prejudicially affected his diplomatic negotiations and his efforts to quiet the growth of sentiment hostile to Germany.

It is thus clear that from May 4, 1916, German-American relations continued to improve. They were adversely affected by the irritation arising from the "conspiracies" referred to by Bernstorff and American opinion was aroused by the so-called "deportations" from Belgium which created a distinctly unfavorable impression here and delayed the initiation of peace proposals by President Wilson. It is not too much to say, however, that from May 1916 until the declaration of the resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare, there was nothing in German-American relations which promised serious trouble, and we shall see that this improving situation was not only recognized by Germany but eagerly acted upon by Germany in efforts made by her Government to initiate peace proposals through President Wilson.

The case was far otherwise throughout this year with the relations between the United States and Great Britain. In October 1915 Secretary Lansing had addressed to the British Government a long and carefully argued résumé of all the controversies between the two governments growing out of the actions of Great Britain infringing upon our trading rights as a neutral. No international lawyer could have written a more intelligent or scholarly review of the accepted principles of international law. No responsible American official could have stated with more firmness or finality the intention of the United States not to waive its rights or concede any invasion of them by the actions of Great Britain held to be illegal and unjustifiable. The last four paragraphs of that note summarize both its complaints and the spirit of its protest:

> (33) I believe it has been conclusively shown that the methods sought to be employed by Great Britain to obtain and use evidence of enemy destination of

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

cargoes bound for neutral ports, and to impose a contraband character upon such cargoes, are without justification; that the blockade, upon which such methods are partly founded, is ineffective, illegal, and indefensible; that the judicial procedure offered as a means of reparation for an international injury is inherently defective for the purpose; and that in many cases jurisdiction is asserted in violation of the law of nations. The United States, therefore, cannot submit to the curtailment of its neutral rights by these measures, which are admittedly retaliatory, and therefore illegal, in conception and in nature, and intended to punish the enemies of Great Britain for alleged illegalities on their part. The United States might not be in a position to object to them if its interests and the interests of all neutrals were unaffected by them, but, being affected, it cannot with complacence suffer further subordination of its rights and interests to the plea that the exceptional geographic position of the enemies of Great Britain require or justify oppressive and illegal practices.

(34) The Government of the United States desires, therefore, to impress most earnestly upon His Majesty's Government that it must insist that the relations between it and His Majesty's Government be governed, not by a policy of expediency, but by those established rules of international conduct upon which Great Britain in the past has held the United States to account when the latter nation was a belligerent engaged in a struggle for national existence. It is of the highest importance to neutrals, not only of the present day, but of the future, that the principles of international right be maintained unimpaired.

(35) This task of championing the integrity of neutral rights, which have received the sanction of the civilized world, against the lawless conduct of belligerents arising out of the bitterness of the great conflict which is now wasting the countries of Europe, the United States unhesitatingly assumes, and to the accomplishment of that task it will devote its energies, exercising always that impartiality which from the outbreak of the war it has sought to exercise in its relations with the warring nations. (F.R.S., 1915, p. 589) [20]

[20] Secretary Lansing in his "War Memoirs" says:

"I did all that I could to prolong the disputes by preparing, or having prepared, long and detailed replies, and introducing technical and controversial matters in the hope that before the extended interchange of arguments came to an end something would happen to change the current of American public opinion or to make the American people perceive that German absolutism was a menace to their liberties and to democratic institutions everywhere. Fortunately this hope and effort were not in vain." (p. 112)

"The notes that were sent were long and exhaustive treatises which opened up new subjects of discussion rather than closing those in controversy. Short and emphatic notes were dangerous. Everything was submerged in verbosity. It was done with deliberate purpose. It insured continuance of the controversies and left the questions unsettled, which was necessary in order to leave this country free to act and even to act illegally when it entered the war." (p. 128)

The long, diffuse and argumentative notes to the British Foreign Office were, therefore, a part of a plan in the Secretary's mind not to allow our controversies with the British to come to a head. On the basis of these statements and particularly the statement made on page 128 of his Memoirs that "there was always in my mind the conviction that we would ultimately become an ally of Great Britain and that it would not do, therefore, to let our controversies reach a point where diplomatic correspondence gave place to action," the question has been raised as to whether Secretary Lansing was really pursuing the policy which President Wilson desired to be pursued with entire loyalty. Of this I personally think there can be no doubt. The President did not want to break with either the Allies or the Central Powers, and while he wanted the State Department to store up the record of all our violated rights for later adjustment, he very distinctly did not want our

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The body of the note from which the above paragraphs are quoted dealt with the detention of American vessels and cargoes, the so-called blockade established by the British Orders in Council of March 1915, and British Prize Court procedure, which Secretary Lansing assured the British Government the United States had no intention of accepting as the judge of the rights of its citizens.

Early in 1916, a fresh controversy grew up from the treatment of United States mails in ships to neutral European countries. The correspondence on this subject dragged over months, interweaving with a similar controversy about the British black list and bunker coal control. Throughout the whole year, Secretary Lansing's patience was tried, but his thoroughly American attitude never wavered, and as late as September 1916 we find him writing to the President advising the sending of a telegram to the British Government, which, though in diplomatic phrases, was a sharp warning that American patience had about reached the limit:

> The British Government appears not to comprehend the fact, for it is a fact, that they are really forcing this Government into a position which cannot but result in strained relations between the two countries. The temper of the American people is now so aroused over the attitude and practices of the Allies, that I fear the consequences unless there is some recession on their part. The black list and the mail censorship are the matters which are most in the minds of the American people — particularly so because the annoyance to individuals is so intimate and so general. I anticipate, therefore, that in the near future this Government, however reluctantly, will be forced by the strength of public opinion to take steps to put the retaliatory legislation of Congress into effect. (Maritime Commerce, v. II, p. 525)

This message was not sent, because at the time the President was already deeply concerned with a program of peace proposals which he had for some months been endeavoring to work out. In acknowledging the receipt of the paper from Secretary Lansing, the President told him that he thought it unadvisable to send the message and unnecessary in view of the conversation he had just had with Ambassador Page, who was then in this

---

controversies of those rights to lead to ultimatums. We shall see later that when Secretary Lansing did recommend a peremptory tone to Great Britain, the President declined to follow his advice and preferred to send verbal messages to the British through Ambassador Page. While I have no knowledge of the fact and know of no record on the subject, I have not the least doubt that Secretary Lansing repeatedly told President Wilson, when he presented his long and argumentative notes for his consideration, that he was deliberately prolonging the correspondence but at the same time omitting no assertion of our claims.

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PUBLIC LIBRARY

country. The full statement of the President on that subject is especially interesting because the presidential campaign was at its height and the reference to it is significant:

> I had a talk with Walter Page of the most explicit kind, and am sure that he will be able to convey to the powers that be in London a very clear impression of the lamentable and dangerous mistakes they are making. I covered the whole subject matter here dealt with in a way which I am sure left nothing to be desired in the way of explicitness or firmness of tone; and I think that our method had better stop with that for the time being. Let us forget the campaign so far as matters of this sort are concerned. (Maritime Commerce, v. II, p. 526)

It is impossible to read the departmental or diplomatic correspondence of this period without coming to the conclusion that from May 4, 1916, to February 1917, American relations with the Allies were much worse than they were with the Central Powers. Our Government and our citizens had multiple and just grounds for complaint against both sets of belligerents. That none of these complaints had been permitted to provoke us to hostilities was due to the wisdom, patience, and firmness of the President. The course he elected to follow was chosen both because of his overwhelming desire to keep America at peace in response to what he knew to be the sentiment of the American people, and also because of his devotion to the ideals of America as a peacemaker and of a better world as a result of the war.

It is now helpful to consider the situation at the end of 1916 and the beginning of 1917.

I have referred several times to the fact that with the improvement of American-German relations after May 4, 1916, the German Government began to turn its mind toward peace proposals. The correspondence between the German Foreign Office and Ambassador Bernstorff is curiously complex and mystifying. Bernstorff had fully communicated to his Government the desire of President Wilson to be the peacemaker. Whenever the German Government felt a fresh flush of confidence in its ability to win the war, the attitude of its responsible officials toward this disposition of the President was one of contempt. Whenever the German military situation looked bad, the German Foreign Office recurred to the President's desire and sought to make use of it. Ambassador Bernstorff, throughout this whole period, was in constant, intimate, and confidential communication with Colonel House and in the fall of 1916, acting under instructions

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

from his Government, he pressed Colonel House to urge the President to initiate peace proposals. The pendency of the presidential election in the United States, the so-called deportations from Belgium, and certain of the so-called "conspiracies" from time to time made an unfavorable atmosphere for the initiation of such action by the President, but in December 1916 the President addressed to all the contending parties an identical note asking a statement of war aims from each. The replies, while unsatisfactory, did not close the door and accordingly the President addressed the Senate of the United States on January 22, 1917, and set forth what he regarded as the essential terms of peace in Europe. In the course of that address he referred to the answers received by the State Department to his note of December 18, and then said:

> . . . The Central Powers united in a reply which stated merely that they were ready to meet their antagonists in conference to discuss terms of peace. The Entente Powers have replied much more definitely and have stated, in general terms, indeed, but with sufficient definiteness to imply details, the arrangements, guarantees, and acts of reparation which they deem to be the indispensable conditions of a satisfactory settlement. We are that much nearer a definite discussion of the peace which shall end the present war. We are that much nearer the discussion of the international concert which must thereafter hold the world at peace. In every discussion of the peace that must end this war it is taken for granted that that peace must be followed by some definite concert of power which will make it virtually impossible that any such catastrophe should ever overwhelm us again. Every lover of mankind, every sane and thoughtful man must take that for granted. (New Democracy, v. II, p. 407)

Proceeding to state the disinterested but lofty aspirations of America to be permitted to play a part in the great enterprise of a constructive peace, the President then outlined the general terms upon which the termination of the war should be sought as a prelude to the great constructive undertaking. He said as to the terms:

> They imply, first of all, that it must be a peace without victory. It is not pleasant to say this. I beg that I may be permitted to put my own interpretation upon it and that it may be understood that no other interpretation was in my thought. I am seeking only to face realities and to face them without soft concealments. Victory would mean peace forced upon the loser, a victor's terms imposed upon the vanquished. It would be accepted in humiliation, under duress, at an intolerable sacrifice, and would leave a sting, a resentment, a bitter memory upon which terms of peace would rest, not permanently, but only as upon quicksand. Only a peace between equals can last. Only a peace the

PUBLIC LIBRARY
ILLINOIS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LIBRARY
ILLINOIS

very principle of which is equality and a common participation in a common benefit. The right state of mind, the right feeling between nations, is as necessary for a lasting peace as is the just settlement of vexed questions of territory or of racial and national allegiance. (New Democracy, v. II, p. 410)

The address is lofty in tone and noble in purpose and was a practical invitation to the belligerents to see and appreciate the spirit in which America sought to be the friend, indeed the servant, of the high cause toward which both sides professed themselves to be devoted.

In Germany, meantime, a most subtle game was being played. The German Government desired President Wilson's intervention to be effective only up to the point of getting representatives of the belligerents to sit down and talk with one another about prospects of peace, but it very distinctly did not want President Wilson, or any representative of America, to participate in the conference. In other words, the situation was the typical one of a country which desires to achieve its own objects by direct and coercive conference rather than of a nation which is frankly seeking a reasonable composition. All the documents which bear out this statement are published in the hearings of the Second Sub-Committee. Bernstorff's instructions, constantly reiterated, were to press President Wilson to start negotiations, but they were equally positive that he should do nothing which committed the German Government beyond a willingness to face their adversaries in direct conversation. Through Colonel House, Bernstorff finally secured a definite statement that President Wilson had no desire to take any part in determining territorial or purely European questions, but that he did desire to have a voice in determining the peace structure which was to be set up when the war was over. With this assurance, the German Foreign Office continued to press Bernstorff to promote the President's activity and when the resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare was actually announced, nobody was more surprised than Bernstorff, who was still acting under the belief that his Government desired success in the peace negotiations and was entirely satisfied with the terms upon which those suggestions were to be made and the progress with which they were being advanced.

We learn from both Ludendorff [21] and Hindenburg [22] that that

[21] "Ludendorff's Own Story," Harper, 1919, v. I, p. 371, *et seq.*
[22] "Out of My Life," Hindenburg, Harper, 1921, v. II, p. 41, *et seq.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

question of the resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare had been pressed on the attention of the High Command from August 1916. Bethmann-Hollweg was consistently opposed to it. The Supreme Military Command felt that the question was a thoroughly practical one and that its answer could only be given by the naval authorities. If such a campaign would certainly, and in a relatively short time, force England to capitulate, then it ought to be resorted to. If the navy could not guarantee that result, the danger of bringing neutral countries into the war was too great to be assumed. The discussion was adjourned from time to time, but in December Ludendorff made a tour of the entire front and returned profoundly pessimistic. At his instance Hindenburg sent a memorandum to the Chancellor urging that unless quite definite assurances could be secured of President Wilson's success in peace proposals, radical steps would have to be taken. On January 9, 1917, the Emperor held a council at Pless. The navy practically guaranteed the success of the submarine. The High Military Command joined in urging its adoption and the Chancellor yielded. The decision was thus taken. Before the decision Bernstorff summarized the whole American situation in a statement to the Foreign Office, dated December 11, 1916, which said, among other things:

> With regard to the question of submarine warfare the American Press are quite unanimous on one point, that a withdrawal of the assurances given by Germany after the *Sussex* incident, or even an intentional breach of these, is bound to bring about, as it were, automatically, a breaking-off of diplomatic relations with Germany; and it is also clear that such a rupture would only be the first step towards open war. (Bernstorff, p. 340–1)

In a dispatch to the Foreign Office dated January 14, Bernstorff said:

> Ever since the Presidential election the political situation here has not changed. Apart from the question of ending the world-war, the public mind has not been constantly or earnestly concerned with any matter. . . .
>
> Meanwhile, the attitude towards ourselves, which after the *Sussex* incident took a decided turn for the good, has slowly improved. (Bernstorff, p. 354–6)

On January 19 Bernstorff received official notice from his government that unrestricted submarine warfare would begin again on February 1. He says in his memoirs with regard to this notice:

> On the 19th of January I received official notice that the unrestricted U-boat campaign would begin on February 1st, and I was to give the American Gov-

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PUBLIC LIBRARY

ernment notice accordingly on the evening of the 31st January. After all that had happened, I could but regard this intimation as a declaration of war against the United States, and one which, in addition, put us in the wrong; because it put an end to the peace overtures made by Mr. Wilson, which had been started with our approval. I did my utmost to try to get the Berlin resolution cancelled, or at least to obtain a postponement of the date on which it was to come into force, and with this end in view I sent the following telegram to Berlin:

CIPHER TELEGRAM

Washington, 19th January, 1917.

War inevitable in view of the proposed action. Danger of rupture could be mitigated by the fixing of a definite interval of time, say one month, so that neutral vessels and passengers may be spared, as any preliminary and timely warning seems impossible if present programme is carried out. I shall have to give the password for unnavigable German steamers on February 1st, as effect of carrying out of my instructions here will be like declaration of war, and strict guard will be kept. In any case an incident like that of the *Lusitania* may be expected soon.

If military reasons are not absolutely imperative, in view of my Telegram 212, postponement most urgently desirable. Wilson believes he can obtain peace on the basis of our proposed equal rights of all nations. House told me again yesterday, that Wilson proposed to take action very shortly, for in view of our declaration regarding future Peace League, etc., he regards prospects of a Peace Conference as favorable. (Bernstorff, p. 358–9)

Later when Bernstorff had returned to Germany, and the question of the propriety or necessity of the declaration of unrestricted submarine warfare in the middle of promising peace negotiations arose, Bernstorff heard from both the Chancellor and Helfferich statements to the effect that they regarded the President's speech to the Congress of January 22 as favoring the Allies in the statement of the war aims from America's point of view. He himself took no such view of the President's address but very frankly said that he regarded the opinion of the Foreign Office on that subject, as later expressed, as merely a convenient fable.

Nor is Bernstorff unsupported in his views as to the state of public opinion in America and the promising character, as well as the sincerity, of the President's peace activities. Haniel, at that time Counsellor of the German Embassy in Washington, wrote to the German General Headquarters a comprehensive letter which fully sustains the observations and reports of Bernstorff. After discussing the relative quieting down of American opinion, Haniel says:

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

There is one point on which we must be absolutely clear. A withdrawal from, or even a material limitation of, the exercise of the so-called concession which we made to the United States this spring in connection with the U-boat war, means war with the United States — and therewith probably also war with Holland and others, which otherwise would be starved out. This is the absolute conviction of all those here who have paid any attention to the question, and this includes those who were formerly inclined to a different view. No government and no party would venture, without committing political suicide, to give in to Germany on this question, which is one involving the lives of American citizens, after America has so definitely announced what it considers its international rights. The national feeling has risen to such a pitch during the war, and public opinion has become so hysterically sensitive as the result of the continually recurring incidents, exchanges of notes, and proddings by the press, that neither one of them will be able to bear any further burdens of this nature.

A revocation of our promises would be immediately followed by the diplomatic break. Our warnings would not be observed, and the death of an American as the result of a U-boat attack would result in a declaration of war. It is certain that the majority of the people in the country desire to see that peace maintained which gave an impulse to the country which it had never dreamed of, and they are grateful to Wilson because "he kept us out of war." But let the diplomatic breach occur, and the pressure will be too strong. Even the most zealous apostles of peace would not be able to endure the reproach that, by breaking off diplomatic relations, they had in a sense given Germany a license to kill all Americans in the future. (German Documents, v. II, p. 869–70)

Even as late as January 29, twenty days after the decision at Pless, Bethmann-Hollweg was telegraphing Bernstorff, "Please thank the President on behalf of the Imperial Government for his communication. We trust him completely and beg him to trust us likewise."

It is perhaps not fair to call this apparent double dealing by any particularly harsh names. The German Government wanted peace on its own terms. It had two strings to its bow: the proposals initiated by President Wilson, if they could be jockeyed into a situation which would bring the representatives of the belligerents face to face to make their own trade; and second, unrestricted submarine warfare, if the navy could promise success before the threatened collapse of the army on the western front which General Ludendorff had come to fear. Both of these alternatives were pursued until finally the fatal day, determined upon at Pless, arrived. The peace negotiations were then definitely abandoned and Germany's fate was permitted to depend upon the ruthless use of the submarine.

On January 31, Bernstorff presented the official communication announcing the resumption of submarine warfare to the

PUBLIC LIBRARY
ALTON, ILLINOIS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PUBLIC LIBRARY
ALGONQUIN, ILLINOIS

State Department. Before doing so he gave orders that the engines of all German ships lying in American harbors should be destroyed. On February 3, President Wilson announced to a joint session of the two houses of Congress the rupture of diplomatic relations with Germany and handed the German Ambassador his passport. From February 3 until April 6 war remained undeclared but certain upon the arising of an appropriate incident. Bernstorff's comment upon this whole situation is interesting, both as showing his own judgment, and as expressing the opinion of Colonel House with whom he remained in intimate and confidential relations until he left the country:

> . . . Furthermore, not only I myself, but almost all those gentlemen who returned with me to Germany, had the feeling, on reaching home, that we in America had formed a much clearer notion of the true state of Germany, than those of our fellow-countrymen who had been living at home; for they had been completely cut off from the world by the Blockade. After we had seen the conditions prevailing in Germany, we could understand even less than we had before, why the Imperial Government had not snatched with joy at the chance of making peace.
>
> As to the question whether we should have obtained an acceptable and tolerable peace through Mr. Wilson's efforts, I am still firmly convinced today, that this would have been the case. The President would not have offered to mediate if he had not been able to reckon with certainty upon success, and he was better situated than any German, to know the attitude of the Entente. In his farewell letter to me, Mr. House wrote:
>
> "It is too sad that your Government should have declared the unrestricted U-boat war at a moment when we were so near to peace. The day will come when people in Germany will see how much you have done for your country in America." (Bernstorff, p. 382)

Those who have some special theory to advance, and particularly those who have not examined, in the documents, the history of this period, may continue to indulge doubts as to what caused America's entry into the war; but those who have examined the documents and who approach the problem with a judicial attitude can reach but one conclusion. America from the outbreak of the war had declined to yield to any aggression upon its rights as a neutral which involved the loss of American lives. It had shown, through more than two years, forbearance and patience in dealing with scattered instances of such violations of its rights, but had never left room for doubt that the declaration of a policy not to regard those rights would force the country to war. Germany took the decision at Pless, not to break the Allied blockade of Germany, but to crush England. Excuses, sometimes

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

given later, and home consumption propaganda in Germany at the time, to the effect that the Germans were suffering for food by reason of the Allied blockade, are, as Bernstorff said, "a mere convenient fable."[23]

The Second Sub-Committee examined this whole question and its reports are conclusive. The VIII Conclusion of the report is as follows:

1. In the general situation which was brought about by the peace move of Wilson in the winter of 1916–17, certain conditions existed which made it possible to reach the point of peace parleys. The Imperial Government did not avail itself of these possibilities.

2. The reasons why the above-named opportunities were not taken advantage of are to be found in the resolution regarding the commencement of the unrestricted U-boat warfare of January 9, 1917. (German Documents, v. I, p. 150)

The whole report of the Second Sub-Committee is of deep interest. On page 146 it is said:

If we seek to inquire into the causes of Germany's failure to take advantage of the situation brought about by the Wilson move, in order to reach a peace of understanding, the only answer that can be given, based on the material made available by official documents and hearings, is that the desire to end the war through a victory brought about by an unrestricted U-boat war eliminated the possibility of peace so far as Germany was concerned.

After characterizing the Pless decision as a mistake largely based upon a memorandum by a Heidelberg professor, "who, by no means, could be considered as an authority of particularly high standing with regard to any question of world commerce or politics," the report decides that the mistake was based upon erroneous estimates, as follows:

1. The assumptions, from the commercial aspect, of a successful U-boat warfare were erroneously entertained, and especially was the commercial assistance on the part of America underestimated.

2. The terrifying effect upon neutral shipping did not reach the extent that it had been assumed would be reached.

3. Sufficient weight was not given to the effect of measures of a military and technical kind which were taken against the carrying on of an unrestricted U-boat warfare.

4. The military resources of the United States as an ally were fundamentally underestimated.

5. The military participation of America in the war in the shape of extensive troop transportation was hardly taken into consideration on account of the belief that the U-boats would be able to stop these transports even if transportation were attempted.

[23] See "American Neutrality, 1914–1917," Charles Seymour, 1935, p. 58, *et seq.*

PUBLIC LIBRARY
PUBLIC LIBRARY ILLINOIS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

6. The question as to how far the military and commercial equipment of Germany would continue to be sufficient was limited to a consideration of the immediate future, but was not examined from the standpoint that peace might not have been obtained in the summer of 1917, and that, through the entrance of the United States into the War, it could be dragged out for a considerable length of time, and the issues thereof become more acute. (p. 147)

The blame for the German decision is put squarely upon German authorities, who are held by the report to have known exactly what they were doing and what the inevitable consequences would be so far as involvement with the United States is concerned. Ambassador Bernstorff was right when he said that the decision at Pless was in effect a declaration of war against the United States. That he recognized it as such could not be proved more conclusively than by the statement he issued to the press on February 3 after he received his passports: "I am not surprised. My Government will not be surprised either. The people in Berlin knew what was bound to happen if they took the action they have taken. There was nothing else left for the United States to do." [24]

I should perhaps remind the reader parenthetically that throughout the period from August 1914 to March 1916, I lived in Cleveland, had no official connection of any kind with national affairs, and had only the access to knowledge common to interested citizens generally. I became Secretary of War on March 7, 1916, and in addition to the task of familiarizing myself with the personnel and routine of the War Department, was immediately plunged into the difficulties occasioned by the Mexican border troubles. The sinking of the *Sussex* on March 24 was my first sharp reminder of the possibility of trouble between the United States and Germany. The definite promise of the discontinuance of unrestricted submarine warfare given on May 4 quieted the situation and throughout the rest of that year I do not recall any acute anxiety on the part of either the President or members of the Cabinet with regard to American-German relations. With Secretary Lansing and various members of the State Department, I recall frequent conversations about the increasing trade restrictions imposed by the Allies, and on two or three occasions members of the Cabinet, led by Secretary Lansing, took strong ground in favor of embargoes, reprisals, convoying of American merchantmen, or other steps to protect America's trade rights as

[24] "War Memoirs of Robert Lansing," Bobbs-Merrill, 1935, p. 217.

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA ILLINOIS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

a neutral. In general, the atmosphere of all these discussions was made by the President, whose determination to keep the country out of war was fixed. This policy was not only accepted, but heartily approved, so far as I know, by every member of the Cabinet. Temporary irritations were always allayed by a few sentences from the President recalling to our minds the great ideals of policy which he was so constantly explaining both to the Congress and to the people of the country.

The preparedness campaign was distinctly not directed at any adversary. In the War Department it led to attempts to expand our capacity for rapid production of munitions in the event of need, but the modesty of the War Department program, and the far greater modesty of the response of Congress to our request for appropriations, quite convincingly prove that neither the Administration nor the Congress intended that we should go into the war, nor believed it very likely that we would be compelled to do so. The National Defense Act, passed shortly after I went to Washington, contemplated preparation by five annual increments of increase in the Regular Army, so that our preparation for war was really based upon a "five year plan."

VII. OUR DOMESTIC WELFARE WHILE NEUTRAL

When the World War broke out in August 1914, I was mayor of Cleveland, a city of approximately 750,000 inhabitants of whom it was said that 75 percent were either foreign born or the children of foreign born parents. There were representatives of every European race and nation. The Germans numbered approximately 80,000, and of the Hungarians, Italians, and Central and South European Slavs there were colonies of even larger numbers. Many of these groups of people were segregated and lived in great districts where the language of their homeland continued to be spoken and ancient customs observed, their racial songs sung, and their churches and newspapers observed and perpetuated the traditions of the countries from which they had come.

On the day war was declared, I sent for the Chief of Police and said to him: "The racial antagonism and bitterness of this war in Europe will inevitably affect our people and we are likely to have the war in miniature in our streets." I accordingly asked him to instruct all officers of the police force to be watchful and conciliatory, and to approach any people whom they found dis-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PUBLIC LIB

cussing the European war and tell them that the war was being fought out in Europe and that we could neither help nor hinder either side, our duty being, so far as we could, to keep ourselves calm and the city's life sound and wholesome. The Chief of Police smiled at my naïveté and said: "Mr. Mayor, I will, of course, do what you suggest, but there will be no trouble here. Most of these people came from Europe to escape the very thing now going on there and their chief emotion will be thankfulness that they have escaped it and are not involved." He added, smilingly: "At the end of a year from now, the reports of the Police Department will show more arrests for disorders growing out of the christening of babies than out of discussions of the issues of the European war." About a year later the Chief of Police recalled that conversation and brought me the figures. His forecast had been verified. Apparently the festivities connected with the christenings had led to fights and disorder somewhat generally, but I do not recall that there had been a single international quarrel.

I tell this incident not because I believe our country to have been wholly free from divided sympathies which sometimes led to disorder and violence, but because both my experience and my reading have convinced me that during the period of our neutrality, American citizens of foreign birth, and to a very substantial extent foreigners resident but not naturalized in the United States, were loyal and law abiding.

It must be remembered, however, that one of the constant anxieties of those responsible for the maintenance of American neutrality grew out of the fact that the feelings of our people were put under the harrow of conflicting propaganda. The extent to which the agencies attempting to create pro-Ally and pro-German sentiment were organized and maintained by European countries is perhaps even yet not fully known. Each side, believing its own cause to be just and recognizing the importance of imponderables, naturally sought to impress the people of the greatest and most powerful of the neutral countries with its point of view, both about its own purposes and about the ambitions and misconduct of its adversaries. This has always been true, to a greater or less extent, and will be increasingly true in the future. A "decent respect for the opinion of mankind" will compel every belligerent nation to state its case as persuasively as it can, and, in the modern world, means of communication

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

have been so perfected that the people of any important neutral country must expect to be argued with and informed, or misinformed, from day to day by those who are struggling for their lives and realize that sympathy if aroused can take a helpful, if not controlling, part in the ultimate outcome of their struggle.

The Allies started with certain great advantages. With Great Britain we had a common language and shared great institutional and historical traditions. For so much of the German philosophy of life as we understood, we had a settled dislike. The war seemed to have been started by Germany and to fulfil an expectation we had long held with foreboding. The denunciation of the treaty guaranteeing respect for the territorial integrity of Belgium as "a scrap of paper," the invasion of Belgium, and the reports of the ruthlessness with which that invasion was carried out, all necessarily put the apologists for Germany on the defensive. There was, of course, no occasion for the Entente Powers to complain of the operation of our neutrality since their command of the seas made it wholly beneficial to them. On the other hand the Central Powers, cut off from access to our commercial and industrial resources, while recognizing the complete legality of America's overseas trade, including the shipment of arms and munitions, were nevertheless aware of the fact that our country was a sustaining storehouse of supplies for their adversaries.

Sir Cecil Spring Rice realized from the beginning both that Americans were impatient of being preached at and also that the advantages of the Allies automatically created propaganda for them. Accordingly he discouraged deliberate efforts on the part of the Allies to set up agencies of propaganda in the United States. I have already quoted from some of his letters and dispatches on this subject. Undoubtedly every favorable item in the Allied press was brought to the attention of American editors and a few men of distinction from the Allied countries came to America to explain their case. How just they were either as to their own conduct, or that of their adversaries, depended, no doubt, upon the temperaments of the speakers and the sources of their information. In general, Allied propaganda does not seem to have gone beyond an exposition of this sort, although some Americans eminent in the country's life were Pro-Ally and were fervent in the public advocacy of their own opinions, a fervor which was not discouraged by the official representatives of Allied countries accredited to the United States.

PUBLIC LIBR
AURORA, ILLINO

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA ILLINOIS

The German case was far different. When the President read his War Message to Congress on April 2, 1917, he reviewed the disturbance of our domestic life by representatives, voluntary or official, of the Central Powers in these words:

> One of the things that has served to convince us that the Prussian autocracy was not and could never be our friend is that from the very outset of the present war it has filled our unsuspecting communities and even our offices of government with spies and set criminal intrigues everywhere afoot against our national unity of counsel, our peace within and without, our industries and our commerce. Indeed, it is now evident that its spies were here even before the war began; and it is unhappily not a matter of conjecture but a fact proved in our courts of justice that the intrigues which have more than once come perilously near to disturbing the peace and dislocating the industries of the country have been carried on at the instigation, with the support, and even under the personal direction of official agents of the Imperial Government accredited to the Government of the United States. Even in checking these things and trying to extirpate them we have sought to put the most generous interpretation possible upon them because we knew that their source lay not in any hostile feeling or purpose of the German people towards us (who were no doubt as ignorant of them as we ourselves were), but only in the selfish designs of a Government that did what it pleased and told its people nothing. But they have played their part in serving to convince us at last that that Government entertains no real friendship for us and means to act against our peace and security at its convenience. That it means to stir up enemies against us at our very doors the intercepted note to the German Minister at Mexico City is eloquent evidence.[25]

Ambassador Bernstorff in his "My Three Years in America" deals with the "so-called German conspiracies" and enumerates twenty-four separate instances, many of which he attributes to spontaneous and misdirected zeal on the part of German sympathizers and in most of which he declares himself to have been wholly without participation. The twenty-four conspiracies enumerated include widespread falsification of passports; the attempted destruction of the Welland Canal; the attempt to bring about a revolution in India, engineered from the United States; plots to destroy munition ships by incendiary bombs and infernal machines; the fomenting of strikes in American factories and among American dock workers; and the operation of spies in American industrial and commercial establishments. The German Government naturally recognized the unwisdom of participation in undertakings of this kind by its diplomatic representative in the United States and accordingly sent over

[25] "The Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson," Baker and Dodd, "War and Peace," v. I, p. 13.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

special agents to operate in its behalf who reported directly to Berlin and not to the Embassy in Washington. These especially accredited agents and some of the consular representatives of Germany in the United States very definitely took part in conspiracies of the sort mentioned, and it was, of course, quite clearly established that the military and naval attachés in the German Embassy, Captains von Papen and Boy-Ed, were involved in many of them. In a personally defensive statement Bernstorff says:

> Such offences against the laws of America as were actually committed were certainly reprobated by none more sincerely than by myself, if only because nothing could be imagined more certain to militate against my policy, as I have here described it, than these outrages and the popular indignation aroused by them. I fully realized that these individual acts in defiance of the law of the land and the resulting spread of Germanophobia, were bound to damage me in the eyes of the United States Government and public opinion. It is thus obviously absurd to accuse me of being responsible in any way for the acts in question, seeing that any such instigation, or even approval on my part, would have involved the utter ruin of my own policy! (p. 107–8)
>
> . . . I may observe, however, that I more than once urgently requested the Foreign Office to use all their influence against the dispatch of Secret Service men to America. (p. 109)

The extent of these conspiracies was made a matter of record by the Sub-Committee of the Committee on Judiciary of the Senate, which in September 1918 undertook an investigation of the whole subject.[26] The accusations against the brewing and liquor interests grew out of the prohibition question and are immaterial here. We may likewise disregard the Committee's inquiry into the so-called Bolshevik propaganda, but the exhaustive investigation into German propaganda led the Committee, in its report filed in July 1919, to conclusions which fully sustain the statements of the President in his War Message.[27] Incidentally, it may be remarked that the report of the Committee is less favorable to Ambassador Bernstorff than his own account of his part in the conspiracies and there is quoted on

[26] The Sub-Committee consisted of Senators Overman, King, Wolcott, Nelson and Sterling, all men of long senatorial experience and of recognized ability. It all too often happens that congressional investigations in the United States are entrusted to senators or congressmen who have already reached a conclusion which they desire to vindicate, or have some personal ambition which they desire to serve. Inquiries when so conducted, of course, exclude rather than discover the truth. Because of our unhappy experience in this regard, I emphasize the character and sturdy independence of the members composing this particular Sub-Committee.

[27] Senate Document No. 62, 66th Congress, First Session, 1919, "Brewing and Liquor Interests and German and Bolshevik Propaganda," Reports and Hearings. 3 v. See particularly v. I, p. vi–xxviii.

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LIBRARY
ILLINOIS

page xxii a telegram from Bernstorff to the German Foreign Office which shows that, even as late as January 22, 1917, the Ambassador was busy trying to bring some mysterious influence to bear upon the Congress to affect its action, and also to stir up Irish hostility to the Allied cause:

> I request authority to pay out up to $50,000 in order, as on former occasions, to influence Congress, through the organization you know of, which can perhaps prevent war. I am beginning in the meantime to act accordingly. In the above circumstances a public official German declaration in favor of Ireland is highly desirable in order to gain the support of Irish influence here.

The evidence printed with the report shows an amazing web of agitation and intrigue leading to frequent disturbance and violence, all of which was, of course, both in violation of our laws and in callous disregard of our right to be undisturbed while we remained officially neutral and officially in amity and friendship with the nation in whose interest and with whose connivance the disturbance was caused.

Too many books have been written and the facts are too well known to justify any elaborate description here of the extent to which, under modern conditions, any industrial and commercial nation interlaces its domestic welfare with its export and import trade. Prior to 1914, there were economic barriers but they were relatively moderate as compared with those which have been established since 1918. Their application had been gradual, reciprocal arrangements and understandings had been worked out, and world trade was a reliable feature of each nation's industrial and commercial life. Next to Great Britain, the United States was, of course, the greatest exporter of industrial products. The welfare of vast sections of the United States depended upon the world market for cereals and cotton. Minerals and oils were surplus products with us and their sale abroad was an essential factor to the maintenance of the scale of production to which our whole life had become adjusted.

The first effect of the war was a profound disorganization of this whole arrangement. Mr. Millis estimates that the exclusion of the Central Powers from our markets cut off at one blow 13 percent of our foreign trade. But our trouble arose not merely from the loss of the markets we did lose, but from the change in the demand of the overseas customers who were still left to us. In every belligerent country the needs of the civil population were reduced to a minimum and every country became concerned to

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

import new forms of industrial products or larger quantities of raw materials especially adapted to war uses.

From the beginning to the end of the war, the cotton situation in the United States continued to be serious and the millions of people who depended upon the prosperity of the cotton market were constantly conscious of the fact that they were bearing a crushing part of the price of the war to the world. We were already in a depression in 1914 which was perhaps magnified for political purposes by those who opposed the extraordinary legislation of the first years of the Wilson Administration. Sales of securities on the New York market by European holders came in such an avalanche that it was necessary to close the Stock Exchange. In October 1913 we had exported 257,172 bales of cotton. In October 1914 we shipped only 21,219 bales and the price collapsed from 12½¢ to 7¼¢, which was known to be far below the cost of production. As against Europe, the United States was a debtor country; and as the European nations gathered their resources they were pressing us for payment, with the result that the pound sterling went to $7.00 and the franc to 23½¢ as American debtors undertook to cover European commitments. The banks of the country made such efforts as they could to meet this situation, supervising the organization of pools in cotton, gold, and banking resources to aggregate the financial strength of the country in support at the points of greatest weakness.

This sudden and disastrous effect of the outbreak of the war eased as the overseas nations began to order American staples, and the fact that Europe was beginning again to take our products and particularly our raw materials was generally welcomed in the United States as a sign of relief and reassurance. Nobody questioned the complete legality of neutral trade and the nation gave itself to finding outlets for its surplus and relief for its own distress wherever anybody who could pay was in a position to buy.

On December 15, 1914, the German Ambassador left with the State Department a memorandum in which he said:

> Under the general principles of international law no exception can be taken to neutral states letting war material go to Germany's enemies from or through their territory. This is in accordance with Article 7 of the Hague conventions of October 18, 1907, concerning the rights and duties of neutrals in naval and land war. (F.R.S., 1914, p. 647)

Both Germany and Austria later made efforts to induce our Government to change the rules of neutrality thus conceded in view

PUBLIC LIBRARY
ILLINOIS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LIBRARY
ILLINOIS

of unprecedented circumstances which they contended made our neutrality wholly favorable to the Allies because of their control of the sea, but, as we have seen, the American Government, after its attempt to secure the general adoption of the Declaration of London, continued to interpret its rights by the established and recognized prewar formulae and declined to undertake the responsibility of changing the rules in the middle of the war merely in response to claims by belligerents that the conditions had changed under which the rules were formulated.

In much of the postwar discussion of the doctrine of neutrality and its future application, there is to be found advocacy of the policy of general embargoes on the theory that any trade with belligerents by neutrals is likely to involve the neutral ultimately in the war. Manifestly if any such policy is to be adopted, it must be announced before a war begins as it would be a distinct breach of neutrality to decline to continue to trade with a nation after war began. Such a course would involve a disapproving and punitive judgment upon the nation with which we thus declined to trade and such judgments are, of course, an anathema to that whole school of international lawyers which feels that neutrality, in the classical sense, rather than isolation, is the safest course for a nation which wants to remain unentangled.

But whatever may be the views of international lawyers as to the wisest course, and whatever policy may be legally adopted in the future in maintaining abstinence from foreign wars, the situation in 1914 was definitely that the United States, as a great trading nation, had rights and obligations upon which others had come to rely, and to the extent that our country endeavored to restore its own shattered commercial and industrial structure by continuing to engage in legitimate commerce, it was entirely justified by the accepted rules of law and morals.

As the size of the war and its prolongation became apparent, American trade grew by leaps and bounds. Buying orders from the belligerents to whom delivery could be made multiplied both in munitions and in staples. Industry, prostrated by its loss of customary markets, reorganized itself for the manufacture of the new types of industrial products in demand, and other neutral countries, cut off from the sources of supply on which they had relied, began to buy from us an increasing variety and volume both of raw materials and manufactured products. This led to a war boom in the United States and to the building of "war babies"

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

which restored our labor to jobs and greatly increased the apparent general prosperity of the country. As the duration of the war was unpredictable, the prices paid for special products was high, both because of the necessities of the buyers and because of the uncertainty of the seller as to how long the orders would continue upon which he depended to amortize his investment in new plants and equipment. I hold no brief for war prosperity. On purely economic grounds it is, in the long view, expensive and unreliable, but I think something can be said for a nation endeavoring to ameliorate, so far as it can, the economic disaster thrust upon it by the war activities of others, and I venture the observation that the lessons of history indicate that in any future similar situation it will be extremely difficult to induce our people to keep from seeking such relief when they begin to suffer too cruelly as the result of wars in which they have no part. I am disposed personally to fear that neutrality legislation, now enacted, which looks to isolation and complete trade abstention with belligerents generally and is at variance with the laws of neutral trade accepted by the rest of the world, will have inherent in it the grave danger of our being unable to control our own people into obedience when the pressure of distress becomes greater than they are willing to bear.

The effect of war upon the internal industry and commerce of a nation is to divert all of the nation's energies to the creation and support of its armies as a first consideration. The satisfaction of normal peacetime needs of a civilian population is a wholly secondary consideration and, in a desperate war, is reduced to the lowest level consistent with the maintenance of that morale on the home front without which the army in the field of battle will disintegrate. Our own experience in 1917–1918 has given those of us who remember it a vivid picture of the reversal of all of our processes of living, even to the acceptance of meatless and fuelless days, as a voluntary contribution by civilians to the aggregate national strength. The need for man power in the army and in army industries reduces the available productive power in other industries and increases the volume of imports when they can be safely transported and the national finances permit their purchase. The effect of all this upon nations, belligerent and neutral alike, in a war which lasts more than four years, is revolutionary. So it was that from 1914 to 1917 American energy found new outlets and American needs new sources of satisfaction as we ad-

PUBLIC LIBRARY
ILLINOIS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

justed ourselves to the world in which we had to live and in which, of course, we desired to live as well as we could under the circumstances. In our overseas trade, munitions continued to bulk large, but our exports included great categories of supplies for civilian consumption, which under normal conditions the countries to which we sent them would have produced or manufactured for themselves.

Now, of course, trade expresses itself in dollars and cents, and dollars and cents are the business of bankers. That is what bankers are for. For the convenience of commerce, banks have grown up as mechanisms for the settlement of accounts, and a great technique of operation has been instituted to enable a manufacturer to deal indirectly with his customers through the assistance of checks, drafts, lines of credit, and loans and balances which, while they express themselves on the books of bankers, are in fact the records of transactions in the ordinary trade relations of a people. In this, for the most part, bankers have no other interest than that the use of their facilities and mechanisms make the transactions possible between the primary producer and the ultimate consumer. For the use of his facilities and services the banker is, of course, paid, just as is the transportation agency, or the warehouse man, or the salesman, or the advertiser, and the banker has the same kind of an interest in the promotion of increased trade in order that he may get larger pay for his greater services, as has any of these other instrumentalities, which, in their aggregate, constitute the mechanism through which trade is carried on. In like fashion, international trade consists of exports and imports and for exactly analogous reasons there must needs be bankers with the facilities and knowledge to deal with international financial transactions. The conversion of the value of the currency of one country into the currency of another country, the settlement of international balances, the creation and service of international credits, the safeguarding of the exportation of capital for investment, or the handling of foreign capital imported for investment, all require the services of specialists, and international bankers are merely those who train themselves to perform for international trade this indispensable service. The transactions which pass through their books are not their transactions, but the transactions of others who are using their facilities, and so when the volume of international banking transactions is stated in dollars and cents, it merely means that producers and con-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sumers have traded with one another over international frontiers, and that their transactions are recorded in the books of international bankers who have been one of the facilitating intermediaries who made the exchange possible. Perhaps because of our failure to realize what the banker really is and does, we are all too likely to blame bankers as though their transactions represented some peculiarly heartless and detached interest in mere money, when in fact for the most part their facilities have supplied no more than the rails upon which the trains of trade have operated.

There has grown up accordingly in very recent years a disposition to charge that bankers and munition makers asserted some sort of pressure upon the Government which affected its policy and ultimately led to our entering the war in 1917.

So far as munition makers are concerned, the charge is a singular selection of a particular group out of a much larger and quite indiscriminate mass. It is easy to demonstrate that the condition of cotton farmers in the United States was infinitely more a subject of concern and anxiety on the part of the Government, executive and legislative, than the interest or welfare of the munition makers.

I am, perhaps, the hardest person in the United States to impress with the idea that munition makers had any influence upon the American decision. Villa raided our Mexican border just as I went to Washington to become Secretary of War and my first duty was to arm and equip the Pershing Expedition, called "punitive" but in reality defensive, and later to arm and equip the augmented National Guard mobilized on the border. By using obsolete weapons of one kind and another, the force was armed, but the Government owned but seven airplanes which could fly far enough to get to Mexico and Captain Foulois reported to me that none of them could be safely flown even on missions of local recognizance. I then spent months trying to persuade some one to build airplanes for the Army but the art was then limited to exhibition types in America and even emergency orders could not be promised under six months' delivery and then only three or four could be expected. Similarly there was but one company in the United States equipped to build heavy machine guns. In a national emergency, that company promised to build seventy in a year and to do its best to deliver the first dozen in six months.

When we began the actual mobilization of material for our participation in the World War there simply were no American

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

munition makers. General Bliss went to England in January 1918, and continued an agreement made in June 1917 whereby the British and French supplied us with cannon out of their surpluses in exchange for raw materials. In the early months of the war our manufacture of guns was negligible. We bought in Canada a large supply of Ross rifles, an obsolete arm, and used the leftovers of the Spanish War, but still gave some of our recruits initial training in the manual of arms with broom sticks. That we were always able to have enough modern rifles for our men overseas was due to the fact that we were able to buy a British-owned factory built in this country after the World War began, and modified the Enfield, with which the British were armed, to our needs.

We bought revolvers and pistols of every sort, ransacked the museums of city police departments for confiscated "concealed weapons" and we got the best our pistol manufacturers could do under "speed up production," but at the end of the war we were still short of the required supply. For months American manufacturers were unable to make heavy ammunition. Some gadgets called "boosters and adapters," necessary parts of high explosive shells, balked our ingenuity for months until I still think of them as the unattainable but indispensable price of success in war.

We converted typewriter factories into fuse factories and generally converted American industrial plants to the war material nearest their normal product. Somehow we got through — in the opinion of the impatient, none too well. But a munitions industry large enough to be interested, much less influential, in our going to war simply did not exist. During 1916 I never saw a munition maker except as I sent for him and urged him to try to help us in the emergency of our border troubles.

But the whole of American industry and all of the persons engaged in it were necessary and proper objects of governmental concern. The workers in munition industries were merely American citizens earning their living, who in turn were purchasers of commodities grown or manufactured by their fellow citizens. To that extent, no doubt, all sorts of statistical tabulations were made which included them in summaries by which our standard of living was shown and the prosperity or depression of our general economic life determined, but there was no munition industry in the United States in 1914, and by 1917 the industry in that field which had been created here, either by or on behalf of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the Allied nations, was merely a part of America's industrial plant diverted from peacetime to wartime production, and the managers of those industrial undertakings could have had no interest in taking the country into the war. To have done so would have been the most shortsighted of policies, for after we went into the war, war profits were reduced to a minimum and excess profits taxes squeezed the profits out of war with a wringer of constantly increasing efficiency. Upon the plainest terms, the interest of the owners of "war babies" was in keeping our country at peace while they continued to supply the belligerents with their needs upon such terms as they could arrange. The charge against munition makers seems to me largely an unsupported accusation made as an argument in furtherance of a policy by those who believe in the nationalization of all arms manufacture and the total prohibition of international traffic in arms.

There are two sides to that argument. Undoubtedly if a nation must depend wholly upon its own industrial organization for the production of necessary war supplies, the consequence will be an immense stimulation in the armament business and a consequent peacetime diversion of capital and labor in the war industries. The policy would in all likelihood lead also to alliances based on anticipated war economics which might be unwholesome or even menacing. For our present purpose, however, the munitions industry can be safely regarded as a mere element in the general problem of maintaining our own domestic welfare, since the exportation of munitions by a neutral to belligerents was thoroughly sanctioned both by international law and by accepted standards of international morality during the whole period of our neutrality in the World War.

With regard to the alleged influence of bankers I feel obliged to speak under the limitations of a very narrow personal experience. While I was a member of the Cabinet from 1916–1921, I do not recall having had a conversation with a banker on any subject, though the strong likelihood is that petty personal concerns were in some way or another filtered through the books of some bank. My complete absence of recollection on that subject extends to conversations with my Cabinet associates and generally with responsible official persons in the Government. I never heard quoted, by any one of them, the opinion of any banker, national or international, that the United States ought to go into the war or that the interests of the United States would be furthered by

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LIBRARY
ILLINOIS

any suggested line of conduct on the part of our nation in dealing with either group of belligerents. As a consequence, I am forced to conclude that if any banker sought to exercise pressure in favor of any national policy on the subject, I was for some reason completely excluded and all of my Cabinet associates conspired to keep me in ignorance of the plan.

The record of the bankers on the subject is relatively simple. Prior to the outbreak of the World War, by the settled and accepted principles of international law, it was unneutral for a government to make a loan to a belligerent, but it was at the same time entirely proper for the citizens of a neutral to make such loans if they saw fit. The history of all countries, and notably of our own, was full of belligerent borrowing by the flotation of securities in neutral countries. Early in August 1914, Messrs. J. P. Morgan & Company inquired of Secretary Bryan whether or not our policy would permit such loans in the European war. To this inquiry Secretary Bryan on August 15 responded by telegram:

> There is no reason why loans should not be made to the governments of neutral nations, but in the judgment of this Government, loans by American bankers to any foreign nation which is at war are inconsistent with the true spirit of neutrality. (F.R.S., 1914, p. 580)

The view thus expressed by Mr. Bryan was not a statement of the legal right of citizens of the United States, but was based upon a local and peculiar condition set forth by him in a letter to the President dated August 10, 1914. The proposed loan which raised the question was sought by France, but Mr. Bryan foresaw similar applications from other countries and said with regard to them:

> *Second:* There is a special and local reason, it seems to me, why this course would be advisable. Mr. Lansing observed in the discussion of the subject that a loan would be taken by those in sympathy with the country in whose behalf the loan was negotiated. If we approved of a loan to France we could not, of course, object to a loan to Great Britain, Germany, Russia, Austria or to any other country, and if loans were made to these countries our citizens would be divided into groups, each group loaning money to the country which it favors and this money could not be furnished without expressions of sympathy. These expressions of sympathy are disturbing enough when they do not rest upon pecuniary interests — they would be still more disturbing if each group was pecuniarily interested in the success of the nation to whom its members had loaned money.
>
> *Third:* The powerful financial interests which would be connected with these loans would be tempted to use their influence through the newspapers to sup-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

port the interests of the Government to which they had loaned because the value of the security would be directly affected by the result of the war. We would thus find our newspapers violently arrayed on one side or the other, each paper supporting a financial group and pecuniary interest. All of this influence would make it all the more difficult for us to maintain neutrality, as our action on various questions that would arise would affect one side or the other and powerful financial interests would be thrown into the balance. (Maritime Commerce, v. II, p. 187)

Messrs. Morgan & Company complied with the wish implicit in Secretary Bryan's telegram, but by October 1914 the State Department had more or less retreated to a strictly legal position and small loans were made to both France and Germany. This modification of policy proceeded from a statement of the President to Mr. Lansing that in his view there was a difference between the creation of bank credits for belligerent governments to be used in the purchase of supplies in America and the flotation of a public loan. (Maritime Commerce, v. II, p. 222)

In March 1915 the State Department gave a negative clearance to a one-year credit offered by public subscription, and by September of that year had come to its settled policy of interposing no objection to loans offered for public subscription in the United States by any of the belligerents.

So far as the conduct of American bankers in this matter is concerned, the record so far as I know indicates complete compliance on their part with the policies laid down by the State Department. Whatever shift took place on the subject was in official opinion and the reasons for it are not far to seek.

On September 6, 1915, Mr. Lansing wrote to the President:

If the European countries cannot find means to pay for the excess of goods sold to them over those purchased from them, they will have to stop buying and our present export trade will shrink proportionately. The result would be restriction of outputs, industrial depression, idle capital and idle labor, numerous failures, financial demoralization, and general unrest and suffering among the laboring classes. (Maritime Commerce, v. II, p. 379)

This did not express a view or purpose entertained confidentially within administration circles: the situation was known and commented upon in the newspapers of the day. Thus on September 15, 1915, the Washington correspondent of the *New York Times*, quoting the above sentences from Mr. Lansing's letter to the President, said:

Officials view the proposed loan sympathetically, not because of its facilitating effect upon the export of munitions, but because of its support to the gen-

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA ILLINOIS

eral trade markets of the country. It was pointed out today that the export of munitions would probably continue, as they are necessary to the Allies' welfare, but unless the loan or some equivalent for it could be floated, the general export trade of the country would be at a standstill.

It was said today that under the stimulating effect of the loan, cotton might get back to 12 or 13 cents, and there might be expected a similarly good effect upon the prices of other staples.

Undoubtedly the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of Labor, the Secretary of Agriculture, and the Secretary of State were watching with grave concern, by all the tests they could apply, the rise and fall of the general welfare of the American people, and endeavored to forecast and influence events which would affect that welfare. That no one of them for a moment considered any departure from our rights and duties as a neutral goes without saying both because the character of the men themselves is known and also because they were in complete sympathy with the policy of the President which, as we have already seen, was committed to neutrality not only to keep us out of war, but also upon the very much higher ground of the ideal mission which he conceived for us as the great neutral.

The position of the bankers changed from time to time. At the outset of the war in 1914, their task was to prevent, so far as they could, catastrophe in the United States from the sudden suspension of a substantial part of our overseas trade and the dumping on the American market of American securities held abroad and sent here for realization. As this phase passed, the task of the bankers changed. It then became their duty, so far as they could, to prevent any avoidable dislocation and confusion in American industry by unregulated and haphazard purchases for overseas shipment, and to keep the business of international exchange working as smoothly and favorably as possible to prevent disorder in our own financial arrangements. When the overseas nations had sold here their holdings in American securities and began to borrow money here on the strength of their credit and their collateral, the international bankers, acting for American trade and industry, had the duty of keeping that form of financial undertaking in as complete order and under as many safeguards as possible, and finally when European nations sought to pay for their American purchases by the sale of their credit in this country in the form of loans offered for public subscription, it became the task of the bankers to carry on the necessary negotia-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tions and to carry through the arrangements which were, in effect, not loans by bankers, but loans by American citizens to the belligerent governments to enable them to continue their purchases from American producers. That the heads of the Treasury and State Departments in Washington conferred with informed and intelligent bankers at various stages in these operations is true as a matter of course. Had they failed to do so they would have been blameworthy in the highest degree. Whatever the interest of the bankers may or may not have been, their knowledge was indispensable if the responsible officers of the Government were to form intelligent opinions and determine wisely national policies. That some of the bankers were personally pro-Ally in their sentiments is obviously true. That some very important international bankers in the United States were pro-German in their sentiment is equally true. That the sentiments of either group had the slightest effect upon President Wilson, if they were even communicated to him, is so fanciful and improbable as to pass the bounds of belief, and as it was Mr. Wilson who determined the national policy, there is no case unless it can be shown that he was influenced by some such pressure. Those who knew Mr. Wilson, and particularly those who realized the state of his mind as the result of the opposition of bankers to the Federal Reserve Act, will not be disposed to believe that he was predisposed in favor of any view of national financial policy they were likely to entertain.

It is thus easy to see that the problem of maintaining its domestic welfare is a very difficult and embarrassing one for a neutral nation. This problem was particularly difficult in a nation like ours with the traditional sympathies of its people divided and its economic welfare daily at the mercy of a long drawn out war to which it was not a party, but which summoned and consumed the energies of practically all the great countries of the world with which it had developed, in peacetime, vital trade relations. The fact that the President was able to dominate the tides of opinion among our people throughout two and one-half years of confusion, agitation, anxiety, and anger, is both a remarkable tribute to his leadership and, it seems to me, a convincing proof of his own loyalty to an ideal high enough to keep his spirit nerved to the task. A brief examination of that ideal will enable me to conclude this paper with some observations which it seems to me just and, I hope, helpful to make.

PUBLIC LIBRARY
ILLINOIS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

VIII. THE LEADERSHIP OF PUBLIC OPINION TOWARD AN IDEAL

Through the complicated and crashing strains of a Wagnerian tragedy there run a series of motifs of which first one and then another dominates the action. Among them is a master motif which emerges as a note of ultimate hope or of triumph and reassures the listener into the belief that, at the end, the tragedy will subside and the great and righteous object of the passionate struggle will be achieved. So throughout the World War there were the motifs of waste and loss, of suffering and of death, and it was often difficult to tell whether we were not in fact bidden to witness the collapse and destruction of modern civilization. But to President Wilson the dominant motif was one of hope, and he continued to hear it and to feel its inspiration when the rest of us felt only despair. Perhaps because of spiritual weariness, perhaps because of the disappointments of Versailles, it became the fashion after 1918 to speak with dispraise of idealism. Peoples everywhere, as they turned to reconstruct their shattered societies, became very realistic indeed and things had value only if they were material and could be measured in the coin of the realm. The fierce spirit of nationalism, as it set up trade barriers and continued, on an economic plane, the struggles which had ceased in the trenches, made of the postwar world a new and less heroic battlefield. Efforts to secure an armistice in that war have not yet succeeded and thoughtful people everywhere are debating whether or not the race must pass through another and even more dreadful crisis before it acquires a philosophy in which peace can be preserved by constructive and coöperative agencies. Without venturing to prophesy how long this new war is to continue or what its ultimate peace terms will be, it is still profitable to examine, if only as a fact, the central motif of President Wilson's thought throughout the period of our neutrality. When it has been set forth it will be judged according to respective temperaments. Those with a Nietzschean strain will discard it as dream stuff in favor of some other philosophy which bids us "Be hard." Those who believe this to be a world governed by moral laws will take another view and will be mystified that a philosophy at once so beautiful and so reasonable could have failed. So far as this paper is concerned, however, we are interested in this subject only for the light it throws upon the maintenance of American neutrality and our country's ultimate participation in the war.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

This central thought was first disclosed in an address to the Senate August 19, 1914. Dealing with the general aspects of American neutrality, the President said:

My thought is of America. I am speaking, I feel sure, the earnest wish and purpose of every thoughtful American that this great country of ours, which is, of course, the first in our thoughts and in our hearts, should show herself in this time of peculiar trial a nation fit beyond others to exhibit the fine poise of undisturbed judgment, the dignity of self-control, the efficiency of dispassionate action; a nation that neither sits in judgment upon others nor is disturbed in her own counsels and which keeps herself fit and free to do what is honest and disinterested and truly serviceable for the peace of the world. (New Democracy, v. I, p. 158–9)

On September 4, 1914, in a letter addressed to Mr. Doremus and explaining his inability to take an active part in the approaching campaign, he said that it was his duty to remain in Washington devoting his entire time to the profound disturbance which had come upon the world:

. . . These are days big with destiny for the United States, as for the other nations of the world. A little wisdom, a little courage, a little self-forgetful devotion may under God turn that destiny this way or that. Great hearts, great natures, will respond. Even little men will rejoice to be stimulated and guided and set an heroic example. Parties will fare well enough without nursing if the men who make them up and the men who lead them forget themselves to serve a cause and set a great people forward on the path of liberty and peace. (New Democracy, v. I, p. 167)

In a Jackson Day address at Indianapolis on January 8, 1915, the President said:

And what a future it is, my friends! Look abroad upon the troubled world! Only America at peace! Among all the great powers of the world only America saving her power for her own people! Only America using her great character and her great strength in the interests of peace and of prosperity! Do you not think it likely that the world will some time turn to America and say, "You were right and we were wrong. You kept your head when we lost ours. You tried to keep the scale from tipping, and we threw the whole weight of arms in one side of the scale. Now, in your self-possession, in your coolness, in your strength, may we not turn to you for counsel and for assistance?" Think of the deep-wrought destruction of economic resources, of life, and of hope that is taking place in some parts of the world, and think of the reservoir of hope, the reservoir of energy, the reservoir of sustenance that there is in this great land of plenty! May we not look forward to the time when we shall be called blessed among the nations, because we succored the nations of the world in their time of distress and of dismay? I for one pray God that that solemn hour may come, and I know the solidity of character and I know the exaltation of hope, I know the big principle with which the American people will respond to the call of the

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

AURORA, ILLINOIS

world for this service. I thank God that those who believe in America, who try to serve her people, are likely to be also what America herself from the first hoped and meant to be — the servant of mankind. (New Democracy, v. I, p. 250–1)

In an address to the Associated Press on April 20, 1915, he said:

So that I am not speaking in a selfish spirit when I say that our whole duty, for the present at any rate, is summed up in this motto, "America first." Let us think of America before we think of Europe, in order that America may be fit to be Europe's friend when the day of tested friendship comes. The test of friendship is not now sympathy with the one side or the other, but getting ready to help both sides when the struggle is over. . . .

We are the mediating Nation of the world. I do not mean that we undertake not to mind our own business and to mediate where other people are quarreling. I mean the word in a broader sense. We are compounded of the nations of the world; we mediate their blood, we mediate their traditions, we mediate their sentiments, their tastes, their passions; we are ourselves compounded of those things. We are, therefore, able to understand all nations; we are able to understand them in the compound, not separately, as partisans, but unitedly as knowing and comprehending and embodying them all. It is in that sense that I mean that America is a mediating Nation.

. . . But I am interested in neutrality because there is something so much greater to do than fight; there is a distinction waiting for this Nation that no nation has ever yet got. That is the distinction of absolute self-control and self-mastery. (New Democracy, v. I, p. 303–5)

Addressing the Daughters of the American Revolution on October 11, 1915, the President said:

Neutrality is a negative word. It is a word that does not express what America ought to feel. America has a heart and that heart throbs with all sorts of intense sympathies, but America has schooled its heart to love the things that America believes in and it ought to devote itself only to the things that America believes in; and, believing that America stands apart in its ideals, it ought not to allow itself to be drawn, so far as its heart is concerned, into anybody's quarrel. Not because it does not understand the quarrel, not because it does not in its head assess the merits of the controversy, but because America has promised the world to stand apart and maintain certain principles of action which are grounded in law and in justice. We are not trying to keep out of trouble; we are trying to preserve the foundations upon which peace can be rebuilt. Peace can be rebuilt only upon the ancient and accepted principles of international law, only upon those things which remind nations of their duties to each other, and, deeper than that, of their duties to mankind and to humanity. (New Democracy, v. I, p. 378)

Even in speaking on the subject of preparedness, the President stated his belief in the providential character of the mission of America:

Here is the Nation God has builded by our hands. What shall we do with it? Who is there who does not stand ready at all times to act in her behalf in a

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

spirit of devoted and disinterested patriotism? We are yet only in the youth and first consciousness of our power. The day of our country's life is still but in its fresh morning. Let us lift our eyes to the great tracts of life yet to be conquered in the interests of righteous peace. Come, let us renew our allegiance to America, conserve her strength in its purity, make her chief among those who serve mankind, self-reverenced, self-commanded, witness of all forces of quiet counsel, strong above all others in good will and the might of invincible justice and right. (New Democracy, v. I, p. 391–2)

It is difficult to resist the pleasure of tracing this insistent theme throughout the addresses of the President delivered in the year 1916. Those addresses were very numerous and were both to the Congress and to private assemblies and persons. They all moved in one direction and sounded one call of inspiration. The President believed that Providence had set the United States apart as a mediating nation, and that the day would certainly come when the exhausted European powers would turn to him, as our representative, to use our great spiritual and material power to aid them in constructing a plan of life which they could accept from us as a disinterested friend but which they would be unable to find for themselves, blinded by passion and grief and disappointment. We have already seen that this belief on the President's part was insistently repeated to the diplomatic representatives of the belligerent governments in Washington and that their various foreign offices thoroughly understood that the President's dominant interest was in preserving America for the mission of aiding in a healing peace. So far as I know, this was never resented by any of the foreign offices except that of the German Empire, where it was received frequently with disdain and characterized as the personal vanity of a man who desired to make a great place for himself in history. The German Emperor's comments upon dispatches laid before him indicating this desire on President Wilson's part are characteristically impatient and scornful.

This I believe to have been the central and guiding thought in President Wilson's leadership of public opinion in America and in his authoritative control of our diplomatic relations through the State Department during the whole period of our neutrality. I am fortified in this belief not only by the record, which seems conclusive, but by my personal recollection of all I saw and heard after I became Secretary of War in 1916. Every argument and every proposal that I heard made in President Wilson's presence was finally brought to the test of how it would affect our ultimate

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

usefulness to the world when peace terms came to be made; and, while it was always assumed, it was nevertheless often expressed, by the President and others who understood him and in his presence, that in the long view the best interests of the United States required that there should be a world in which it could play the drama of its own great development free from the disturbance and catastrophe of wars among those who also had parts to play on the stage of world affairs.

I shall not prolong this paper by any extended examination of the President's use of Colonel House as his personal representative. Admittedly, it was an unusual, if not a unique, thing for a President to have a personal representative in constant correspondence and personal contact with the highest officers of governments with which the President was necessarily sustaining, through a regular department of the Government, official relations; but it was the very fact that official relations were governed by traditional and formal rules that made it necessary for the President to have an informal and irresponsible contact in addition. So far as the war was concerned, the State Department, of course, conducted all relations affecting American interests. Had the geographical situation made it possible for Lloyd George, Balfour, Bethmann-Hollweg, and other responsible prime ministers during the course of the war to visit Washington informally, they would all have conducted any formal business they had with the State Department, but nobody would have doubted the propriety of the President's receiving them as guests in the White House and discussing with them his hopes for a new world when the present difficulties had come to an end. Informal conversations of that kind, of course, were impossible. Colonel House's mission was to have them on the President's behalf. This he did by intimate contacts with members of these governments in their own capitals. He visited London and Paris, but he also visited Berlin. He told them the far-reaching hope of the President and he brought back to the President reports of their reception of the ideals which he was pursuing. It was not Colonel House's business to bind the United States, nor was he under any particular obligation to be discreet. The whole value of his service lay in his being intimate, as he tried to find how much hope there was in the world for the ideals which the President cherished. Everybody with whom he talked knew him to be unofficial and without authority to do more than discuss hopes and plans and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

this he obviously did with undiscriminating candor. The complete freedom with which Bernstorff constantly consulted him has been revealed in Bernstorff's book and in the dispatches which he sent to his Government as the result of these conferences, and the relationship was so intimate that in times of great anxiety and stress Bernstorff repeatedly went to Colonel House for advice and even assistance in devising ways to avoid a crisis. There are no scales by which such matters can be weighed; but the evidence, considered as a whole, seems to indicate about the same amount of confidential and indiscreet discussion between German statesmen and diplomats and Colonel House on the one side, and Sir Edward Grey and Colonel House on the other. That each group tried to impress Colonel House with the righteousness of its cause and that he expressed sympathy with so much of it as seemed to him righteous is altogether likely. That the statesmen on either side intentionally, or indeed at all, beguiled Colonel House, or misled President Wilson through him, is simply at variance with the action taken at any stage of the official relations between the United States and the various belligerent governments.

There have been from time to time charges made in the public press that Mr. Lansing, as Secretary of State, and Walter H. Page, our Ambassador to Great Britain, were "unneutral." Their positions, of course, were official; that of Colonel House was wholly unofficial.

The criticism of Mr. Page is based upon statements contained in his "Life and Letters" published in 1922 and particularly upon a cablegram sent by him in March 1917 to President Wilson. Professor Seymour in his "American Neutrality" discusses the correct interpretation of that cablegram and the misinterpretations of it which have achieved the greatest notice. Apart from the cablegram, however, it of course is true that Mr. Page personally and philosophically sympathized with the Allies. He was a highly intelligent and completely trained scholar, an American of an ancient tradition steeped in knowledge of the things which formed the spiritual basis of America's institutional and political history. With such a background it was inevitable that he should sympathize with the British position, and particularly that he should see the profound effect upon America's place and chance in the world which would result from a destruction of the British Empire by the philosophy which

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LIBRARY
ILLINOIS

at that time animated the Central Powers. Living in intimate contact with the sacrifices the British people were making, he no doubt at times permitted his sympathies to be known and it may be that they colored some of his communications of an official character to the President and to the State Department, but both the President and the Secretary of State knew Mr. Page and were perfectly well aware that while they might have to make allowances for sympathies which grew out of his deepest intellectual and spiritual nature, he was nevertheless always fundamentally an American, thinking only of America's highest interests. That the President and Secretary of State both thought it necessary to be conscious of Mr. Page's nature and surroundings in dealing with his advice is abundantly clear. Thus Mr. Lansing in his "War Memoirs," published in 1935, at page 170 says:

"One of the chief results of Mr. Page's visit to the United States and of the conferences which he had with Mr. Wilson was, unless I am greatly mistaken, to make the President more than ever irritated against the British . . . His insistence on our adopting the British way of looking at the situation stirred the ire of the President and made him stubborn . . ."

These statements of Mr. Lansing could not have been made if he had been in effect conspiring with Mr. Page to influence the President's mind toward joining the Allies in the war.

The charges against Mr. Lansing grew out of the very frank statements he made in his "War Memoirs," and particularly a memorandum of his dated July 11, 1915, "Consideration and Outline of Policies," which he made for his own guidance. It must be taken as true that Secretary Lansing believed the war to be one between imperialism and democracy, and that he regarded the German submarine campaign as only the most conclusive evidence of the disaster which the dominance of a military imperialism would mean to the world. That conviction led him to express to himself, and for his own guidance, complete distrust of the promises of the German Government to abandon unrestricted submarine warfare, and in that distrust he was thoroughly vindicated by the event. The position finally assumed by the German Government on that subject was that the ethics of the sinking of unarmed ships without opportunity for noncombatant passengers to escape was to be judged solely by determining whether or not it would be helpful in the military

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

adventure. We are to judge Mr. Lansing, however, not by the views he entertained but by the official action he took, and as I have already pointed out, the German Government regarded him as neutral and helpful.

In this connection it is interesting to note that officials in the German Foreign Office thought Bernstorff had been too much affected by his American environment to be a reliable adviser. Helfferich said in commenting upon Bernstorff's interpretation of the President's address of January 22, 1917:

> . . . And the only way in which I can account to myself for the fact that Ambassador Count v. Bernstorff interpreted this message to constitute a further step toward a peace acceptable to us, and continued to send in reports even after the 22d of January, reflecting this view, is the length of time during which he continued to be cut off from every direct intercourse and every direct contact with his German home, subjected to the strongly suggestive influences of the American world by which he was surrounded. This message of President Wilson's of January 22, 1917, was but the mask which failed to conceal behind it the features of the Wilson of Versailles. (German Documents, v. I, p. 684.)

The most elaborate statement of the case against Mr. Lansing is by O. W. Riegel in "The Pattern of the Unneutral Diplomat: Robert Lansing and the World War," *The Southern Review*, v. II, no. I. But the entire criticism is based upon what Mr. Lansing thought rather than on any action he took officially.

There is really no such thing as a neutral diplomat. The sympathies of such men as Myron T. Herrick, our Ambassador to France; Brand Whitlock, our Ambassador to Belgium; Thomas Nelson Page, our Ambassador to Rome; Walter H. Page, our Ambassador to London; and Mr. Lansing, as Secretary of State, could not be expected to be unaffected by their ultimate beliefs as to the world of which their country was a part, or to remain unaffected by their education and opportunities for observation and their philosophy of life. Every Secretary of State, if he is competent to hold the office, must have far-reaching views upon international relations and a strong desire to see those views ultimately prevail. This does not mean, however, any disloyalty to their country or any partisanship in controversies between other countries except as those controversies may ultimately affect American interests. Perhaps the whole case can be summed up by saying that Mr. Lansing, as Secretary of State, believed it to be better for the United States not to have German military imperialism crush democracy as represented by England

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

AURORA, ILLINOIS

and France; and that at times, in reflecting upon this subject, he went so far as to feel that such a triumph would be a catastrophe which the United States would be justified in preventing by going into the war. Whether or not these views might have caused our going into the war under other circumstances is immaterial to consider, since we went into the war for an entirely different reason and in vindication of very much more direct and immediate American interests. The trouble all arises from the candor with which Mr. Lansing has permitted us to know the inside of his mind, and the criticism made of him, I am persuaded, has come largely from people who believe it to be possible to have a Secretary of State who would be useful in that office and at the same time uninformed and unimaginative about international relations.

Only two other matters of minor importance need be referred to: the so-called "Secret Treaties," and the diplomatic conduct of the United States after we entered the World War. Neither, obviously, can have any bearing on why we entered the war. But they are constantly introduced into discussions of that subject and hence must be dealt with.

When the British Mission came to America immediately after our declaration of war, it is quite clear that Mr. Balfour and Colonel House discussed at least some of the so-called "Secret Treaties" and that Mr. Balfour promised that copies of all of them would be sent to our State Department. In the conversation which President Wilson later had with Mr. Balfour, the same ground was covered and at least some of the Secret Treaties were discussed to some extent. How many of them were referred to was not made a matter of record, but that both the President and the State Department knew of the Treaty of London is clear. All of these treaties were kept secret by the parties to them to prevent a squabble growing up about the distribution of the spoils before there were any spoils to distribute. Some of them were published in 1918 when the Russian archives were released. The experts in the State Department and in the so-called "Inquiry" organized to prepare data for the Paris Peace Conference certainly knew some of the arrangements made by these treaties and we have the testimony of Mr. Walter Lippmann and a good many newspaper references to the treaties to the effect that they were thus used.

The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on August 19, 1919, interrogated both Secretary Lansing and President Wilson

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

as to the extent of their knowledge of the treaties and the time when such knowledge came to them. Secretary Lansing was at first vague, but after an opportunity to consult State Department records and his own papers he told the Committee that he had known of some of the treaties at an earlier day, but complete and detailed knowledge of all of them was made available first at the Peace Conference. President Wilson in his answers to the Committee on this subject, took substantially the same ground, although the President's answers are certainly open to two interpretations: one, that he claimed to have known nothing about any of the treaties prior to his arrival at Paris; and two, that he had known about some of them but that his knowledge was more or less casual and that the full disclosure of the "whole series of understandings" was not made to him until he arrived at the Peace Conference. On the basis of the first of these possible interpretations of the President's answers, hasty and harsh accusations have been made as to his truthfulness, but a critical examination of the whole situation leads, it seems to me, inescapably to the other view.

Both before and after we went into the war the President's central thought was upon the establishment of a just and stable peace when the opportunity should come. He had sought by direct inquiry of all the belligerents a statement of their war aims, and in his own addresses had ventured to enumerate quite definite articles which in his opinion would have to be incorporated in any series of treaties at the conclusion of the war if the peace to be established was to be stable. In the formulation of his declarations, he recognized certain well-known national aspirations, like the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine and the establishment of an independent Poland, but it is manifest that he took no account whatever of the possibility that there were arrangements among the belligerent nations, although he of course knew that it was quite impossible for a group of nations to coöperate in such a war without the exchange of all sorts of understandings and promises. From his point of view, therefore, it was clear that all of these secret promises and war aims and aspirations would ultimately have to yield to a statesmanlike determination at a peace conference of what was right and just and best in the long view for the world. This, I think, is borne out by the fact that he continued to insist throughout 1917 and 1918 that the territorial aspirations of the Allies should be left for the Peace Conference and that the

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LIBRARY

price of a lasting peace was to be "impartial justice in every item of the settlement no matter whose interest was crossed."

The important thing which Mr. Balfour explained to the President in his long talk on April 30, 1917, was the financial stress in which England found herself due to her own vast expenditures and the extent to which she had been obliged to finance her allies. Upon this subject undoubtedly Mr. Balfour was eager, earnest, and explicit. The result was that the United States immediately began to assist in the maintenance of the British financial position. The circumstances of that conversation made it both right that Mr. Balfour should refer to the treaties and probable that he did, as well as to other relations existing between England and her allies and to the aspirations of the various belligerents, and that all of these references took the color in the President's mind merely of interests later to be considered and adjudicated rather than obligations which might bind the Allied countries to resist terms of settlement ultimately agreed upon as wise and just. Details of this kind would have interested the President under the circumstances only to a moderate degree both because they required no immediate attention and also because nothing could have been more resolute than the President's intention that the United States should not be bound by arrangements which it had no part in making. His own thought, then, had changed direction but had not changed ultimate purpose. America was going into the war and could no longer reconstruct the peace of the world as a mediator, but that the peace of the world should be placed on a stable foundation as a result of the war remained his fixed objective. He, therefore, quite naturally declined to interest himself in or associate himself with inter-Allied ambitions and purposes, and the impression made upon his mind by those treaties, to the extent that they were discussed, was probably slight. When he got to Paris and found those treaties and other arrangements and ambitions of the Allies lying athwart his path to the League of Nations, they had to his mind a sinister importance which he had not foreseen and which created in him the surprise which he expressed to the Senate Committee.

Such considerations indicate that the difficulty with the President's testimony before the Senate Committee is not a question of veracity, but rather a lack of clearness and detail about a really complicated question of fact to which no categorical answer could have been given. What one knows about a series of transactions

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

when one learns different details in the series and when one comes to appreciate the importance of the series as a whole are complex questions. The inherent improbability of conscious untruthfulness about this matter on the President's part is impressive not only because of the character of the President but also because in the very examination in which he made these statements he showed familiarity with the fact that the same questions had been asked Secretary Lansing and with the answers which the Secretary had given showing knowledge of some of the treaties long before the Paris Conference. The fact is the President had an unusually accurate and comprehensive memory and he gave direct and personal attention to diplomatic matters throughout the whole period both of our neutrality and our belligerency. He could not have forgotten the Treaty of London or been unaware of the existence of other treaties and arrangements looking to postwar territorial readjustments. As many of them were common knowledge and some of them figured in his own recorded conversations and correspondence, the explanation of the whole situation therefore seems to me to be that the President's testimony is to be taken not as a disclaimer of piecemeal knowledge, but as a disclaimer of any such consenting knowledge as bound the United States to consider the details of such treaties as any part of our own war objective or any obligation upon us at the Peace Conference. In this view the President's statement that the whole series of arrangements was first disclosed to him at Versailles and that the Government of the United States had no earlier knowledge of them can be understood.[28]

It is very easy, by following the President's thought from the War Message to the end of the war, to demonstrate the truth of these statements. Throughout the whole period he clung to his ideal, fashioning its details and proclaiming them both to our own people and to the people of the world, so that when the Armistice came, he was still insistent that America had no selfish purposes and had had none, that we had ceased to be a mediator and a neutral and had become a belligerent and a victor, but that our spirit was still the spirit of the servant in the house.

The United States never became an ally of the Entente Powers, and in order to keep the separation upon which the President

[28] This subject is discussed in *Current History* for June 1929 by Mary Reno Frear in "Did President Wilson Contradict Himself on the Secret Treaties?" Miss Frear has corrected the authorities and discusses the problem clearly and dispassionately.

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

insisted, the cumbersome title of the "Allied and Associated Powers" had to be adopted because America was an associate and not an ally. In my own contact with this there are many evidences of this clear insistence in the President's mind. I explained to him the reasons for the maintenance of a separate supply system for the American Army, and for the retention of our own types of weapons and our own calibers of ammunition. For all of this there were sound military reasons, but his acceptance was always with the comment that we had no necessarily complete identity, either of interest or purpose, with any of the Allied nations, and that it was highly important to preserve America's freedom of action by complete independence of equipment and operation. When proposals were made to pool shipping, although the situation very desperately required that it be done, the President yielded reluctantly and only partially. To suggestions that there be a pooling of supplies for the armies, he declined to yield and he rigidly withdrew from our military representatives in Europe even the smallest liberty of diplomatic or political discussion or action, requiring all such questions to be submitted to him for action. His often expressed view was that we were fighting the same war but our position in it was for American rather than European reasons or objects.

Now that we no longer face the problems which the Administration had to face from 1914 to 1919, it is possible to indulge all sorts of speculations about what might have happened if other courses had been followed. In the flood of talk about peace which has swept through the United States in the years since the war, it is easy for those who do not like what has happened (and few of us do) to imagine that things might have been quite different if we had known enough to turn off that long road at some of the many turnings which now seem to have been practicable. Such judgments, however, are of the kind that Pericles had in mind, and whether they are wise we shall never know. When the actions now doubted were taken, they were the best we knew, and the most important thing about them is that the reasons which really moved us be clearly understood, so that those who are called upon in the future to act in like emergencies may see all the complex elements which enter into the formation and expression of the will of a great people. No future Secretary of State is going to be able to form his policy under the wisdom of twenty years after. I am perhaps no better satisfied than anyone else with the course

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the world has taken since 1919, but I am wholly unconvinced that the world is any worse off because of the idealism with which an American President, sustained by an overwhelming public approval, endeavored to serve it.

The war ended eighteen years ago. While I was a member of the Wilson Cabinet, my preoccupation with questions of military organization, supply and policy so occupied my time that I had very little opportunity to consider diplomatic problems. When the war was over and I left Washington, I turned my face very resolutely toward the future and have not to this day reëxamined my personal files or attempted any reëxamination of the problems then disposed of. With that much background I tried to bring to the questions here discussed as detached a state of mind as possible, and while I knew and honored the men whose actions I have here discussed as the officials responsible for American policies, I know quite well that their place in history will not depend upon any prejudiced judgment I may form of their actions.

I have spent practically all the leisure of the last year examining this subject, attempting to read all that has been published by our State Department and by the foreign offices of other governments and much of the discussion of these subjects by scholars and publicists. Out of it all I have come with the clear conviction that the entry of the United States into the World War was not in the least affected by munition makers or bankers, that the business interests of the country and the welfare of our people during the long struggle were a constant but, as it seems to me, a proper object of solicitude of the Government, but that nothing done in the protection or furtherance of these business interests affected the ultimate decision. I am convinced also that our entrance into the war was caused directly and solely by the German use of the submarine and that to the last President Wilson worked to keep America out of the war, not only for those reasons which would move any enlightened statesman who tried to save his country from such horrors, but also and primarily because of his conviction that a saving mission was a part of a providential plan for the world. That the President's hope was defeated presents itself to my mind as the surrender of a purpose cherished above all others, in response to a duty which the President felt to be inescapable. The whole point was that the national interests of the United States, the long-range view of the nation's position in the world of which it is a part, would not suffer the endurance

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PUBLIC LIBRARY
ELGIN, ILLINOIS

of the ruthless taking of the lives of Americans engaged in occupations which they had both a legal and moral right to pursue.

IX. CONCLUSION

It may contribute to clearness for me to restate the conclusion at which I have arrived in this examination and in advance to anticipate criticisms of it of four kinds.

What I have written will not appeal to those whose thinking starts from the pacifist or communistic point of view. The pacifists regard all alleged causes of war as so essentially heretical that to pick out any one of them is a work of supererogation, while those who write from the communistic point of view regard no wars as justified, on any ground, except the class war which has as its object the seizure of power by the proletariat, in which any degree of violence regarded as helpful is justified. To those who have this approach the wars of the modern world are conclusively assumed to be the defensive antics of the capitalist system, and they are not patient of proof, however conclusive, that the activities and ambitions of bankers and other representatives of the property-owning class were not the determining factors.

Criticism from another point of view will arise in the minds of those generally known as economic determinists. Since the war, opinion of this sort has grown rapidly and it is held by men occupying places of dignity and importance in the fields of scholarship in the social sciences. This school assumes an economic basis for all social phenomenon and rejects, even where it cannot disprove, the intervention of emotional influences and spiritual factors, which are regarded as manifestations of economic pressures. Much of what I have written will seem to such a modern materialist as either superficial or mystical, but I can make no other defense than to express my profound conviction that human events are not always motivated by economic considerations. We see on every hand personal and group passions which spring from traditional, racial, religious, and temperamental sources. Influences of this sort have not only been responsible for great events in human history, but they have frequently produced actions quite at variance with the obvious economic interest of those involved. Great leaders of men know this and have always known it, and their appeals have rarely, if ever, been to the economic advantage of actions which they desire their followers to take. Indeed, it may be said almost to be the characteristic of the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

kind of "inspiration," which has led men to deeds of individual or national heroism, that it involved the sacrifice of temporal and economic advantages for an ideal. Peter the Hermit preached the crusades not to sack the Holy City but to rescue the Holy Sepulchre. The negative of this thesis seems equally true to me. When cautious and conservative leaders have sought to restrain an emotional uprising by pointing out the obvious economic advantage of acquiescence in some spiritual or intellectual tyranny, they have been swept aside by movements of masses who set a higher value upon abstract things, like civil or religious liberty or the rescue of oppressed peoples, than they did upon economic well-being. The most beneficent forms of despotism have never been able, by plentiful bread and circuses, long to suppress the spirit of those who prefer to be poor if necessary, but in any case free.

The most pertinent criticism which I anticipate will come from those who feel that I have over-simplified the cause of America's entry into the World War and confused the occasion with the cause. This I may to some extent have done.

Certainly the occasion of the United States' entering the World War was the resumption of submarine warfare. The implications of that form of warfare and the atmosphere into which those implications were received seem to me to have been the cause. On an early page I have quoted from a letter written by Haniel, Counsellor of the German Embassy in Washington, to the German Headquarters. I repeat two sentences from it:

> . . . No government and no party would venture, without committing political suicide, to give in to Germany on this question, which is one involving the lives of American citizens, after America has so definitely announced what it considers its international rights. . . .
>
> . . . Even the most zealous apostles of peace would not be able to endure the reproach that, by breaking off diplomatic relations, they had in a sense given Germany a license to kill all Americans in the future.

This realistic opinion states the case. The American Government, as a great neutral, endeavored for two and one-half years to maintain the rights of its citizens while the rest of the world was engaged in a war of such desperate severity that all rules were off among the belligerents, with respect to the rights of neutrals, if a recognition of those rights threatened the success and, therefore, the safety of the fighting nations involved. As a consequence, the United States was perilously near a war with Great Britain in

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

BLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

1916, although the likelihood is that, if forced to the choice, Great Britain would have yielded rather than fought with us under the circumstances. The situation made our disputes with the Allies center around rights of property, as to which there could be arbitration and compensation for wrong when quiet was restored. Our controversies with Germany, however, centered upon the problem of human life, as to which no compensation was possible. To yield here involved an ultimate interest of the United States. Thiers ruthlessly restored order in Paris, asserting, "The first business of a government is to govern." Certainly the second business of a government is to protect the lives of its people. No government which conceded that some other government might kill its citizens in response to some exigency of its own, with no more serious consequences than a postponed attempt to secure a money compensation, would be intrinsically respectable or able to hold the confidence of its own people. The submarine warfare, therefore, presented the question to which there could be but one answer and about which there could be no delay. When the answer was given, it represented a composite expression of emotions which had been long brewing. Business interests, the "view of life," adherence to particular forms of civil liberty, dread of the consequences of the triumph of militarism, no doubt all made contributions. President Wilson himself expressed this when he said, "We are glad to fight for the ultimate peace of the world and the liberation of its peoples," a sentence which may be regarded as pure "idealism" and therefore held in low esteem. What has happened since 1918, however, has repeatedly demonstrated that Wilson's idealism was in fact a very far-seeing but stern realism. The present state of the world illustrates the importance of such considerations. We Americans at the present moment are looking with dread and disapproval at the menace of war which overhangs Europe. It is no doubt quite irrational and upon a cold analysis could probably be shown to spring from an infinitely complex interplay of economic tensions, nationalistic aspirations, and racial and religious traditions. But there they are! They make up the modern world, and they are not disposed of by disapproving of them. For all practical purposes, nations have ultimate interests which they would rather fight for than surrender. Those interests may be wise or unwise, selfish or unselfish. In 1917 the United States had such an interest and it was untainted by any selfish consideration.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

BACK OF THE SPANISH REBELLION

By Lawrence A. Fernsworth

MY EARS are still repeating, as I write, the echoes of roaring cannon and exploding bombs, of the intermittent "putt-putting" of machine guns and of continuous volleys of rifle fire, of clattering hoofs and bugle calls, of men shouting and others screaming in anguish, of screeching flocks of swallows flying back and forth in a frenzy as bullets whistle among them, of all the deafening cacophony with which, on the morning of July 19, rebellion was unleashed here in Barcelona and elsewhere on the mainland of Spain.

Here and in other loyal cities an armed anti-fascist militia of citizens are patrolling the streets afoot and in requisitioned motorcars, rifles across shoulders, pistols in hand. The streets and the highways bristle with barricades held by these same citizen soldiers whose only uniform is their firearm. Churches, monasteries and convents have been invaded and burned in hundreds upon hundreds. Priests and nuns have been scattered to the four winds and a sickening number of them have been killed, as have other fascist sympathizers. The rebels, also, are taking without pity their innumerable victims — peasants and workers and Republicans of all shades of opinion opposed to theirs. The land is drenched in blood and the end is far from sight.

Red revolutionists — Anarcho-Syndicalists, Socialists and various brands of Marxists — have made common cause with the government to save Spain from fascism. It is recognized, both within and without the country, that fascism versus popular rule has become the sharply defined issue. But when the revolutionary minded proletariat shall have done with the fascists, they will still have to come to an understanding with the constitutional government. Can Republican constitutional government prosper in Spain or has a proletarian social system, long incubating, settled upon it for an indefinite stay? That is a question which to a foreign observer like myself looms fully as large as the one of fascism versus popular rule.

Overnight — literally — the course of Spanish history has been changed. As we watch the moves of foreign Powers we realize that perhaps the course of western history is being changed as well. Some form of communism may have invaded the west, or

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

AURORA, ILLINOIS

fascism in one guise or another may have acquired a third European front and may have succeeded in encircling France. The constitutional government meanwhile is bravely fighting with its back to the wall, hoping to save the Republic as against both fascism and communistic proletarian rule. But the odds against it are heavy. The decision may be long postponed. Or it may already have been enforced by one side or the other before these lines can appear in print. But in either case an account of the background of the struggle as it appears to a foreign observer who has been in Spain for several years may have some value.

First, how did the actual rebellion begin? On Sunday, July 12, a lieutenant of the shock police, José del Castillo, was assassinated in the streets of Madrid. It was the culmination of a long series of fascist provocations and murders, openly admitted by fascist spokesmen. They had of course been answered in kind. Similar acts of violence and retaliation had been going on ever since the elections of February 16 last restored a Left government to power. The Left victory was by an overwhelming popular majority, despite wholesale corruptions and irregularities on the part of the Right, which in such provinces as Cuenca, Granada and Orense used the armed forces of the state to prevent their opponents from voting, or simply falsified the returns, as was amply proved in the ensuing debates in the Cortes. The assassination of Lieutenant del Castillo was answered that same night by the assassination of the monarchist leader and finance minister of the Primo de Rivera dictatorship, Calvo Sotelo. The shock police invaded his home in force, placed him in a police lorry and took him away. That was the last seen of him until his body with a mortal bullet wound in the head was delivered to the porter of a Madrid cemetery. Was Sotelo the secret leader of the fascists, one of the inspirers of a chain of assassinations? In Spain such things are well-nigh impossible to prove. But the shock police, an organization set up by the Republic in its first year to defend it in an emergency, was certainly convinced that he was.

The killing of Sotelo was followed by a most violent uproar on the part of the fascists, monarchists and their allies. At his graveside monarchist leaders took solemn oath that his death should be avenged. At a meeting of the permanent commission of the Cortes two days later, there were unbridled speeches, one of the most violent being made by the Catholic Party's leader, Gil Robles, who warned the Government that "responsibility" would over-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

take "the highest" therein, "and will fall upon the parties which support you in the Popular Front coalition, and will strike the whole parliamentary system and spatter the very régime with mud, with misery and with blood." He quoted the words of Saint Dominic addressed to a Castilian king: "Sir, you can take my life but you can do no more. It is preferable to die gloriously rather than to live in shame." Having made his speech, Gil Robles immediately departed for France, and thence to Portugal.

Four days after this speech was pronounced the garrisons in Spanish Morocco under General Francisco Franco rebelled. The next day saw the uprising on the mainland.

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

II

The present uprising is the climax of a revolutionary process which has been under way ever since the proclamation of the Spanish Republic on April 14, 1931. Three distinct periods may be noted:

(1) The "first biennium" — the period of pure republicanism; of the adoption of the constitution; of the granting of autonomy to Catalonia (an action which many said meant the dismemberment of Spain); of the curbing of the excessive powers and pretensions of the army; of the separation of church and state; of a series of revolutionary attempts against the Government by the Anarcho-Syndicalists; of trials and errors and tardy rectifications. The first biennium ended in the elections of November 1933, which turned out the Azaña régime and gave power to the Right, acting in combination with the Radical Party bloc.

(2) The "black biennium," the reactionary period which followed and which lasted until the elections of February 1936. This was the period of waste, of marking time, of corruption, of the undermining of the constitution, of the wrecking of Catalan autonomy, of the glorification of the army, of the suspension or disregard of the religious laws and the replacing of the clergy on the payroll. Finally, it was the period of the Catalan and the Asturias revolutions and of the wholesale and cruel repressions that followed.

(3) The brief period after the recent elections which brought back to power the "pure" Republicans led by Don Manuel Azaña, in agreement with the Socialists and Communists, though not with their participation in the cabinet.[1] These groups together

[1] *Cf.* the author's "Mass Movements in Spain," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, July 1936.

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

constituted the Popular Front, with a minimum social program accepted by all. This period saw the rehabilitation of the constitution; the abrogation of illegal laws and decrees, the restoration of Catalan autonomy; the liberation of political and social prisoners; the enactment of laws and decrees giving employment to workers and increasing their pay; and the settling of the peasants upon the land in large numbers. It also saw the development of a fatal circle of violence and retaliations, and finally the loosing of civil war.

The rebellion against the Republic is the work of three main forces united in a well-understood pact, sealed by the fact of mutual and interrelated interests. The forces in question are the privileged and propertied classes, the army and the church.

The privileged and propertied classes have kept the people in misery. That is a fact. The tale of its how and why has been told so frequently that to tell it again now would be mere wearisome repetition. The position of the army, and in even greater degree the position of the church, are not so well known. Indeed, with respect to the church many persons inquire in amazement how it can be that in a Catholic country a Catholic people can turn against the church with as much vehement fury as was ever recorded of Protestants in the old days of church persecutions. The army and the church, therefore, deserve more extensive examination, particularly as regards the positions they took up vis-à-vis the Republic.

But first it may be well to view somewhat more *in extenso* certain aspects of the second of the three revolutionary periods already mentioned, the period in which Gil Robles was the moving figure, not only because it is closely linked with the present attitude of the army and the church, but because the manœuvres of that time paved the way for that which has now come. The rebellion is the great cry of frustration of all those reactionary elements which had hoped to profit by what was in preparation during the "black biennium" of relaxation and retrogression.

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

III

José Maria Gil Robles, a professor of law at Salamanca and also a journalist of the staff of the Madrid Catholic paper, *El Debate*, came into prominence a year or two after the advent of the Republic by his organization of a Catholic party, "Acción Popular," to defend the interests of the church. This party later

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

became the principal unit of the CEDA (Spanish Confederation of Autonomous Right Parties). Gil Robles was a monarchist who later, for reasons soon to be seen, finally declared himself to be a republican and became minister of war under Lerroux in 1935. The following extract from an interview given by him a few months ago to the *Diario Español* of Buenos Aires, and published also in *La Vanguardia* of Barcelona on June 2, may serve to throw light on his peculiar mentality:

> For us Democracy is a transitory means of influencing the politics of the country. We act as *posibilistas*, which in the last analysis is the way everybody acts. When we find ourselves confronted by a reality we seek to procure two things: to derive the greatest benefit from it, and to transform it to our ideology. The present Spanish political system is very far from constituting, let us not say an ideal of perfection, but not even the possibility of efficacious action in the country. What I do is to find a supporting base on whatever offers itself to me in order to transform it and, if necessary, to destroy it. I do not refer to such an insignificant and transitory thing as the form of the government, but to the problem of the fundamental change of the country.

This statement made by Gil Robles after his departure from power throws a searching light on his procedure while in power. The Republic was a reality and he accepted it as "a supporting base" to be transformed and destroyed, as the record of his speeches and his proceedings while in power all too plainly demonstrate. No republican or liberal Spaniard ever had the least doubt of that — and no partisan of Gil Robles. Fishermen tell that the cuttlefish is the sea's greatest hunter of lobsters. When the lobster sees one coming it becomes paralyzed for fear and drops its claws. The cuttlefish then wraps itself around the lobster and in a short time there is no meat left in it, only the empty shell. Within sight of all, Gil Robles and his followers who had "accepted" the Republic were rapidly leaving it with no republican meat in it — only the empty shell.

In 1933 the Pope issued the Encyclical *Dilectissima Nobis*, which, while deploring "the provocations and vexations of the enemies of the church," also stated: "All know that the Catholic Church, being in no manner bound to one form of government more than to another, provided always that the rights of God and of the Christian conscience are safeguarded, finds no difficulty in accommodating itself to the various civil institutions, be they monarchic or be they republican." Taking this as its cue, the Catholic organ *El Debate*, on December 15, 1933, published an editorial which was meant to be a message to devout Catholics

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

and which concluded by saying that Spanish Catholics, in view of the words of the Pope, need not necessarily find difficulty in reconciling themselves to Republican institutions. This editorial further sponsored "political action of the Right," which it defined as "political action of Catholics and as Catholics." This norm, "political action of Catholics and as Catholics," was henceforth to be the dominant note of "Acción Popular" and its allies. Indeed, Gil Robles, who was building up his party on fascist lines, with himself as the "supreme chief" whom all should unquestioningly obey, had anticipated it, for on June 19 we find him saying at the *Cine Monumental*, Madrid: "I assure you that the first and sole reason for the existence of 'Acción Popular' is that it is eminently Catholic and in its whole being it ratifies the declarations of the Bishops and the papal Encyclical."

Gil Robles, in addition to his alliance with the church, entered into an alliance with the army. He glorified it repeatedly in his public speeches, as for instance at the great mass meeting at Medina del Campo, June 30, 1935:

> The army is wholly at the service of Spain; it is not at the service of any party or of any political action or of any man. It is at the service of Spain, of the nation, of the collectivity. This title is its glory and it has never dreamed of departing from its course nor can any evil minded person believe that the army is capable of being traitor to the high destinies which rest in its hands.

These are words full of equivocal meaning, of the kind which in Spain fall in the category of "Jesuitism," just as the reasoning in the heretofore quoted interview is what the Spaniard calls "Jesuitical" — whether with justice to the Jesuits I do not venture to say. In Spain "Jesuitism" is a current term meaning labyrinthine action, and I am obliged to report the existence both of the term and of what it describes. Spain being a land where one is commonly expected to read between the lines of statements of public men and of the press, the suspicion grows that the words, "nor can any evil minded person ever believe that the army is capable of being a traitor to the high destinies which rest in its hands," were actually intended as a backhanded appeal to the army to act in a propitious moment precisely as it has subsequently acted to save the undefined "high destinies" entrusted to it. However that may be, no Spaniard on either side doubted for a moment that this was a direct bid for the army's favor and support, the more so as while he was at the war ministry Gil Robles had curried the good will of the army by reinstating generals and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

other high officers whom the Republic had dismissed as disloyal, and by procuring for it huge budgetary appropriations.

About this time there was active an organization known as "Unión Militar Española," which for more than two years had been fomenting military revolt. Many persons knew about it. I hold one of its secret pronunciamentos in my hands. It is a violent exhortation to military men to "save Spain" from an "international plot" to "pulverize" it and "promote the ruin of religious sentiment and of the Spanish family, of capital, of labor . . . " Yet in an interview given to *La Nación* of Buenos Aires (reprinted in *El Noticiero*, Barcelona, August 28, 1935), Gil Robles said that it was "absolutely untrue that in the army there existed Juntas of Defense," that the "Unión Militar" had "scant influence in the army" and that "today the Spanish army is absolutely apart from politics and most perfectly disciplined."

Although he professed to accept the Republic, Gil Robles was constantly qualifying his words. Thus in the same interview: "The possibilities of restoring the monarchy are in direct ratio to the acts of violence which the Republic may commit."

Consider now what he said in an interview given in Lisbon to the correspondent of *Paris-Soir* after the outbreak of the present hostilities and published in that journal on July 31. He denounces with indignation responsibility for "the terrible events which are happening in Spain" and disclaims "all material and moral responsibility" for the rebellion. He continues: "In the present situation it seems to me that a military dictatorship might be envisaged as a transitory government. But Franco and Mola and Llano, after having driven the government from Madrid and delivered Barcelona, should form a government containing civilian technicians." One cannot help but wonder at the strange mental processes of a man who talks about "terrible events," disclaims responsibility for them, speaks in the same breath with equanimity about "driving the government from Madrid" and "delivering Barcelona," and gives counsel to forces in arms against the legally constituted government, of which forces he had not long before said that they could never be "traitors to their high destinies." What, then, were those high destinies?

LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

IV

The Spanish army is a vestige of feudal times, a strangely incongruous institution in this twentieth century. In the Middle

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

Ages there existed various castes, each having its *fueros* or rights and privileges, the *fueros* of the military caste running nip and tuck with those of the church. The officer was the direct representative of the king and to a certain degree his personification. An offense against the army was therefore an offense against the king. Officers could not be criticized, much less disobeyed. They were virtually immune from the law as it applied to most citizens.

This sacred character of the Spanish army was maintained under the monarchy; and though somewhat modified under the Republic, the tradition survived. Under the monarchy, criticism of the army or unfavorable comment upon it constituted an offense which subjected any citizen, even in peace times, to long terms of imprisonment at the hands of a military court. The army was a pampered institution. Ex-King Alfonso preferred the company of military men to all others, and their influence over him, and consequently over the government, was great. In his day there was passed the law of jurisdictions which gave to the army authority, not only over offenses committed against its person, but over any criticism or comment or action which might be construed as hostile to the king, the state or the régime. Thus republican agitation was a *military* offense. The army became obsessed with the idea that its special mission was to be the "Savior of Spain." It controlled its own internal régime, disciplined refractory members, and intervened in political affairs by means of secret committees called Juntas. These Juntas frequently fomented conspiracies against the government itself. So pernicious were their activities that the late dictator, Primo de Rivera, abolished them. The army then formed secret committees which plotted against the dictator.

With the advent of the Republic the power of the army was considerably curbed. The press, radio speakers and public speakers in general were freed from the jurisdiction of military courts. Courts of honor were abolished. The law was laid down that the army must be amenable to civil authority. Officers out of harmony with the new régime were given the opportunity of withdrawing on retirement pay. Many accepted, but the most intransigent monarchists remained to continue their plotting, though of course showing a bland countenance to civil superiors and professing to be loyal to the established régime. Unfortunately, many liberal officers of advanced ideas, having scant sympathy with militarism, also withdrew; they considered liberal

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

action within the army to be hopeless. Thus the army did not escape from the domination of the old diehards. Yet in material ways the army was treated well. The Republic sought to reorganize it upon more efficient lines and to equip it better, hoping gradually to win it to its side.

The case of Luis de Sirval, a well-known Madrid reporter, who as correspondent for a press syndicate went to Oviedo during the "black biennium" and there was assassinated in prison by three army officers (October 27, 1934), may be chosen to give an insight into Spanish military methods and their "tie-up" with reactionary civil authorities. Sirval had been arrested for having written an article exposing army excesses. The three officers simply went to his cell, took him out into the patio and killed him, thus vindicating "the honor and good name of the army." There was such an uproar in the press that even the Right government was compelled to do something about it after it had tried in vain to hush the whole thing up. So one of the officers, a Bulgarian who had joined the foreign legion, was allowed to present himself as a scapegoat and be tried in a civil court. The trial was such a travesty on justice that it is almost impossible to believe it could have occurred in a country calling itself civilized. The public prosecutor was in effect the attorney for the defense, acting in open collusion with the president of the court. Notwithstanding irrefutable testimony of cold-blooded assassination, the court's verdict, "homicide by imprudence," virtually absolved the defendant. He was sentenced to serve six months and a day in prison, and the sentence was considered extinguished by his term of arrest on parole. The court found that the victim's offense of making revelations about the army constituted an aggravating — presumably a justifying — circumstance.

The plain fact is that the attempts of the Republic to curb the power of the army, to moderate its *fueros*, to make it strictly amenable to civil authority, constituted a blow to its pride which it could never forgive. And when the Republic's enemies flattered the army with fair words, whispered to it that it was still the anointed "Savior of Spain," it seized the opportunity of salvaging its private interests under the guise of saving the state.

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

V

When one considers the age-long position of the church in Spain, and that which has now befallen it, there comes to mind an

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

adaptation of a famous line: "Of all sad words of tongue and pen, the saddest are these: It needn't have been." For indeed the fate of the Spanish Church in modern times need never have been if only it had followed another path. This writer some two years ago cautioned a Catholic editor for whose journal (being also a Catholic) he sometimes wrote, that Gil Robles was pursuing a course which would merely make matters worse for the church. The caution has proved well-founded. Unpleasant as is the tale of the church's alliance with the Republic's enemies, the facts must be faced; the tale must be told. To do otherwise would be insincere and cowardly.

In such countries as England and the United States, where the high calibre of the men of the church win them general respect, the question is incessantly asked: "How is it that in an almost purely Catholic country the people can turn against the church in such fashion?" Catholics and Protestants alike are perplexed to explain how an institution charged with the mission of spreading and defending the doctrine of love for one's neighbor, of the dignity and worth of individual man, of a common justice for a common humanity, and which was, moreover, in a privileged position to accomplish its task, should nevertheless have failed so miserably as only to stir up in the hearts of its children a frenzy of distrust and hate, with all the terrible practical consequences which we are now witnessing?

Popular uprisings against the church in Spain are not new. In 1835 there was a widespread burning of churches and monasteries, one of the principal grievances in that day being the church's excessive holdings of land and wealth in contrast to the misery of the people. But the church "came back," again grew great in power and wealth. Everywhere it again had churches and monasteries enormously rich.

Up to the advent of the Republic there existed a kind of union of church and state which meant that the clergy and the hierarchy were paid from the public treasury; the Bishops were the nominees of the King, that is to say, were political personages addicted to the régime; certain Bishops were members of the Senate; the church had intervention in the national schools for the purpose of teaching religion. In other words, the church was the ally of the state; but the state was regarded by the people as their oppressor. At least, illiterate and hungering masses saw it that way. Moreover, the church constituted a heavy drain upon the eco-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

nomic resources of the country. It was top-heavy with clergy — sixteen to twenty of them could be seen any day at some modest funeral, each one collecting his fee. And how many times have I walked into some cathedral to find a solemn or a pontifical mass being celebrated in all liturgical pomp with the assistance of the entire cathedral chapter and in the presence of only three or four of the faithful!

The people had their chief contacts with the church for funerals, masses and dispensations. They arrived at the conclusion that the church was a *negocio*, a business. Some of the clergy lived scandalous lives. Too many of them were accused of attempting to dominate the households with which they had contact, of setting themselves up as bosses in the villages, and of much more. In consequence the clergy came to lose the respect of great sectors of the population — if not, indeed, of a majority of Spanish Catholics. Hundreds of thousands were completely driven away from the church. Others, the anti-clericals, drew a sharp line between clericalism and Catholicism. Of such were the many good practising Catholics who favored the Republic and who bitterly resented the attempts of the clergy to make them oppose it.

Let *El Socialista* (April 11, 1936) complete the record of the opposition's complaint against the church:

> The monarchy did nothing but deliver itself over to the intrigues of Rome, whose tendency to exercise temporal power and privilege in the affairs of state is irrepressible. Bishops and parish priests shared political control with governors and mayors. The Papal Nuncio was accustomed to have greater influence than the Prime Minister. There existed the anachronistic situation of two systems of law incompatible with the sovereignty of a lay and indivisible state: the canonical law and the civil law. Religious indifference was deemed an offense against the fatherland and public functionaries were participants in liturgical services. The consequences of this Byzantinism were that the people reacted in equal degree against the church and the monarchy which appeared in umbilical union. Upon the fall of the monarchy there was severed this morbid juncture. The state proclaimed its absolute power in matters of law and laicism. . . . The church, however, has not resigned itself, and its latest offense is that which is represented by the CEDA. . . . We men of earth, respectful of the ecstasies of others, merely ask that the priestly caste do not stir up the rancor of its sheep against our political institutions.

The foregoing sums up the viewpoint of those who sought to bring about the separation of church and state by radical processes. The reference to the respectfulness of the average Spaniard toward religious worship appears true to this writer. It seems

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

improbable that after the initial outburst of church burning in 1931 there would have been further violence against the church if it had had the wisdom to let well enough alone. Indeed by prudence and patience, by recourse to what it itself calls "Christian resignation," by showing a disposition to mend its ways, it might very well have gradually recaptured much lost sympathy, have procured an abatement of some of the religious laws and won a full recognition of its legitimate rights. If, for instance, the Republic had been convinced that the clergy would not use the church schools as centres of propaganda against a government which the Supreme Pontiff himself had found not incompatible with the church's interests, it seems fairly certain that in time it would again have had its schools. Unfortunately the church did not see it that way. It went hand-in-glove with a party and a leader who were known to be the Republic's archenemies. The people felt that to maintain itself in power the church stood ready to wreck the Republic. And so the church drew destruction upon its own head.

I do not mean to suggest that within the Spanish church organization there were not sincere and self-sacrificing men and women; efficient and altruistic institutions of learning and charity; priests, monks and nuns dedicated to the service of humanity. I refer particularly to the Franciscan order which was close to the people according to the testimony of many revolutionists themselves. But in actual practice the members of that order were somewhat in the position of ugly ducklings vis-à-vis the church organization. All these sincere and innocent people were the unwitting victims of "the system," of the Spanish church's imprudent procedure, of its absolutism. With it they have fallen.

Let us now examine briefly the "anti-church" measures to which the Republic had recourse. The hierarchy and the clergy were cut off from the public payroll. They were permitted to exercise their sacerdotal functions as they pleased but were forbidden to earn a livelihood as teachers. Cemeteries were laicized: religious burials required that the deceased should have given permission before his death; public religious funerals required the permission of the local authorities (but they were rarely prohibited); religious processions such as were held in the streets on great festivals likewise required permission (they were in the main disallowed, although the Seville Holy Week processions went on as usual). Local

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

authorities sometimes harassed the church by prohibiting the ringing of church bells or putting a tax upon them.

A special law dissolved the Jesuit order and confiscated its property. Another special law, known as the religious congregations law, suppressed religious schools and limited the activities of the religious orders, placing them under strict state supervision although not suppressing them. The third of the trilogy of religious laws provided for the nationalization of church property. This law simply declared all church property, inclusive of treasures, to be the property of the nation, on the ground that it had not been acquired in the way of ordinary property and so did not fall into the same category; it was held to constitute an unearned patrimony of national wealth and therefore to be the patrimony of the people. The nationalization of church property did not mean its confiscation. All such property was left in the possession of the church, down to the last chalice and candlestick, with not the slightest restriction on its use. The only limitation was that it could not be disposed of by the church as though it were private property. Neither could it be disposed of by the state, which was specifically charged with its protection and upkeep. Furthermore, as state property it was exempt from taxation, a fact which would seem to constitute the lifting of a great burden from the church. Finally, diplomatic relations with the Holy See were not severed. The Papal Nuncio remained at Madrid, and during the first biennium there would have been a Spanish Ambassador at the Vatican (as indeed there was during the "black biennium") had not the Vatican declined to accept the appointee.

This is a succinct summing up of the treatment received by the church at the hands of the Spanish Republic. If some of the measures seemed unjustifiably harsh, they were not without a prospect of remedy. It may also be commented that they were not so harsh as the things that were done to the church in countries such as Mexico and Germany.

Nevertheless the church threw all the weight of its clergy, its press and its amenable followers into the political struggle. There was formed, simultaneously with "Acción Popular," a great organization of laymen, women and children, and even clergy, known as "Acción Católica." Every individual owning the name of Catholic was urged to join it. "Acción Católica" was no more than an adjunct to "Acción Popular," and when the elections of 1936 were preparing it boldly flung itself into the political cam-

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PUBLIC LIBRARY

paign against the Popular Front. A single citation is enough — the manifesto of the Archdiocesan Junta of "Acción Católica" for the Archdiocese of Tarragona, forewarning Catholics of "the dangers of the triumph of the revolution in the forthcoming elections" and enjoining upon them the "duty" of voting "the announced candidacy of order," since by so doing they would be conforming to the desire of the Pontiff recently set forth by His Eminence Cardinal Goma, Archbishop of Toledo and Primate of Spain. This manifesto added: "Abstention in these circumstances would be a desertion and a betrayal of the fatherland and a manifest disobedience to the norms which, in the present situation, have been outlined by the Holy See and the Spanish Episcopacy. Let all then vote as a single man, with a single ticket, for religion and the fatherland."

I can bear personal witness regarding good Catholics of scant Republican sympathies who, shocked by this attempt to tell them how to vote, either abstained or voted for the Republic. The manifesto was widely published in the press, and its appearance is particularly cited in two Barcelona newspapers of non-political and moderate tendencies which maintain church pages for their readers, *El Noticiero*, February 8, and *La Vanguardia*, February 11 and 12.

Attempted church dictation in politics had already showed itself in the national elections of 1931, only a few months after the Republic was proclaimed. This was revealed by various pastoral letters of the Episcopacy at that time, particularly that of Cardinal Segura, the Primate, which merited his expulsion from Spain. By the time of the Catalan regional elections of November 1932 the political intervention of the church was well organized. Voters were deluged with literature (of which I retain some specimens) informing them that "their consciences did not permit" them to vote for a Left candidate. It is a commentary on the disposition of the extremists not to be provoked to further excesses that no campaign of violence against the church ensued. An occasional attack upon a church occurred, particularly during the 1934 uprising, but there was no widespread or systematic attack for five years.

Penitents of the church have been compelled to don sackcloth and ashes. They have gone to Canossa. But the Spanish church never does. It does not look into its own heart, it does not make an examination of conscience or a confession of error. Its defenders

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

abroad, moreover, represent it as the victim of completely unreasoning persecution without practical cause. The gates of hell are simply presumed to have been opened against it.

VI

Having taken account of the forces engaged in the struggle against the Spanish Republic, one is impelled to draw up the following indictment:

In a moment when a duly elected and constitutional government was fighting, its back to the wall, to save Spanish democracy both from the onslaughts of its enemies of the right and from the excessive demands of revolutionaries of the kind commonly called red, the privileged classes, the army and the church, to salvage their own material interests, deliberately made common cause in an attack upon the government, deliberately unloosed a reign of terror in which both sides have since had an equal share of guilt, deliberately opened the gates to the revolution of untutored and infuriated masses bent upon wiping out democratic government and establishing the supreme domination of the proletariat.

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

ALTERNATIVES BEFORE THE LEAGUE

By A. Lawrence Lowell

SINCE the British cabinet decided that sanctions against Italy should be dropped because (as the Foreign Secretary admitted) the purpose for which they were imposed had not been realized, the change of attitude towards them has been rapid. The House of Commons supported the cabinet; France agreed to take a like position at the League; Poland definitely gave up the sanctions; and finally the Assembly at Geneva voted to advise its members to abandon them — the voice of the Union of South Africa alone being heard strongly in opposition.

The resolution adopted by the League as it adjourned on July 4 was as follows:

The Assembly,

(1) Having met again on the initiative of the Government of the Argentine Republic, and in pursuance of the decision to adjourn its session taken on October 11th, 1935, in order to examine the situation arising out of the Italo-Ethiopian dispute;

(2) Taking note of the communications and declarations which have been made to it on this subject;

(3) Noting that various circumstances have prevented the full application of the Covenant of the League of Nations;

(4) Remaining firmly attached to the principles of the Covenant, which are also expressed in other diplomatic instruments such as the declaration of the American States, dated August 3rd, 1932, excluding the settlement of territorial questions by force;

(5) Being desirous of strengthening the authority of the League of Nations by adapting the application of these principles to the lessons of experience;

(6) Being convinced that it is necessary to strengthen the real effectiveness of the guarantees of security which the League affords to its Members:

Recommends that the Council:

(a) Should invite the Governments of the Members of the League to send to the Secretary-General, so far as possible before September 1st, 1936, any proposals they may wish to make in order to improve, in the spirit or within the limits laid down above, the application of the principles of the Covenant;

(b) Should instruct the Secretary-General to make a first examination and classification of these proposals;

(c) Should report to the Assembly at its next meeting on the state of the question.

The Assembly,

Taking note of the communications and declarations which have been made to it on the subject of the situation arising out of the Italo-Ethiopian dispute;

Recalling the previous findings and decisions in connection with this dispute:

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Recommends that the Co-ordination Committee should make all necessary proposals to the Governments in order to bring to an end the measures taken by them in execution of Article 16 of the Covenant.

Except for the giving up of sanctions against Italy in the last paragraph, this has left everything uncertain until the next meeting of the Assembly in September; and reflects, as did the preceding debate, the lack of any coherent plan on the part of the delegates. Under these conditions it is natural for one who was active twenty years ago in the League to Enforce Peace to review the past and speculate about the future; for it seems to be assumed that a turning point has been reached at Geneva — another turning point if you will, but one where a definite, and perhaps final, policy should be settled.

That the members of the League of Nations did not in the cases of Japan and the Chaco put into effect the sanctions of the Covenant was obvious enough, but their failure to do so was hardly such as to indicate an intention not to do it thereafter, especially if the question should arise nearer home. In each of these cases the conditions were at first puzzling. Japan complicated the issue by insisting that her action was not war, and by stating that she would withdraw her forces into the railroad zone in Manchuria as soon as the country was pacified; while in the Chaco an attempt to apply sanctions to the full extent between two South American nations would have raised uncomfortable questions, involving not improbably the Monroe Doctrine. In the case of Japan, the Assembly did, indeed, finally declare in substance that she had violated the Covenant; and although no member of the League acted in accord therewith, their abstention was not universally regarded as an abandonment of the principle. Within the present year a clearer test case came, where a great European Power attacked another member of the League in such a way that the Council did not hesitate to declare that it had resorted to war; where its intentions were known beforehand; and where sanctions were actually used, but without effect. What can the world learn from this experience? May we not safely draw two conclusions that have a bearing on the future of the League and of the American attitude thereto?

The first is that deterrents from aggression must be brought to bear before a country goes to war, and not after it has actually become engaged in hostilities. When a nation has made its preparations, when the campaign is going on, when the blood of the

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

AURORA, ILLINOIS

people is up, it is well-nigh impossible for the government to back down, or for the people to be so intimidated as to demand a withdrawal. To be effective, a deterrent must be applied before the rulers have committed themselves, and therefore they must know definitely what the penalties for aggression will be, and that they will surely be carried out. After war has begun, a meeting of nations to consider what shall be done is obviously too late. It is wiser and safer to keep a dog from getting a bone than to take it out of his mouth afterwards.

The second conclusion that can be drawn with reasonable certainty from the Ethiopean war is that sanctions should be strong enough to effect their object, or they are likely to do more harm than good by irritating the aggressor without restraining him. They may leave bitterness enough to tip the balance the wrong way on some delicate occasion, sowing seeds of ill-will that may germinate when they will do the most harm. Moreover, they encourage in other rulers contemplating aggression a feeling that sanctions are after all rather a demonstration than a danger, and will not be carried far enough to require hesitation on their part. In the case of Italy the League is said to have reckoned on Ethiopia's holding out until the rains, when the pressure of the sanctions would become effective. That would not be preventing war, but making it unsuccessful.

If these two conclusions are correct inferences from the events of the past year they suggest some reflections about the future of sanctions under the League of Nations — provided the League does not through resignations fall into decrepitude, but remains really active. It would seem that sanctions ought either to be made more rapid, stringent and decisive, or else abandoned altogether; and in fact much current talk seems to lead in one or other of these directions. There are, indeed, vague suggestions of some middle course, leaving the present conditions mainly unchanged, and therefore uncertain; but that does not settle the future policy which must be determined before long on a definite, permanent and workable basis; for to retain in the Covenant obligations that cannot, or will not, be carried out, or that are unlikely to produce the result for which they are designed, is to deprive the League of moral weight, and ultimately of the respect of mankind. To retain its significance, the League must fulfil the functions it professes to perform, and must be relied upon to do what it undertakes, be that more or less.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

To many people the alternative of making sanctions drastic enough to be really effective or abandoning them will appear unreasonable, for it means that either extreme is better than the moderate course the League has been trying to pursue. Yet a choice of this kind is often presented in the conduct of life. In every profession and occupation there are times when a man is compelled to follow one or the other of two very widely different paths, because anything between will lead to inevitable failure. Cases of that kind present the most difficult questions to decide, for they require clear thought and courage which try men's souls; and many people, lacking boldness, slip into a middle course that is much easier to enter, but leads at best nowhere, at worst to a calamity.

The first of these alternatives — that is, making the sanctions instantaneous and drastic — would be to go back to the Covenant, which in the first section of Article 16, as originally drafted, and as it still stands, provides:

> Should any Member of the League resort to war in disregard of its covenants under Articles 12, 13 or 15, it shall *ipso facto* be deemed to have committed an act of war against all other Members of the League, which hereby undertake immediately to subject it to the severance of all trade or financial relations, the prohibition of all intercourse between their nationals and the nationals of the covenant-breaking State, and the prevention of all financial, commercial or personal intercourse between the nationals of the covenant-breaking State and the nationals of any other State, whether a Member of the League or not.

This, of course, meant a strict blockade by sea and land, and there can be no doubt that the framers of the Covenant intended it to be carried out as written. In fact, the very proposals made in the reports and deliberations of the Assembly, for delaying and reducing sanctions, were in substance rejected by the Committee that devised Article 16 in Paris. David Hunter Miller tells the story in his "Drafting of the Covenant," where he begins by referring to the remark in the first draft by Lord Phillimore's committee that they have desired to make the sanction as weighty as possible and therefore have made it unanimous and automatic.[1] Miller himself did not agree with this point of view, but thought there should be a decision by the League or the Council before sanctions were applied,[2] and the draft which he and Hurst prepared read: "Should any of the High Contracting Powers be

[1] Vol. I, p. 5.
[2] For his opinion *cf.* v. I, p. 177–78, 180–81, 366–67; v. II, p. 81.

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

found by the League to have broken or disregarded its covenants," etc. But Lord Robert Cecil proposed to substitute for "be found by the League to have broken or disregarded" the words "break or disregard," which was passed without comment, although Miller remarks that "The question as to what State is the aggressor," etc., was again left open.[3] Also, in the obligation to apply sanctions the words "so far as possible" were struck out, making it more rigorous; and to a question by Baron Makino whether Article 16 contemplated the suppression of all private intercourse between individuals, Lord Robert Cecil answered that experience with the blockade had demonstrated the need of putting an end to relations of every kind with a blockaded country.[4]

As in the case when the Constitution of the United States was under discussion, the smaller bodies were at first the most reluctant, and later the most willing, to accept strong measures. Denmark, Norway and the Netherlands proposed again that the use of sanctions should be decided by the League, that the smaller countries should be specially treated; and Sweden, going farther, that the economic ones should be applied progressively. But these suggestions were not adopted, Bourgeois remarking "that economic action would be automatic, but military action would require separate ratification" [5] — and so it was provided in Article 16. In presenting the draft to the full committee, President Wilson said: "Armed force is in the background of this programme, but it is in the background, and if the moral force of the world will not suffice, the physical force of the world shall." [6]

These references are surely enough to prove that the founders of the League of Nations intended the sanctions to be immediate, automatic and complete.[7] The assumptions underlying their belief in the efficacy of Article 16 to prevent war clearly were that the fact there had been resort to war, and the aggressor who did so, would in practice be obvious; that the members of the League would fulfil strictly the obligations they undertook; that in combination they would form such an aggregate of force as no nation would venture to resist; and thence that the probability of

[3] v. I, p. 180–81; v. II, p. 551.
[4] v. I, p. 261; v. II, p. 322.
[5] v. II, p. 616–18, 629–30, 641–43.
[6] Ray Stannard Baker, "Woodrow Wilson and the World Settlement," v. I, p. 285.
[7] Certainly the League to Enforce Peace — the principal organization in this country then advocating a league of nations to prevent war — so understood the provision, as may be seen in "The Covenanter," a series of articles written by some of its members.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ever putting the sanctions into effect would be extremely small. But the League was hardly organized before obstacles in the way of enforcing sanctions appeared, and there began a process of paring them down which has never ceased. A full history of the discussions and votes on this matter would require too much space to be given here; but enough may be told to indicate the general trend of thought among the members, and the substitution of a gradual limited pressure, after consultation and agreement, for the original plan of immediate, universal, automatic action.[8]

The assumption by the framers of the Covenant that war, the aggressor, and the consequent duty to act forthwith under Article 16 would be self-evident, was by no means accepted by the members of the League, and at the very outset the Council and Assembly concurred in appointing an international Blockade Committee on the procedure to be adopted in such cases. It made an elaborate report with recommendations tending to reduce the effect of sanctions. It suggested that any alleged violation of the Covenant should be referred to the Council which should express its opinion on the matter; and although everyone recognized that this would not be binding upon the members it was thought that the moral effect would be decisive with them. But, of course, to await the opinion of the Council meant delay until the aggression was well under way, and the war temper of the aggressor inflamed. The Blockade Committee further suggested that the Council should fix a date for joint action to begin — another postponement involving the same ineffectiveness. Even more important was its recommendation for a gradation of economic sanctions by the Council, beginning perhaps with the recall of diplomatic agents, and increasing in severity as the methods tried failed to deter the aggressor. The result of such a policy cannot be better expressed than by M. de Brouckère in a report on disarmament five years later:

> To say that ambassadors only will be recalled under an article which definitely requires the breaking off of all personal relations; to say that certain commercial relations will be gradually severed when the text demands that they should *all* be broken off *forthwith* is to make an almost ridiculous use of a clause in which the peoples most exposed to aggression see their supreme safeguard. It means weakening it dangerously and at the same time weakening the whole League.[9]

[8] The writer described the history of this matter at length in a Φ. B. K. address at Harvard in June 1934, printed in *The Atlantic* for July of the same year.

[9] League of Nations Reports and Resolutions on the Subject of Article 16 of the Covenant. A. 14. 1927. V. p. 70.

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In 1921 and again in 1924 the Assembly proposed amendments to the first clause of Article 16, modifying and softening its provisions; and although neither of them was adopted by the members of the League, the reports, the discussions and the resolutions in the Assembly revealed its attitude toward sanctions, and in fact governed the only serious attempt to apply them against a great nation. In the cases of Japan and the Chaco, as no use was made of them no precedent was created and no experience gained. The first real trial came in the war of Italy against Ethiopia; and although Article 16 has remained unchanged the procedure followed was substantially that proposed in the report of the Blockade Committee endorsed by the resolutions of the Assembly thereon — in short, postponing action until the campaign had begun, and then applying sanctions progressively. The result was not to deter, or prevent, Italy from carrying on the war until Ethiopia was crushed. Indeed, the League's action is said to have increased martial fervor among the Italian people; and certainly it left ill feelings among some of the nations concerned that do not help the general cause of future European peace. Sanctions as thus applied seem to be a staff on which if a man lean it will go into his hand and pierce it. Nor is there any reason to suppose that as thus used they would have a greater effect on any other powerful aggressor.

Now, is it possible for the League of Nations to reverse its own history, to go back to the policy of a complete blockade by sea and land to be put into effect on the outbreak of hostilities by all the members? Would they be willing to make such an agreement? Would the fear that when made it will be strictly carried out be strong enough to deter a Great Power from aggression, or the confidence in it sufficient to prevail on other Powers to reduce their armaments? And, finally, is there any other form of compulsion that would achieve these results?

Few people who have watched the course of the League since the World War will be inclined to answer any of these questions in the affirmative. The smaller members would, no doubt, be glad to have their protection increased; but the Great Powers, on whom the weight of the obligations must rest, having shown no overwhelming eagerness to execute in full their obligations under the Covenant as written, where their own interests were not involved, would be highly unlikely to renew them in the stringent form originally designed. They are beset with new cares, and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

especially with new fears, that engage their attention more than do undertakings to preserve the general peace of the world. Moreover, the League's action, or failure to act, in the past has not, in the minds either of prospective aggressors or of countries dreading attack, strengthened the faith in what any such organization will actually do, and hence a renewed Covenant for sanctions would have even less effect now than at first in preventing war or promoting disarmament. Finally, so far as the Great Powers are concerned, the League has virtually become an affair of Europe and its dependents. Is it not safe to say that although Russia is a European Power, yet if war broke out between her and Japan, with no other nation in Europe taking part, the League would not attempt to interfere?

The question remains whether any other form of compulsion than the action of the League can be devised with any chance of its adoption. None appears on the horizon, and there is no probability that any will for many long years to come. The vision of a universal league of nations acting with harmonious vigor to enforce peace over the world has faded into the light of common day, and Europe seems to be going back to the old system of separate treaties for mutual protection. A compact among European nations to repel aggression by one of their neighbors — Germany for example — may well be made; but that is very different from a universal league to prevent war by sanctions.

But suppose that, contrary to all probability, the provisions of the Covenant should be revived in their integrity to prevent the outbreak of war anywhere in the world, and that Italy and Russia should agree to play their part, would it be wise for the United States to join? In the present attitude of public opinion in this country she certainly would not; and in view of the history of the League on the subject, of the reluctance hitherto shown by the members to act in concert and with effect, of the compelling force of urgent particular interests, the chance of our exerting any serious influence would be so small that to join would be a mistake. Still less should we be willing to join in a reformed League, whatever its formal provisions, the real object of which was in fact limited to dealing with aggression in Europe. Any general war there would be a calamity to civilization that would drag us downward with that part of the world from which we sprang; but in the present aspect of affairs we cannot help to prevent it, for it rests upon conditions there which we cannot change, upon the inability

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

of European nations to act with harmony enough to settle their dissensions by peaceful means. We should not, let us hope, by insisting upon a right of neutral trade, interfere with whatever steps a League so reformed might take to forestall hostilities or hinder their extension; for we should not lose our sympathy with genuine efforts in any part of the world to rid itself of the horrors of war.

But the question whether we should join a resurrected organization to prevent war by the use of effective sanctions is, in fact, hardly worth discussing, for, in the existing state of feeling in most of the European countries, a well-nigh universal revival of the League with teeth to rend any aggressor — as distinguished from a military alliance for mutual protection — is virtually impossible.

The other horn of the dilemma, the contrary alternative, that of frankly abandoning altogether the sanctions that, as applied, have proved delusive, raises a very different question. In some form this course is not improbable, either by express amendment of the Covenant, or by a tacit understanding that Article 16 has become obsolete, not to be put into effect again. If so, the League would cease to be an instrument for the forcible prevention of war; for threats directed at nations meditating a breach of the peace; for sanctions or compulsion of any kind. But that by no means implies futility. Quite apart from its manifold services to the world in those international relations which have no bearing upon war, and therefore are less spectacular and less generally known, such a means of constant consultation is far from valueless. European congresses, notably that at Berlin in 1878, have thwarted the outbreak of war, or have negotiated peace; and many people believe that if such a meeting could have been held in time the World War would not have taken place. A congress of this kind meets under no previous obligations on the part of its members, no concerted means of compulsion, and yet it is not ineffective.

A League of Nations reorganized without sanctions would be such a congress, assembling at definite times, and also whenever the international clouds darkened. The consent of any nation to hold the meeting would not be needed, as that of Germany was in 1914, and hence none could prevent its taking place. No member would be wisely absent from such a gathering, held when war seemed to impend but had not broken out; nor would any

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

be likely to stay away, because even an aggressor wants to state its case while the world can hear, and will listen to it; and in fact Japan, and later Italy, preferred to retain their membership in the League until their immediate objects were achieved.

Much as some people may regret to have the League become a purely consultative body, shorn of teeth and claws, there is no intrinsic reason why any peaceable nation in Europe, and perhaps elsewhere, should not join it. Does this apply to the United States? Even while the League involved serious obligations by its members, our government has deemed it worth while to "listen in," to keep a man at the keyhole to talk with delegates as they went in and out. We have feared contamination by commitments which members made, but did not carry out, even if we did not assume them ourselves. But if there are to be none in the future, certainly none that we undertook, why should we hesitate to enter the hall? There is much to be gained by having an accredited diplomat at any international conference, to consult and exchange views with other nations. We do it constantly with individual governments, and sometimes with three or four together. Why should we be alarmed by imaginary entanglements if the same thing is proposed on a larger scale? A League so stripped of power is by no means what some of us had hoped for, and others dreaded — a fellowship of many nations bound together to enforce peace on the world. That has proved a dream. As a mere body for consultation it should have a different aspect for friends and foes. It could cherish no great aspirations, and should involve no risks; but it would be a useful place for international conference in which it could do us no harm to take our seat.[10]

[10] Nothing has been said here about adhering to the World Court, not because of any lack of importance in the issue, but because it is a wholly separate question. To accept the Court does not involve joining the League, participating in any of its actions, or submitting to any orders it may, as reconstituted, have power to make.

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

AIMS OF THE JAPANESE ARMY AND NAVY

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

By William Henry Chamberlin

THE Japanese fighting services constitute an *imperium in imperio*. They have their special objectives in foreign and domestic policy which no Cabinet can ignore with impunity. Their position is trebly buttressed by tradition, by constitutional privilege, and by the present balance of political forces.

The Japanese officer is the heir of the mediæval knight, the *samurai*, in popular respect and esteem. The Chiefs of the Army and Navy General Staffs enjoy the important right of direct access to the Emperor; and service theoreticians interpret this as freeing the Army and Navy from any parliamentary control of their activities. The requirement that the War and Navy Ministers must always be respectively a General and an Admiral in active service makes for strong military and naval influence on every Cabinet, since the corporate spirit of the services is so strong that no senior officer could be prevailed on to assume office in a Cabinet with a personnel or a policy that seemed inconsistent with the realization of military and naval aims and objectives. Moreover, the whole trend of events since the occupation of Manchuria, still more since the incident of February 26, has been in the direction of consolidating the predominant position of the Army and the Navy. The February outbreak was a dramatic and spectacular move in the complicated struggle between extremists and moderates that is always going on in Japan.

In one camp are the fighting services. The Army, especially in the middle and lower ranks of its officers' corps, is deeply affected by a ferment of vague but strong anti-capitalism and social radicalism. The Navy, less concerned with social questions, makes a united front with the Army on such points as insisting on industrial policies with a strategic turn, asserting freedom from civilian control, and demanding larger appropriations. With the fighting services may be reckoned the small but active societies and groups that advocate various brands of extreme nationalism. The Army and Navy, especially the former, exert much influence on the nationwide Reservists' and Young Men's Associations.

So much for the extremists. The moderates would include Japan's influential senior statesmen, men like Prince Saionji and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Count Makino and the victims of February 26, Viscount Saito and Finance Minister Takahashi. It is a curious but unmistakable fact that the older a Japanese statesman is the more likely his political outlook is to be tinged with liberalism and moderation. No doubt this is largely attributable to the fact that most of Japan's older leaders visited Europe and America during the formative years of their lives at a time when the liberal philosophy in politics and economics was not so generally flouted as it is today. The big business and financial interests, the larger part of the civilian bureaucracy, and the majority of the oldline politicians in the Diet may also be regarded as on the side of relative moderation in foreign policy and maintenance, in essential points, of the economic *status quo*.

Militarism, with its accompanying "navalism" and "big business," are the strongest articulate forces in Japan today. There are individual Japanese liberals, but there is no liberal party. A very mild socialist party, the Shakai Taishuto, substantially increased its vote in the Diet election which immediately preceded the February 26 outbreak. But the political influence of this organization is very limited. Communism is a proscribed faith in Japan. Apart from the constant watchfulness of the police — which finds expression in periodic round-ups of young people, especially students suspected of cherishing "dangerous thoughts" — there is little indication that communism is a serious force in Japan today. Some of the active communist and left-wing agitators of a few years ago have now become extreme nationalists.

There are several points at issue between the fighting services, on one side, and the business interests and civilian bureaucrats, on the other. First comes the ever pressing problem of how much Japan can afford to spend on armaments. Army and Navy estimates are naturally more generous than those of business men and financiers. Furthermore, the services favor certain industrial policies more defensible on military than on economic grounds.

The Navy's desire for an assured supply of oil looms large in the framing of some of these measures. From the standpoint of national self-sufficiency, Japan's oil position has been steadily deteriorating during the last decade. The use of oil products increased more than fourfold between 1923 and 1934, while domestic production remained practically stationary. As a result, the proportion of home-produced oil to the country's consumption declined from 34.2 percent to 8.4 percent. In the event of a

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

wartime emergency, Japan, by peaceful means or otherwise, would doubtless have the use of the oil of Northern Sakhalin, which the Soviet Union has no means of defending. But even this acquisition would, on the basis of present production, only raise the proportion of self-supplied oil to about 20 percent; and war would, of course, greatly increase the need.

Various measures have been adopted and proposed with a view to coping with this oil shortage. Foreign and Japanese oil companies are required to keep in storage a constant six months' reserve supply. The American and British oil companies for a long time opposed the application of this law, on the ground that it would put them to unreasonable expense in providing additional storage facilities. But a compromise has just been arranged, under which the companies will comply with the law, while the powerful Mitsui interests will provide the storage facilities. Other measures that are being pushed with strong support from the Navy are experiments in mixing gasoline with alcohol, intensive exploration of even the least promising oil-bearing land in the Japanese Empire, and state subsidies for the erection of plants devoted to the manufacture of oil from coal. Three such plants are definitely planned, two in Manchukuo, at Fushun and Ssupingkai, the other at the naval base of Tokuyama. The Navy's desire for assured oil supplies is also a powerful factor in strengthening its interest in the southward route of advance, to be discussed shortly. The Dutch East Indies, owned by a small and distant European power, contains the richest oilfields in East Asia. The projection of Japanese naval strength into the South Pacific might reasonably be expected to increase Japan's chances of access to this most important petroleum source in time of war.

Many Army and Navy officers, especially of the younger generation, regard themselves as champions of the debt-ridden, poverty-stricken peasants against exploitation by urban industry and finance. They see in the peasant the best human material for military service and also the representative of the old Japanese virtues, unspoiled by contact with the corrupting and unsettling influences of the towns. Consequently there is a strong demand in military and naval circles for more liberal agrarian relief regardless of the expense to the city taxpayer and mortgage-holder.

Without directly opposing the demands for strengthened national defense, more liberal agrarian relief and the shaping of economic policies to meet strategic ends, the business interests

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and the civilian statesmen, so far as they dare, offer a kind of passive resistance to the full-blown military program, emphasizing especially the financial obstacles to its realization.

This struggle between extremists and moderates, to give convenient terms to the two tendencies, is the axis around which revolves Japan's real political life, as distinguished from the shadow-boxing of the parties in the Diet. Sometimes the struggle proceeds imperceptibly, behind closed doors. Sometimes it takes extremely violent forms of expression, as in the terrorist acts of May 15, 1932, and the still more formidable military revolt of February 26, 1936. But finality is not to be expected in this struggle, because neither militarism nor big business, despite their quarrels and differences of opinion, can get on without the other. This is why crises which, viewed from a Western standpoint, seem to demand a "showdown," a decisive solution of some kind, end in Japan in compromise and a new groping for a working basis of equilibrium.

There is interdependence, as well as antagonism, between the two most powerful forces in contemporary Japan. Some industries, especially munitions, engineering and shipbuilding, are drawing substantial profits from the execution of Army and Navy orders. Individual Japanese firms, if not Japanese economy as a whole, stand to gain from the expansive development of Manchukuo. Japanese business men, like those of other countries, are not inclined to underrate the value of a strong Army and Navy as a trade protection and promotion agency, even if they sometimes grumble at the bills which are presented in this connection. At the same time, Army and Navy senior officers, if not the more impetuous juniors, believe that the capitalist, while he may be a disagreeable necessity, is still a necessity. They realize that any sudden disturbance of Japan's delicately adjusted mechanism of production, trade and currency would react unfavorably on the country's military capacity.

The outlines of the unwritten compromise that was the sequel to February 26 are fairly clear. The higher Army leaders, whose mouthpiece is the new War Minister, General Count Terauchi, have agreed to make every effort to curb the extremists among the younger officers on condition that the Army's views receive more consideration in state policies. The seventeen death sentences meted out to the more active participants in the February 26 revolt indicate a determination on the part of the Army leadership

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

to maintain discipline by sterner means than were formerly considered possible or expedient. The Navy is a more silent partner in this arrangement. In view of these circumstances the aims of the two services are of greater significance than ever.

Military and naval influence has never been negligible in directing the course of Japanese policy, especially in recent years. For a long time a curious kind of dual diplomacy has prevailed in Japan's dealings with China. Conciliatory gestures of diplomats have repeatedly been counteracted by high-handed and quite independent actions of soldiers and sailors. A Japanese publicist recently defended this practice on the following grounds: [1]

> We cannot believe that a single line of diplomacy necessarily represents the best method of readjusting existing difficulties. A certain amount of dual practice is more likely to achieve better results where the Chinese are concerned than any single line of policy, if one considers the present conditions in China, the peculiar nature of the Nanking Government and the character of the Chinese.
>
> The Chinese are gifted with a talent for frustrating the intentions of others when they foresee the methods of their opponents. In diplomatic astuteness the Japanese are no match for the Chinese. Unfortunate as it may be, China is a country that must be handled from all directions by all tactics, if it is to be aroused from the folly of its ways.

There have been several indications of the Army's intention to hold a tight checkrein on the new Cabinet. Several of Mr. Hirota's original nominees for ministerial posts were dropped as a result of peremptory vetoes from the Army. The Cabinet accepted the four points which the Army laid down as the prerequisites of its coöperation. These are: strengthening of national defense, clarification of national polity, adoption of a positive and independent foreign policy, and stabilization of the people's livelihood.

The last of these points may mean almost anything, from very slight measures of social reform to drastic extension of state control over industrial and economic life. "Positive and independent foreign policy" is also a very elastic phrase. "Clarification of national polity" is an accepted euphemism for the suppression of liberal constitutional theories, like those of Dr. Tatsukichi Minobe, who horrified conservative retired officers by describing the Emperor as "an organ of state." There will probably be a revision of teaching in the schools and universities along still more nationalist and orthodox lines.

[1] See the article by Mr. Bunroku Yoshioka, a member of the staff of *Nichi Nichi*, one of Tokyo's leading newspapers, in *Gaiko Jiho* for November 1, 1935.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Of all the four points the most concrete and the most inescapable is the increase in military and naval appropriations. Japan's financial resources have already been severely strained. The budget of 1932 assigned the Army 227,480,000 yen, the Navy 227,120,000 yen. A succession of steady increases raised the Army appropriation to 508,000,000 yen, the Navy allotment to 551,000,000 yen for the fiscal year, 1936–1937.[2] About 47 percent of the revenue is devoted to military and naval purposes.

Even this proportion is considered inadequate; the aged Finance Minister, Korekiyo Takahashi, paid with his life for his opposition to the demands of the services for still higher appropriations. Various devices are suggested for raising additional funds. Some savings are possible through refunding state loans at lower rates of interest. But it seems that, for the bulk of the supplementary revenue which will be required, the new Minister of Finance, Dr. Eiichi Baba, will be obliged to resort to two methods which are fraught with economic risk: higher taxes and increased flotation of deficit-covering bonds. Higher taxes will almost inevitably tend to raise the cost of living. This, in turn, may well initiate an upward spiral in wages and costs, disturbing the internal economic equilibrium which has been a main factor in Japan's remarkable gains in foreign trade. As for issuing more bonds, many financial observers believe that Mr. Takahashi had already done this up to, if not beyond, the limit of safety.

But the demands of the fighting services are insistent, and there is every prospect that by one means or another they will be satisfied. The Army lays special stress on strengthening its aviation and mechanized branches; and the heavy Soviet troop concentrations in the Far East are used as an argument for increasing the Japanese forces in Manchukuo, possibly to the extent of the four divisions which were disbanded during Japan's pacific interlude in the twenties. The prospective state of no-treaty relations in the Pacific serves the Navy as a talking point much as the alleged Russian menace reinforces the demands of the Army.

In their stand for increased appropriations, the suppression of liberals, the curbing of capitalists, and the subordination of the national economic life to the exigencies of defense, the Army and the Navy constitute on the whole a fairly united bloc, although the younger officers in the Army have been more unruly, more

[2] While the external value of the yen depreciated by more than 60 percent during this period there was little change in its internal purchasing power.

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

permeated with ideas of social radicalism than their colleagues in the Navy. The two services are also in agreement as to the desirability of a stiff and assertive foreign policy.

But there is a definite and significant cleavage of viewpoint between Army and Navy as to the immediate objectives which should be pursued. The former favors a westward, the latter a southward trend of expansion.

The Japanese Army was the real creator of Manchukuo. At a reception held on the occasion of the anniversary of Manchukuo's declaration of independence in Tokyo, I was struck by the number of prominent Japanese Generals who were present. From a subsequent trip in Manchukuo I carried away the impression that the Army was likely to have the last word on matters of administrative and economic policy, although in Manchukuo, as in Japan, there is a struggle between militarism and finance, with a cross-current of antagonism between Japanese traders who are primarily interested in profits and Japanese technical advisers who sincerely wish to promote the interests of the new state. Closely linked up with Manchukuo are the problems of North China and Inner Mongolia. Here again the Army naturally plays the leading rôle. It is Generals, not Admirals, who flit about between Hsinking, Peiping and Mukden, who pull the strings that move the curious little "autonomous" marionettes in Inner Mongolia and in the Demilitarized Zone.

Japan's determination to play the predominant rôle in North China has recently been reëmphasized by the increase in its garrison in the Tientsin-Peiping area to a figure in the neighborhood of 10,000. This is an important move in the Army game of westward, continental expansion. It means that Japanese troops will henceforward outnumber those which all other Powers maintain under the terms of the Boxer Protocol. Japanese "face" will be correspondingly enhanced. In the Orient, perhaps even more than in other parts of the world, it is often sufficient to show power without actually using it.

The geographical and professional considerations that attract the Army to the westward route of expansion dictate to the Navy a southward course of Empire. While the Army points to the timber, soya beans, coal and gold of Manchukuo, to the iron of Chahar, the coal of Shansi, the cotton of Hopei, Navy spokesmen not infrequently call the attention of Japanese business men to the wealth of tropical foodstuffs and raw materials in the South

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Pacific: oil, cotton, iron, tin, hemp and copra, to mention only a few of the most important minerals and raw materials. Admiral Sankichi Takahashi, Commander of the Combined Fleet of the Japanese Navy, recently told a gathering of Osaka industrialists, according to the report of the leading Japanese news agency: "Japan's economic advance must be directed southward, with either Formosa or the South Sea Island mandates as a foothold. In this case the cruising radius of the Japanese Navy must be expanded suddenly as far as New Guinea, Borneo and Celebes."

Admiral Takahashi, who after Japan's withdrawal from the London naval talks told a reporter of the Tokyo newspaper *Yomiuri* that Japan could defeat Great Britain and the United States together, is supported in his advocacy of a southward economic advance by Mr. Koichiro Ishihara, shipping magnate and financial patron of the Meirinkai, one of the more respectable and less violent nationalist associations with a large membership among retired military and naval officers. Ishihara, whose shipping and trading interests are in the South Pacific, published an article in a recent issue of the magazine *Diamond* recommending that Japan conclude a treaty of alliance with Germany and the Soviet Union "in order to make the European Powers keep their hands off the Orient." He characterized as "unnatural" policies which prevented Japanese settlement in Australia and the East Indies, declared the latter country was pursuing a self-destructive policy in restricting imports of Japanese goods, and confidently predicted that "Japan's southward policy will solve the political, economic and social problems confronting the country."

Economically there is much to be said for the idea that Japan's manifest destiny lies to the south. The share of Japan's foreign trade carried on with South Seas countries (British India, the Dutch East Indies, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Malaya and Siam) rose from 18.7 percent in1929 to 28.4 percent in 1934. With the exception of Australia and New Zealand, all these countries are inhabited by peoples of low purchasing power who have been eager buyers of the cheap Japanese textiles, bicycles, rubber goods, and miscellaneous exports. Moreover, experience has shown that Japanese emigrants prefer a warmer, not a colder climate than that of their native islands. Japanese agricultural settlement in Manchukuo up to the present time has yielded the most negligible results. A few thousand colonists have been settled in North Manchuria, where they have been com-

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

pelled to carry on a running fight with the numerous political bandits of that region. On the other hand, thirty or forty thousand Japanese have migrated to the very limited area of the South Seas mandated islands during the last few years; at the present rates of population increase they will soon far outnumber the natives. Japanese have also adapted themselves very well to Philippine living conditions in Davao, where their predominance in the hemp industry has created an internal and international problem for the Commonwealth Government.

Politically, however, the continental route of expansion is less risky. Manchukuo is a *fait accompli*, little affected by the general withholding of diplomatic recognition. And it does not seem likely that a further extension of Japanese hegemony in North China and Inner Mongolia will encounter serious opposition, either from China or from foreign Powers. There is little prospect that Chiang Kai-shek will play his desperate last card of armed resistance to Japan before the Japanese advance has crossed the Yellow River, especially in view of recent complications with the southwest. As for the Western powers, a prominent British expert who was recently in the Far East voiced a general impression when he expressed the opinion that they are fighting a "rearguard action" in defense of their interests in China. In the South Pacific, on the other hand, while Japan has large commercial opportunities, any step of outright political aggression would risk war. The rich Dutch colonial empire is perhaps the weakest link in the chain of Eastern tropical and semi-tropical lands. But it is generally believed that an attack on Borneo or Java would be equivalent to an attack on the British Empire.

The competing expansionist pulls of the fighting services, one to the west, the other to the south, is a main reason for the apparent lack of adroitness and flexibility of Japanese diplomacy in manœuvring against the Powers with which it has competing interests in the Far East. The three main Powers which fall under this classification are, of course, the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the United States. It might have been imagined that a main objective of Japanese foreign policy would have been to drive a wedge between the Soviet Union and the Anglo-Saxon powers. This objective might have been achieved in two ways.

The conclusion of a Soviet-Japanese non-aggression pact, combined with the establishment of a clear line of demarcation between Japanese and Soviet spheres of influence in East Asia,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

might have produced an understanding with the Soviet Union which would have freed Japan's hands for a southward advance. By the same token, a more conciliatory Japanese attitude on such questions as naval limitation and the Manchukuo oil monopoly would have strengthened Japan's position *vis-à-vis* the Soviet Union by taking off the sharper edges of antagonism with Great Britain and America.

Japan has chosen neither of these alternatives. The continuance of strain and tension in the border relations with the Soviet Union, reflected in repeated clashes between frontier patrols, has not been accompanied by any gesture of conciliation toward the Anglo-Saxon Powers. Several factors account for this apparent failure of diplomacy. Of these, Japan's desire to acquire a position of absolute hegemony in China is not the least. But another consideration is the professional rivalry between the two services and the unwillingness of either to acquiesce in a line of policy that would give the other a predominant rôle.

Do the Japanese Army and Navy want war? This question, put in such blunt and crude form, can certainly be answered in the negative. Modern war is a gigantic risk not only for the individuals who take part in it but for the whole political and social order of the belligerent country. Japanese military and naval leaders are certainly not blind to the grave dangers of internal unrest that would be involved in defeat, even in stalemate.

Despite its remarkable industrial progress Japan is economically and financially ill-prepared to stand the strain of a prolonged large-scale war. The country's gold reserve is slightly in excess of 500,000,000 pre-devaluation yen (about 250,000,000 gold dollars). In addition the Island Empire possesses about a billion and a half yen in foreign deposits and securities and owes between 700,000,000 and 750,000,000 yen in foreign debts. Only part of the foreign holdings are liquid. All this represents no very adequate war-chest for a land that is notably deficient in such vital military raw materials as oil, rubber and cotton. Captain M. G. Kennedy, a sympathetic student of Japan's military position, expresses the opinion in his latest book[3] that "Japan's one chance of success in the event of hostilities would lie in her ability to strike hard and strike rapidly, so as to ensure a war of short duration and to ensure, too, that the enemy was kept out of bombing distance of her own shores." Now the only major wars in which

[3] "The Problem of Japan," p. 235.

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LIBRARY ILLINOIS

Japan could well become involved are with Soviet Russia, Great Britain and the United States. And it is a question whether any of these hypothetical opponents, barring some unpredictable factor, such as internal disintegration or extreme preoccupation elsewhere, would be susceptible to the swift knock-out blow which Captain Kennedy sees as "Japan's one chance of success."

Take first the case of Russia. Suppose that all the Japanese military calculations worked out smoothly, that the Soviet air force failed to wreak havoc on Japan's inflammable cities, that the Japanese armies were as successful as in the war of 1904–05. A defeat, a series of defeats in the Far East, would leave Russia's main centers of industry and population untouched. Provided there were no violent widespread upsurge of internal disaffection (a contingency which seems less probable today than in 1932 or 1933), and no intervention from Europe, Russia could establish a new front around Lake Baikal and look to time, climate and Siberian guerrilla warfare as allies in carrying on the struggle.[4]

A naval conflict with Great Britain, the United States or both combined might bring Japan spectacular successes in its first stages. Japanese warships and expeditionary forces could perhaps seize Hong Kong, Borneo, the Philippines by means of a series of swift, sudden blows, delivered before effective succor could arrive. But such successes would affect very little the military and economic power of the British Empire or of the United States. Their fruits would be poor compensation for the costs of a protracted war which would almost certainly assume the character of an economic duel of endurance, with Japan the weaker party.

One factor that has at times made for war in other countries should not indeed be left out of consideration. It is quite clearly indicated in the following citation from an article which General Nobuyuki Abe, who recently resigned as a member of the Supreme War Council, contributed to the magazine *Gaiko Jiho* on the subject of the occupation of Manchuria:

> [After the World War] individualism and liberalism, which were introduced from the West, began to gain strength rapidly in the nation. Coupled with the striking prevalence of materialism, due to the boom brought about by the war, these Western "isms" wrought serious moral havoc in Japan by blighting the nation's traditional virtues. In fact it was sometimes feared that the nation might lose the national spirit which characterizes the Empire. . . . Capitalism began to gain ground, followed by the introduction of socialism and communism.

[4] Cf. T. J. Betts, "The Strategy of Another Russo-Japanese War," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, July 1934.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

All persons who were concerned about the country were at their wits' ends as to how to control this deplorable state of spiritual disorder. At this moment the Manchurian Incident occurred to sound a note of warning to the nation. From this standpoint also the domestic significance of the Manchurian Incident may be said to be inestimable.

General Abe here expresses a widespread view in Japanese conservative and nationalist circles: that the seizure of Manchuria, apart from its material significance, fulfilled a valuable moral function by counteracting disintegrating foreign ideas and arousing the martial and patriotic spirit of the nation.

But a remedy that is effective in small doses may be fatal in large ones. From a purely military standpoint Japan's success in Manchuria was a foregone conclusion. This could not be said with certainty in advance of a clash with a Great Power. So, while there is more than one danger-spot on the farflung Japanese military and naval front, the real likelihood of war is less than sensational publicists are apt to estimate. One thing might alter or modify this proposition. If any large Power with Far Eastern possessions became so absorbed in Europe or elsewhere as to be quite incapable of defending them, then we could not rule out aggressive action by Japan, which has seen the Anglo-Japanese Alliance thrown over and has itself renounced the League of Nations, as being beyond the bounds of possibility.

Meanwhile the aims of the Japanese Army and Navy may be briefly summarized as follows. First and foremost, along with all other armies and navies, they stand for bigger and better armaments. The rumor that a retired Admiral may be appointed governor of Japan's tropical island, Formosa, is significant in this connection, especially as treaty limitations on fortifications in the Pacific will soon lapse. In domestic policy, the fighting services favor changes in the direction of a more militarized, regimented, "totalitarian" social and economic order. They want to see national defense and agrarian relief take precedence over considerations of profit and expense. They want a vigorous affirmation of traditional Japanese beliefs and ideas throughout the educational system, together with the suppression of unsettling Western "isms." Finally, the Army sees as its special function the maintenance of the Watch on the Amur, while the Navy conceives as its mission the vindication of Japan's commercial and other interests in the South Pacific.

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE WORLD CRISIS OF 1936

BLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

By the Marquess of Lothian

THE nineteenth century was an era of comparative peace. The seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries had been racked by European and world wars. But after the defeat of Napoleon in 1815 there was no world war till 1914. There were two main reasons for this. The first was because nations were preoccupied with the industrial revolution and because during the Victorian age there was relative freedom for migration, trade and the export of capital throughout a large part of the world. The second was because the supremacy of the British fleet, established after Trafalgar, made impossible European warlike adventures overseas.

This period of relative stability ended when the Kaiser, dissatisfied with the "place in the sun" enjoyed by the new German Empire, decided to force attention to his claims by building a navy comparable with the British, and by pursuing an aggressive diplomacy. This drove Great Britain out of her old detachment from the European Balance of Power and made her a part of it. The crisis approached with the threatened collapse first of Turkey and then of the Austro-Hungarian Empire under the disintegrating effect of internal agitation for national self-determination. The collapse of Austria-Hungary would not only have gravely weakened Germany, standing between the Franco-Russian alliance, but raised the question whether Germany or Russia was to be the heir to the Hapsburgs in the Balkans. From 1904 all the nations of Europe began to prepare for war, some hopeful, some fearful, none ready to start it, but all feeling that war was becoming inevitable as armaments rose. Germany was confident that if war came she could win it. Europe escaped war while Turkey was being driven back to Constantinople by the Balkan nationalities; but it was unable to escape it a few years later when Franz Ferdinand, the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne and the one man who might have kept the Empire together, was shot by a South Slav assassin. This crime produced the Austrian ultimatum to Belgrade, backed by Germany and by a mobilization of the Austro-Hungarian army. It was this mobilization which set in motion the fatal military timetable, since it was followed almost inevitably by the mobilization first of Russia,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

then of Germany, then of France, and finally of Great Britain — each fearful of being caught unprepared. Directly mobilization was complete the German General Staff made its fierce thrust through Belgium, on the ground that the national existence of Germany required the defeat of the French Army in the west before the slow moving Russian steamroller was ready to cross her eastern frontier. It was this military timetable which swept to one side the efforts of Sir Edward Grey and other statesmen to find a solution for the Austro-Hungarian conflict by conference, and which sucked the whole world into an universal war which nobody really wanted and for which nobody deliberately pressed the button.

I set forth this brief analysis of the origin of the World War because we are rapidly drifting back into a not dissimilar situation.

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

II

Why was the United States drawn into the maelstrom? So far as I can judge — and I had some contemporary means of judging — the reasons were as follows:

There was deep feeling in America about the outrage of the invasion of Belgium contrary to guarantee, and a general, though by no means uncritical, conviction that on the whole France and Great Britain were fighting for democracy and national self-determination as against military dictatorship. It was this general sentiment which, when the inevitable conflict arose over neutral rights at sea (the freedom of the seas), made it practically impossible for the United States to go to war with France and Great Britain in defense of American neutral rights, or to prohibit trade in munitions; and which, when the tension became unbearable after the second German submarine campaign, insured that the United States took action against Germany and not against the Allies. The factor of the wartime trade in munitions and loans did not influence Congress so much but helped to drive Germany towards the unlimited submarine campaign which precipitated the American decision. Finally, there was the fact that in January 1917, after President Wilson's drive for peace had failed, it looked as if Germany had won the war. She had practically destroyed Russia, was master of Eastern Europe, the Balkans and Turkey, and had possession of Belgium and Northern France. There seemed no likelihood that the Allied armies by themselves could evict her. If, therefore, she could endure the blockade long enough

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

by exploiting the resources of Russia, she had only to stand pat to compel the Allies to make peace on terms which might not only give her an enlarged colonial empire but a permanent military hegemony over Europe as the price for evacuating Belgium and France.

The conviction that the victory of Germany would be a challenge both to American ideals and even eventually to American security, had marked influence both on the opinions of persons in high office in Washington and, less consciously and more intuitively, on American opinion at large. And, in fact, it was the American contribution which was decisive. Without it Germany might have won the war. It is difficult for journalist-historians, writing in the security which victory insured, to recapture the sentiments of a period of deep anxiety and doubt, and it is easy for them to attribute to clever propaganda decisions for which there were more fundamental explanations.

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

III

It was Woodrow Wilson's speeches which crystallized Allied and American opinion on the purposes for which they were fighting and the general nature of the peace which ought to ensue. President Wilson not unnaturally sought to apply to the problem of peace the fruits of American experience. The war, like that of 1776, was for the right to national freedom, and peace was to be secured by ending the international anarchy which was the ultimate cause of the 1914 catastrophe by the nearest approach to a world federation for which the nations were ready. That was the lesson of the era 1781–1787. War was inherent in an anarchy of sovereign nations. So Wilson's central purpose was to add to the liberty of nationality achieved by the war a League of Nations which would end war. But the world was clearly not ready for the surrender of sovereignty involved in federation as were the American States in 1787. It was not even ready for confederation. Every nation insisted on the retention of full national sovereignty. So the Covenant of the League of Nations attempted to square the circle. The core of the Covenant was an agreement by the sovereign states whereby they undertook to meet annually to discuss world affairs, to refer every dispute not solved by diplomacy to judicial settlement, arbitration or investigation by a standing Council and Secretariat of the League during a prescribed period, and to take economic sanctions against any

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

state which went to war before the League thus had time to find a pacific solution. This system, later supplemented by the Kellogg Pact not to use war at all as an instrument of national policy, was to be the guarantee of peace in a new world order.

It is curious that neither President Wilson nor the American League to Enforce Peace, which also had much to say in forming public opinion about the League, grasped the central lesson of American experience as set forth with ruthless logic by Alexander Hamilton, Madison and Jay in the pages of *The Federalist*. That lesson was that there is no real halfway house between the anarchy of state sovereignties and full federation, and that attempts to combine sovereign states by contract is foredoomed to failure, for the reason that under such a system no alteration in the *status quo* is possible except by the consent of the states immediately concerned; that state sovereignty is bound to express itself in economic nationalism with fatal results for the trade of the world; and that the only method by which any League can, in the last resort, coerce one of its own members is by war. At the best, the League system could only have been a temporary halfway house leading either to a true federation of nations, or at least of some nations, or to a relapse into anarchy.

But even to make the League work as a transitional system certain conditions were essential. The first was universal membership. The second was free trade or at least universal low tariffs and the cancellation of war debts and reparations or the reduction of both to quite low levels. The third was a common moral basis in democracy. The fourth was universal limitation of armaments.

It is worth while to trace briefly the stages whereby these omissions — quite inevitable at the time — have gradually destroyed the bright vision of 1918–19. The frontiers laid down at Paris were the best that Europe had ever had. It has been the retention of complete national sovereignty — especially in economics — which has led to the present welter of armaments, unemployment and dictatorship.

Wilson saw the vital importance of free trade. One of the Fourteen Points provided for "the removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers and an equality of trade conditions." However, not only was he utterly unable to promise any reduction of the American protectionist tariff; he could not even discuss the possibility of balancing a reduction in American claims for war debts against an equivalent reduction in the Allied claims for

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

reparations. So the new international order started off, not with that internal free trade which has been one of the main secrets of American prosperity and stability, but with a vast increase in interstate indebtedness — an indebtedness which could only be met by a gigantic transfer across national frontiers of goods and services which the sovereign nations were quite unwilling to receive, or by a transfer of gold of which the total supply was adequate only if it was not used to pay war debts or reparations. And this indebtedness, though the utter impossibility of its being discharged was disguised for a time by Anglo-American lending, became a principal factor in creating economic dislocations which led not to lower but to higher tariffs, quotas, embargoes, and finally to the destruction of the international gold standard. These conditions together destroyed the greater part of international trade and investment, and so created the unemployment and social distress which has caused democracy to be replaced by dictatorship over more than half the globe. Rather than abandon its protectionist nationalism, the United States eventually sacrificed some $14,000,000,000 which the world had borrowed from it during and after the war, and instead collected and sterilized in its vaults some 40 percent of the world's gold supply.

But the principle that the new order must be based on the retention of complete national sovereignty led to still further disastrous effects. It raised no barrier to those immigration restrictions which almost completely stopped that migration across the Atlantic to North and South America and Australia which had relieved Europe of intolerable strains and pressures during the nineteenth century. It led some of the Great Powers to withdraw from the League of Nations. It has inexorably undermined the League's capacity either to bring about peaceful change or to give its members security and has thus led back to the reappearance of the system of competitive armaments and alliances which is inherent in the anarchy of sovereign states.

Though President Wilson had been the principal champion of the new international order represented by the League of Nations, the United States was the first to reject it. It did so, partly no doubt because of the strength of the Washingtonian tradition against foreign alliances, but also, I think, because the Senate remembered one lesson of what Fiske has called the "critical period" of American history from 1781 to 1787. The central lesson of that period was that under a system of voluntary coöpera-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tion of sovereign states the decisions of the central authority could be enforced in the last resort only by war. If the states refused their quotas of cash or soldiers, if they refused to conform to collective decisions, if they acted injuriously against one another or the Confederation, the only remedy in the hands of the center was compulsion of the states. Yet, as Madison insisted, compulsion of one government by another government could only be done by war. The success of any coöperative system therefore depended on voluntary agreement because attempts to use compulsion spelt war. It was this consideration that had clinched the argument for federation, for the creation of a federal government to which the individual citizen owed allegiance in its own sphere, and which had taxing and legislative powers and sole control of army and navy and of tariffs on foreign trade.

The Covenant of the League, however, did provide for compulsion under both Articles 10 and 16. Article 10 required members to "respect and preserve against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all other members." Article 16 required them to take economic sanctions, and possibly military sanctions, against an aggressor who resorted to war. President Wilson declared that Article 10 was "the heart of the Covenant." Yet as Senator Lodge says in his book, "The Senate and the League of Nations," Article 10 "was the storm center of the debate and did more than all other provisions put together to defeat the treaty," or as he also says: "There is no question that the preservation of a State against external aggression can contemplate nothing but war." So the first breach in the League as a universal system for the prevention of war was made.

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

IV

Not less far reaching in its efforts than the refusal of the United States to join the League, was its decision not to ratify the Anglo-American Treaty which gave France a joint guarantee against "unprovoked aggression." France's supreme preoccupation was her own security. Nobody can understand the psychology of Europe who does not realize that France, even more than Germany, is suffering from the psychosis of defeat. Germany was defeated by all the Allies acting together in 1918. But if one regards the World War as the latest of the duels which have been going on between France and Germany for a thousand years,

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

C LIBRARY
A, ILLINOIS

France was decisively defeated, both in 1870 and in 1918, by a power permanently possessed of larger industrial resources and man power and at least equal in military talent. To French opinion, therefore, security meant a continuance of that close military association with the British Commonwealth and the United States which had rescued France from inevitable defeat and which was embodied in the Anglo-American Treaty of Guarantee. Had that treaty been ratified and had the United States joined the League so that the three victorious democracies remained its center of gravity, the League might have found it possible to discharge that function which Wilson, in his speech recommending the Covenant to the Plenary Conference at Paris, declared should be the first duty of the League, to remedy those inequalities and injustices which were inevitable in a peace imposed even by victorious democracies at the end of four years of war.

But no sooner did the Anglo-American Treaty of Guarantee disappear than France, left as she felt to face Germany alone, fell back upon an alternative system of security. She set to work to build up a set of military alliances with Poland and the powers of the Little Entente which insured absolute military preponderance over a Germany disarmed and compelled to keep the Rhineland demilitarized. This was not only a system of security for France and the new nations of Eastern Europe, it was a system of peace for Europe itself, for so long as there was a complete military preponderance behind the Versailles settlement it was useless for Germany or Bulgaria or Hungary to think of trying to alter it by force. But it was essentially impermanent because it rested upon enforced inequality for Germany, the most virile nation in Europe. The vacillations in British foreign policy, so brilliantly described by "Pertinax" in recent pages of FOREIGN AFFAIRS, have been due to the conviction that the French solution of the European problem, the permanent inequality and encirclement of Germany, was bound in the end to defeat itself.

The politics of Europe, ever since the rejection by the Senate of the League and the Treaty of Guarantee, have been dominated by the struggle of France to maintain her own security and the peace of Europe by her preponderance over Germany, and to use the League of Nations as support for the maintenance of the *status quo* against the efforts of Germany to change it. The struggle began with the French invasion of the Ruhr. Great Britain in January 1922 had offered on her own account the same guarantee

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to France against unprovoked aggression that had been contained in the unratified Anglo-American Treaty, in return for a French agreement to work out a solution of Europe's most urgent problems at a new conference at Genoa which Germany and Russia were to attend for the first time on equal terms. But Poincaré, convinced that European peace and French security could only be assured by proving to Germany that resistance to the Versailles Treaty and to French preponderance was hopeless, rejected this offer and invaded the Ruhr. That invasion accomplished its primary object, though it proved very costly to France and produced the inflation and the German Ruhr-fighters who were the real beginning of National Socialism. Europe then recovered an uneasy breathing space through the Locarno Treaties, whereby Great Britain and Italy undertook to guarantee the demilitarized zone against invasion either by France or by Germany; Germany in turn entered the League, and through the Dawes and Young Plans and the American loans postponed for a few years the inevitable failure of the attempt to collect mountainous reparations and war debts in a nationalist and protectionist world. This was the great era of the League in Europe.

But the great depression wrecked these economic arrangements, ended war debt and reparation payments, intensified economic nationalism with embargoes and quotas, and swept Hitler into power on a wave of unemployment and social unrest. The first article of the Hitler creed was that Germany should no longer acquiesce in the position of compulsory inferiority imposed upon her by the Treaty of Versailles. He waited a few months to see if he could gain equality in armaments by the disarmament of his neighbors. But though the United States and Great Britain had been pressing for all-round reduction of armaments as the best guarantee of peace, France resolutely rejected every proposal for disarmament unless it was combined with guarantees for security. As Britain would not go beyond the Locarno guarantees and was herself largely disarmed, and as the United States would enter into no commitment at all, the deadlock remained unresolved. Hitler then, on the ground that Germany was refused the equality she had been promised, left the League, began to rearm contrary to the Treaty, and on April 16, 1935, restored conscription in Germany for an army of 500,000 men, and proclaimed the formation of an immense air force and a navy which, on his own proposal, he agreed should not exceed 35 percent of the British Navy.

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

France's answer to German rearmament was to extend her military alliances among those who were interested in maintaining the *status quo*. She composed her ancient quarrel with Italy, who was chiefly concerned to prevent Germany's appearing on the Brenner Pass as a result of the Anschluss. Austria became to all intents and purposes a dependency of Mussolini. France and her ally Czechoslovakia then initialled treaties of mutual assistance with Russia — now rapidly expanding her military strength and increasingly alarmed at the growing military menace of Fascist Germany. Russia also joined the League. No sooner was the Franco-Russian Pact ratified by the French Chamber of Deputies than Hitler sent 30,000 troops into the Rhineland in order to reassert German sovereignty there and her right to refortify it in self defense. At the same time he made proposals for a 25-year period of European peace. As justification for his unilateral breach of the Locarno treaties he declared that the basis on which Germany had accepted the unilateral Locarno demilitarization had been destroyed by the Franco-Russian military alliance. France, as the price of not attempting militarily to reoccupy the Rhineland, secured a reaffirmation of the British guarantee to assist in repelling unprovoked aggression by Germany on France or Belgium, to be made more effective by military "staff talks." The Schuschnigg-Hitler arrangement about Austria acquiesced in by Mussolini; the challenge of Herr Greiser to the League's authority in Danzig; and the Anglo-French invitation to Germany and Italy to take part in negotiations for a new Locarno treaty without any reference to past breaches in the Treaty of Versailles, mark the final end of the Versailles "system" of inequality in Europe. And it has been ended, not by the voluntary action of the League, but as the inexorable consequence of the gigantic increase in German military and air power in the last two years. The League has failed as a system for revision of treaties.

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

V

There is a Far Eastern parallel to this history. In 1921–22 was held the successful Washington Conference. Great Britain and the United States were still in the full plenitude of their authority and naval power. Faced by this combination, Japan agreed to restore complete sovereignty to China, to accept a naval ratio of 3 to 5 in return for an all-round limitation of armaments and the non-fortification of the Pacific bases, and to substitute the Four Power and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Nine Power Treaties for the old Anglo-Japanese Alliance. But as the interest of the United States in world affairs waned after the American rejection of the League of Nations, as Great Britain became more engrossed in Europe, as both allowed their armaments to decline, and as both became preoccupied with their internal economic wounds after the great depression of 1929, Japan felt that nobody would interfere if she set out to solve her own difficulties by realizing her long cherished ambition to absorb the whole of Eastern Asia into her own political and economic system. Her judgment proved right. While the United States and the League Powers blustered and protested, none of them was prepared to risk that war with Japan which alone could have prevented her embarking on the process of altering the *status quo* by force in violation of the treaties. The United States was not ready to face war, while Great Britain, with no naval force stationed in the Pacific, was not prepared to consider action which might lead to war unless it knew that the American navy would also be engaged. So the power politics inherent in international anarchy have undermined the Washington settlement of the Far East, including the naval treaties, just as it has undermined the League system in Europe.

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

VI

There is one more episode to be examined — the Abyssinian crisis. It is revealing of realities.

Nobody can yet tell the exact origins of Mussolini's Abyssinian venture. Some say that as part of the Franco-Italian common front against Germany, especially in Austria, M. Laval promised him a free hand to find natural resources and land for settlement in Abyssinia. Others think that it is only the first move towards the restoration of a Roman Empire in the Eastern Mediterranean, because Mussolini believes that when he has an army in Abyssinia as well as in Libya and an adequate fleet and air force in the Central Mediterranean he has only to wait until Great Britain is compelled to station her main fleet in the North Sea or the Far East for Egypt, Palestine and the Sudan to drop like ripe fruit into his resolute grasp.

However that may be, the more Mussolini became committed to his Abyssinian adventure, the more British public opinion became determined to stand up for the League. There were many reasons for this. There was the feeling that this was the last

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

AURORA, ILLINOIS

chance for making the collective peace system effective. There was the so-called Peace Ballot in which 10,000,000 adults voted in favor of the application of economic sanctions against any Power declared an aggressor by the League. There was a General Election looming ahead, which made the Government hesitate to offend this tremendous vote. It is certainly true that consideration of the consequences of Italian penetration of Abyssinia on British interests in the Suez Canal region, however much it may have influenced the professionals in the defense and diplomatic services, played at first hardly any part in determining public opinion. The dominant factor was a wave of public sentiment generated by League of Nations societies, both in the British Isles and overseas in Canada, Australia and South Africa, demanding that the failure in Manchuria should not be repeated and that the Covenant as a system of defense against aggression should be resolutely put to the test as the last hope of stopping the general drift towards war.

So there ensued Sir Samuel Hoare's speech at Geneva on September 11, in which he promised that Great Britain would fulfil its obligation to offer steady resistance to unprovoked aggression in violation of the Covenant; the inauguration of economic sanctions against Italy by fifty nations after Mussolini had invaded Abyssinia; the gradual realization that if oil sanctions or the closing of the Suez Canal were added to the rest, it probably meant war with Italy; the General Election on the government cry "Support the League but without war;" the Hoare-Laval plan, designed partly to bring the conflict to an end before the risk of war with Italy became acute, but put forward in part, perhaps, because the inside people realized the fundamental weakness of Abyssinia; the outburst of public indignation which led to the fall of Sir Samuel Hoare; the paralysis of any extended sanctions policy caused partly by the confusion following the Hoare-Laval episode and partly by fear of war; and then the unexpected but triumphant series of Italian victories and the flight of the Ethiopian Emperor.

The failure of the League to save Abyssinia has been a shattering blow to those who had hoped that while its worldwide power had clearly waned it might still be a system of peace for Europe. For the Abyssinian episode has made certain things quite clear. The economic sanctions provided for in the Covenant were intended to be a system of coercion which would be effective with-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

out war. It is now quite clear that, as against a Great Power, economic sanctions applied by a League which does not contain all the other Great Powers are either ineffective or lead to war. Italy was a Power singularly dependent on foreign supplies and by embarking on an expedition on the other side of the Suez Canal had put her head through a fatal noose if the League or Great Britain had had the resolution to close it. But at no time was any member of the League prepared to risk war, either for Abyssinia or for the Covenant. At the outset, as M. Laval told the French Chamber of Deputies on December 28, 1935, he agreed with Sir Samuel Hoare "to avoid military sanctions, to adopt no measure of naval blockade, never to consider the closing of the Suez Canal, in a word to reject everything that might lead to war. We then considered what financial or economic sanctions we could adopt." That was, in essence, the view of every other member of the League. But once it had become clear that the League members, for the very good reason that a war with Italy over Abyssinia might easily have set Europe and the world afire, would not press their resistance to this point of war, Mussolini had a clear path. If he could conquer Abyssinia before economic sanctions compelled him to come to terms he had victory in his hands. The air force, poison gas and the impetuosity of the Rasses did the rest. They gave him a victory more complete than he desired and have left him with a problem in government and settlement which it will take Italy years to solve. It is probable that if the British Government had been more resolute last autumn and had been willing to take the risk of telling Mussolini that it would ask the authority of the League to close the Canal unless he would accept a compromise acceptable to the League, Mussolini would have come to terms rather than risk a war. But its own determination not to risk war coupled with the almost insuperable difficulty of getting fifty nations, including France, to agree to such a policy, ended in that diplomatic defeat which was the almost inevitable consequence of taking up the position adopted by Sir Samuel Hoare last December, with the reservation that in no case would it be pressed to the point of war.

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

VII

What is likely to be the effect of this history of disillusionment on the policy of the nations? At the moment, discussion in Europe centers about two international questions. The first is whether the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

League of Nations should have its coercive sanctions strengthened or should have its teeth drawn by the elimination of the sanctions Articles, 10 and 16. The second is the problem created by the rapid rearmament of Germany and the struggle between communism and fascism in Spain.

The pro-sanctions party declare that there is nothing wrong with the Covenant of the League and that it has failed only because of a want of resolution on the part of its members. They demand that the system of "collective security," which it embodies, should be strengthened by a clear-cut engagement, at any rate on the part of all its European members, that they will resort to war against an aggressor. They believe that if only the League can be based on the system that a war on one is a war on all, the world, or at least Europe, will be safe from aggressive war, for a would-be aggressor will never risk the certain defeat that would be involved. The anti-sanctions party reply that no peace system can be based on an automatic obligation to go to war, that inasmuch as the League has no power to alter any treaty except with the consent of all concerned such a system would be no more than a military alliance to maintain the *status quo*, and that in any case it will not work for the reason, so abundantly proved in the Manchurian and Abyssinian cases, that no nation will, in practice, incur the terrific risks and cost of modern war except where its own vital interests are involved. They believe that in the present state of the world the only practical course is to abandon the sanctions Articles. Once that is done and security is treated as a matter for regional arrangements outside the League, the League itself might begin to recover that universal membership which is necessary to its moral authority and its social work.

This argument will come to a head at the impending meeting of the Assembly of the League of Nations. But more and more this somewhat theoretic argument is likely to be thrust aside by the harsh realities which are emerging as a consequence of German rearmament and of the civil war in Spain. Germany will shortly have the most powerful military force in the world. It is stated that it will consist of 35 first-line divisions and at least as many more in reserve; an air force of between 2,000 and 4,000 first-line aëroplanes; and a navy one-third of that of Great Britain. What is she going to use it for? There are many conflicting views. Will she be content, once she has thus recovered equality and power, to help to organize Europe for peace through the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

League and to discuss in a reasonable manner round a table those economic questions, such as the stabilization of currencies, the lowering of tariffs and access to raw materials, including the very difficult colonial question, which must be the first step towards general recovery? Or will she use her military strength as the instrument with which to establish a hegemony in Central Europe and to obtain concessions from others by the traditional methods of *Macht politik?* Or will she prepare to thrust the Bolshevik dragon back into Asia by war? Or will she try to reverse the verdict of 1918 by a renewed war on the West? Perhaps the answer will become clear at the Locarno discussions which are to take place some time this year. All that can be said with certainty is that the era of compulsory inequality has come to an end and that Germany is once more a world Power.

The Spanish civil war raises questions not less serious. It may well transform the political alignment of the globe. At the time of writing it seems doubtful whether democracy can survive in Spain. Whichever side wins will almost inevitably establish a dictatorship in order to suppress its opponents by force. Yet Europe can hardly be indifferent to the result. If Spain ends by going communist the Soviet system will have secured an outpost at the other end of Europe. If it goes fascist it is likely to lean towards Germany and Italy rather than towards semi-Socialist France. The world, indeed, may gradually form into three groups — the communist, the fascist, and the democratic groups.

VIII

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

There is little use in trying to prophesy about even the immediate future. But one thing is perfectly clear. The Wilsonian world created by the victory of the Allies is rapidly disappearing, including the League of Nations as originally conceived. It might have lasted much longer if Wilson's full program, with its universal democracy, its low tariffs, its disarmament and its three victorious democracies standing together and united by the Treaty of Guarantee to France at the heart of the League, had prevailed. But the writers of *The Federalist* have been proved right in their view that a League of sovereign states must either move forward to a true federation of nations or national sovereignty will drive them back into an anarchy of economic nationalism, competitive armaments and war. The dream of 1918 has now disappeared beyond recall. To paraphrase Smuts' famous saying, humanity,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

after a short rest in the tents of the League, is once more on the march into an unknown world.

In my view, the movement in Britain for strengthening the League will fail, and Great Britain, after a period of controversy, will resume her traditional semi-detachment from Europe. She will give to France and Belgium a guarantee, possibly on mutual basis, against unprovoked aggression; but she will refuse any commitment, through the League or otherwise, which can involve her automatically in economic sanctions or in war in Central or Southern Europe. There she will keep a free hand. The gigantic armaments of Germany, the immense and rapidly increasing forces now at the disposal of Russia, the armaments of Italy and France, to say nothing of the lesser nations of Europe, reduce to relative impotence the power of a non-conscript Britain to intervene on the Continent. She will therefore endeavor to stand outside the new balance of power in Europe which is likely to replace the recent preponderance of France, and she will inevitably be drawn nearer to the American position by the Dominions. It may be that she will be unable to adopt this position of detachment because Germany, possibly with allies, would then be in a position to establish a hegemony over all Europe. If this situation were to arise a fateful decision would arise for Britain, and in the long run for the United States also, as it did in 1914–16. But that time does not seem to have come yet. For the moment all parties are agreed that Great Britain must recover her strength on the sea and in the air, if she is to defend the Commonwealth and restore her influence in world affairs.

Moreover, it may well never arise. If Europe and Northern Asia become more and more divided between the two new aggressive political religions, fascism and communism, the democracies, if they are to survive, may have to endeavor to stand together outside the conflict. They will not try to impose peace on a world which is clearly not ready for it, but they may have to act together in order to prevent the area in which free institutions still exist from being narrowed, bit by bit, by dictatorial aggression.

This problem will come up for consideration first by Great Britain and the Dominions of Canada, Australia, South Africa and New Zealand. They can hardly postpone a decision as to the common policy they are to pursue in the new world of force and power politics which is arising all about them beyond the Imperial Conference which is to assemble next year for the Coronation.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

But tomorrow it may confront the United States also. The United States by its Monroe Doctrine has cast its mantle over all North and South America. In doing so, especially now that practically all the American nations have stopped immigration and put on high tariffs, it has said in effect to the 1,500,000,000 inhabitants of overcrowded Europe and Asia that the relatively empty continents of North and South America are to be kept for the exclusive use of their present inhabitants. Yet the Americas, and especially South America with its 75,000,000 inhabitants, form an infinitely more important field for settlement and economic development than Africa (containing immense deserts and already peopled by 100,000,000 people, mostly black), or Australia (a mere habitable fringe round an immense arid interior).

Further, ever since Canning prompted the Monroe Doctrine a little more than one hundred years ago, the British Commonwealth has been the outer ring of protection for the United States. Indeed, until the era of "parity" it was the British Navy rather than the American which was the effective guarantee of the Monroe Doctrine. Indeed, the Kaiser once proposed to a British Minister that Germany and Great Britain together should call the bluff of the Monroe Doctrine and solve the European problem by taking for Germany a large slice of Brazil. So long as the British Commonwealth exists, the United States is secure But suppose that in another world war it seemed likely that she would be defeated, and suppose totalitarian dictatorships seemed likely to become the heirs of British and French possessions bordering on the Atlantic (including South and Central American territory) and in the Pacific, could the United States remain indifferent to the outcome? These questions are not a mirage. They were presented in 1916. They may be presented again.

Even if they are not, and the new world alignment centers about communism, fascism and democracy, is it not possible that the United States might best preserve its own peace by using its immense power to maintain, in association with the British Commonwealth and the Pan-American Union, command of the oceans of the world as security that democracy and free institutions shall continue to exist over nearly one half of the globe? Mr. Walter Lippmann in a brilliant Armistice Day address delivered in 1934 pointed out that while during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries there had been constant world wars, during the nineteenth there had been none. This he attributed mainly to

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

the fact that once Great Britain, after Trafalgar, had established a supreme navy and Europe had reached a balance within itself, Britain could keep in that relative detachment from the continent which, except for the treaty of guarantee to Belgium, she maintained till she made the entente with France in 1904, and that there could be no world war so long as England respected the Monroe Doctrine and no European Power had a navy with which to challenge her. There might be local wars, but unless Great Britain were attacked or chose to intervene it would not be a world war. And, in fact, there was no world war after 1815 until Germany set out to create a navy capable of challenging the British. But when Great Britain became involved, the war became a world war, because her possessions were scattered all over the world, and the question of the involvement of the United States also inevitably arose.

The situation of the last century cannot be recreated by Great Britain alone. She is not strong enough. But the United States, the South American Republics and the nations of the modern British Commonwealth could together recreate it. They have among them immense superiority in industrial and financial resources, in naval and air power, in commercial shipping; and they control all the world's naval bases and narrow channels, like Suez, Panama and Singapore. No power or combination of powers could dare to attack them in their own area with the slightest chance of success. They also are both democratic and territorially satisfied. If they should act together, they have it in their power to end world war, though not, as the League has tried to do, to end all war.

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FRENCH FASCISM

By Alexander Werth

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

NEARLY a million people marched with their red and tricolor banners through the Paris streets on the Fête Nationale of July 14, to commemorate the capture of the Bastille and to celebrate the victory of the Front Populaire in the last General Election. The Colonne de Juillet, marking the place where the old prison had stood, was decorated with flags and streamers, and round it were large panels with pictures of Rousseau and Voltaire and Diderot and Henri Barbusse and the obscure Lille workman who composed the Internationale. Julien Benda, who had surveyed the vast human torrent from a window, wrote a few days later in the *Dépêche de Toulouse:*

> This giant procession, the like of which had never yet been seen in Paris, was the direct outcome of the events of February 6. So also were the formation of the Front Populaire and the last General Election. The Waldeck-Rousseau Cabinet was the outcome of the anti-Dreyfus agitation; the 1877 election, with its Left victory, was the outcome of the MacMahon *coup*. In the last sixty years a sharp offensive from the reactionaries in France has been followed, with mathematical accuracy, by a sharp, inevitable reaction from the Left. The men who organized the February 6 riots could have been sure of it. But their stupidity, as M. Herriot has said, is even greater than their wickedness. In the meantime, until they understand, let them contemplate their work from their balconies.

"*Le grand vaincu*," as the French say, — the "great defeated" — of the May election was Colonel de La Rocque, the leader of the Croix de Feu. In two years the Croix de Feu had grown from a small, select body of distinguished war veterans into the greatest "fascist" force in the country. In April 1936 they claimed a membership of nearly a million; and the rival fascist forces, the Jeunesses Patriotes, the Solidarité Française, as well as the Royalists of the Action Française (who, it must be said, had played a far more active part in the street rioting of January-February 1934 than the Croix de Feu) had, in comparison, shrunk into insignificance. "French Fascism" came to mean the Croix de Feu. They denied being fascists, and their fascism was, indeed, of a peculiar kind, as we shall see; but they had certainly become, in two years, the greatest anti-democratic force in the country.

The Croix de Feu did not run candidates in the General Elec-

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tion; they pretended to be above such things. But they announced far and wide that they would be the great "arbiters" of the election; and would, wherever possible, keep the Reds out by actively supporting the non-socialist and non-communist candidate. In certain cases, they said, they would even support a "pink" against a "red" if there was no other choice. In fact it was alleged at the time (though this was strongly denied by La Rocque himself) that in certain constituencies instructions had been given to the local Croix de Feu to support the communists in the first ballot, with the result that he would be the only Left candidate in the second ballot, and in the expectation that many Radicals would, in the second ballot, vote for the Right candidate rather than for the communist. But even if this manœuvre was resorted to, it did not yield the desired result, any more than did any other of the Croix de Feu "arbitration" manœuvres: for the communists, with 72 seats in the new Chamber, instead of 10 in the old, were the great electoral winners. Curiously enough, wherever the Croix de Feu showed any activity at all they were not regarded by anyone as a "super-party" but were simply identified with the Right. During the election campaign I visited constituencies in various parts of France; and whenever I asked what election meetings were on, I was almost invariably told: "A communist meeting, a socialist meeting, and a Croix de Feu meeting." Conservatives, reactionaries, Croix de Feu, had come to mean practically the same thing. Did it mean that the Right had gone fascist, or that the Croix de Feu had simply gone conservative? Actually, there was an element of truth in both. For, especially since December 6, 1935, the Croix de Feu were no longer what they had once been.

The heroic days of the Croix de Feu were in 1934 — between the February riots and the fall of Doumergue on November 8. It was then a romantic movement. After February 6 thousands of young men, sincerely disgusted with Parliament, joined the Croix de Feu and its affiliated organizations in search of a "better and cleaner" France. In January the Stavisky Affair had been magnified to colossal proportions in the press campaign against the Chamber, and particularly against the Left — for the Stavisky Affair was represented as being an eminently "Left" scandal. The riots of February 6 were largely organized by the leaders of various fascist and semi-fascist organizations, and with the help of men like Chiappe, the Paris police chief who had been

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

dismissed by Daladier a few days earlier. But these riots would not have been so effective had not thousands of young men, incensed by weeks of newspaper propaganda, and feeling genuinely revolted by the Chamber, joined in the riots. The primary object of this press campaign, supported as it was by "Big Business," had been to bring a National Government into power and to disrupt the Left majority. The young men who had their heads broken in the Place de la Concorde that night had fought — most of them — spontaneously and thoughtlessly "against the deputies"; and when the Daladier Government was forced out of office by "the Street," but was replaced two days later by a government presided over by an old man of 72, many of them must have felt disappointed — not that they knew exactly what they would have preferred instead.

But Colonel de La Rocque tried to console them. When the Daladier Government resigned he wired to the local Croix de Feu committees: "First objective attained. Keep on your guard." And later he treated the Doumergue Government as "a poultice on a gangrenous leg" — as a temporary solution to be followed, before long, by a better and more complete solution. He came to be regarded by many as the torchbearer of a "better and cleaner France." In his speeches in 1934 he treated politicians as the profiteers of the régime, and the socialists and communists as the arch-enemy. The Croix de Feu movement, he said, with its spirit of the trenches — *l'esprit ancien combattant* — stood for disinterested service to France. The men who had risked their lives for France, he said, must at last have a say in the matter. La Rocque's "16 years of profiteering" was not unlike Hitler's "14 years of shame." He had no clear program, but said that there was no need for any. A *mystique* was more important than a program; and a *mystique* he had undoubtedly created. And there were some young men in the movement who scarcely hesitated to call themselves openly fascists.

Only the contempt that La Rocque professed for Doumergue was, in reality, more apparent than real; and when towards September 1934 Doumergue abandoned his grandfatherly airs and launched a campaign, full of senile rage, against the socialists and communists, proposing to reform the Constitution by increasing enormously the powers of the Prime Minister (who, according to the Doumergue plan, could henceforth dissolve the Chamber on his own initiative), competent observers began to

LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

realize that there was a closer contact between the old Premier and the Croix de Feu than either would admit. The French constitutional conflict of September-November 1934 has been largely misunderstood abroad, where there are still many who believe that Doumergue "wished to improve the French democratic system"; and there were even some English journalists at the time who proclaimed Doumergue "the last defender of French democracy!" In reality, the old man had by this time attained a dangerous degree of megalomania and was working hand-in-glove with an innate anti-democrat like Tardieu (whose ideas had been incorporated in Doumergue's constitutional proposals), and with the "Street" — that is, the Fascist Leagues — against the Chamber and the Senate, which was the first to rebel against him.

Doumergue felt in a strong position. He believed that the deputies (whose memories of February 6, when the rioters nearly broke into the Chamber, were still fresh) would be too frightened of "the Street" to resist his demands. When Herriot and the Radicals, whom the prospect of a government crisis still made rather nervous, proposed compromise solutions, Doumergue rejected them disdainfully. And when on November 6, exasperated by his attitude, the Radicals threatened to resign from the Government, one observed in the lobbies of the Chamber various unknown people who whispered ominously that if Doumergue were forced to resign there would be trouble, and that "our fellows are simply itching to come out" — the "fellows" being the members of the Croix de Feu and of the other Fascist Leagues. But after some trepidation the Radicals called the bluff and Doumergue resigned in a great rage, saying that he had been driven out by the men "who had shot down unarmed war veterans on February 6." A few hours later the Flandin Government was formed.

It was not until three days later, on the night of Armistice Day, that the Croix de Feu, the Jeunesses Patriotes and the Solidarité Française, held a demonstration — not outside the Chamber, but outside M. Doumergue's house in the Avenue Foch. It was then that Colonel de La Rocque declared that "he had for a long time been in touch with M. Doumergue; and that the Croix de Feu would continue to keep in touch with him; for the day would come when he would save France for the second time."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Left found the idea of a moth-eaten politician like Doumergue at the head of the fascist forces of France rather reassuring. But, commenting on the fascist demonstration on Armistice night, M. Herriot told me, a few days later: "You see how right I was to have suspected Doumergue of the worst, and not to have surrendered to his demands. For it *was* a conspiracy against democracy." It is claimed by some of the Croix de Feu men that November 8, 1934, when Doumergue resigned, was the greatest opportunity La Rocque had ever missed. Bertrand de Maud'huy, once one of La Rocque's henchmen,[1] recently claimed that on that day the Croix de Feu could have marched on the Chamber and seized power. I doubt it. Even moderate public opinion had become rather tired of Doumergue, "the savior." It cared little for his constitutional reforms, and was more concerned about the economic crisis, which he had done nothing to remedy. A fascist coup that day would not have received one quarter of the popular support that had been given the riots of February 6, and in the probable absence of any support from the army and the police it would have failed. There would also have been an immediate reaction from the working class, who were very much on their guard during those days.

Under the Flandin Government (November 1934–May 1935), a more normal democratic government, the Croix de Feu kept extremely quiet. Their membership continued to increase, and their semi-military organization, aided by donations from industrial and banking magnates, was improving; but the old fervor had gone. The extremists in the movement could not forgive La Rocque the opportunity he had missed, and were becoming restive. In April there was the first notable example of "direct action" when a number of them raided the socialist headquarters in the rue Feydeau in Paris; several of the men were arrested on the spot; and Colonel de La Rocque condemned and denounced them. His "uncomradelike" attitude on that occasion increased the discontent among the fascist extremists in the movement; and it is about that time that several prominent members, such as Bertrand de Maud'huy, resigned in disgust.

But the Croix de Feu were not played out yet, and in June and July 1935, after the fall of the Flandin Government, their activity increased again. La Rocque continued to claim that they were in a position to overthrow the Republic at any time they chose. Thus,

[1] *Cf.* "The French National Revival," by Bertrand de Maud'huy, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, July 1934.

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

shortly after the double Cabinet crisis early in June (the overthrow, in one week, of the Flandin and Bouisson cabinets), which led to the formation of the Laval Government, La Rocque claimed at a memorable meeting at Algiers that "there would have been sport" if the President of the Republic had only dared to give a cabinet post to Daladier, the *fusilleur* of February 6. In other words, only governments and ministers tolerated by the Croix de Feu could take office in France.

The summer and autumn of 1935, with the sympathetic Laval as Premier, marks the second acute phase of the "fascist offensive" in France. The Croix de Feu by this time had about 600,000 members; their parade (with Laval's blessing) in the Champs Elysées on July 14, 1935, was enormously impressive. It was something like an apotheosis of the Croix de Feu movement; and the west-end public that watched it was in raptures. The Croix de Feu had money, both from donations and from the membership fees which at 30 francs per head provided the tidy yearly sum of some 20 million francs. At their great rally at Algiers, 30 aëroplanes took part in the display; and motor rallies became a regular Croix de Feu exercise. Acting on secret instructions, several thousand Croix de Feu men, travelling in private automobiles, would be mobilized from time to time and with great swiftness at some specified point, usually on the estate of some wealthy sympathizer.

Laval was in close contact with the Croix de Feu leaders. To a friend of mine he once said: "I am accused of being on friendly terms with the fascists. But they are the only people I can fall back on, since the socialists and communists will have nothing more to do with me. But the Croix de Feu contain some very fine human material, and may become the backbone of an anti-capitalist party." Whether he sincerely believed in their "anti-capitalism" may be doubted; but, in any case, they suited his purpose. They were pro-Italian and were effective in conducting an anti-sanctions campaign. The minor fascist leagues also were useful. One night in October the Solidarité Française (an organization composed of a few thousand young men, mostly ruffians) went so far as to call an anti-British demonstration in the Place de l'Opéra; and the British Embassy that night had to be guarded by *gardes mobiles*.

But the "lightning mobilizations" of the Croix de Feu were beginning to alarm the Left very seriously. Especially in Sep-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tember and October the *Œuvre*, the *Populaire* and the *Humanité* published many hair-raising stories about a Croix de Feu "plan of action," involving the occupation and "neutralization" of the "red" suburbs of Paris and an eventual March on the city. It was even explained — complete with addresses — how the fascist troops would be concentrated on the eve of the Great Day in hundreds of private villas on the outskirts of the Bois de Boulogne. It was under the impression of such stories (in many cases deliberately exaggerated and over-dramatized) that the Radical Congress met in Paris at the end of October. Pressed hard by Herriot and his other Radical ministers, Laval had, a few days previously, given the Radicals a sop in the form of three "anti-fascist" decrees of a somewhat platonic character (preliminary declaration of any meetings in *public* places, etc.). The Radicals were not satisfied, and insisted upon the discussion of more stringent measures immediately the Chamber met at the end of November. In the interval, on November 16, there was the famous shooting affray at Limoges, when a crowd of workers who were demonstrating outside a hall where the Croix de Feu had gathered were fired on by the latter. About 20 men were wounded. The firing was not perhaps done without provocation; but it provided the Left with an argument against the "armed Leagues" when the Chamber met. In the course of a three-day debate Laval was accused of complicity with the fascists, and Paganon, his Radical Minister of the Interior, of incomprehensible leniency. "Either you change your methods," M. Guernut, the Radical deputy, exclaimed, "or we shall change the Government."

And then, on the last day of the debate, an extraordinary thing happened — the famous "National Reconciliation Scene" of December 6. Speaking in the morning debate on behalf of the Croix de Feu, M. Ybarnégaray appealed for national unity. The proposed dissolution of the Leagues, he said, would be ineffective and dangerous. "Let us keep the Leagues, but let us disarm. If all the Leagues and all individuals are disarmed, the problem will be solved." M. Ybarnégaray then proposed a law in terms of which anyone found guilty of carrying arms in the street would be liable to from one year's to three years' imprisonment. M. Blum, the Socialist leader, then rose. "This discussion," he said, "may yield some welcome results. Only, in my opinion, the question of individual weapons is of secondary importance; for weapons can always be found. The essential thing to me is the

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ILLINOIS

existence of formations which, by their organization, their discipline, and their method of recruitment, are military in character. Although there is no close analogy between the Croix de Feu and the small groups of self-defense which we have organized in the Socialist Party since February 6, I am willing to say to M. Ybarnégaray: 'We are prepared to destroy and dissolve these formations. Are you prepared to do the same with your military formations?'" Mr. Thorez, speaking for the Communists, said that he identified himself with M. Blum's proposal as far as the semi-military communist formations were concerned. M. Blum continued: "All this discussion may have a salutary effect. Again I say to you, M. Ybarnégaray, that we are prepared to disarm in so far as our comrades are armed. In so far as our organizations are military in character we are prepared to dissolve them. Are you prepared to do the same?" There was a moment of tense silence. Then M. Ybarnégaray replied: "In so far as our organizations are para-military, I say: Yes."

This "national reconciliation" scene, though not quite spontaneous (M. Laval and M. Ybarnégaray had prepared much of it in advance), created an enormous impression in Paris. It seemed that the menace of civil war had been definitely averted. That night the Chamber passed the first of the anti-fascist bills giving the Government the right to dissolve by decree any organization of a military or semi-military character; any organization guilty of holding armed or forbidden meetings in any public or private places; and any organization liable to be a menace to the territorial integrity of the country or to the republican régime. The original government bill provided for a complicated juridical dissolution procedure; the text amended by the Chamber gave the Government itself the powers of dissolution.

The "reconciliation scene" wrought havoc among the Fascist Leagues. There were several spectacular resignations from the Croix de Feu, and Colonel de La Rocque and M. Ybarnégaray were savagely attacked by the smaller Leagues, whom the Croix de Feu had succeeded so well in eclipsing. M. Taittinger, the leader of the Jeunesses Patriotes, treated La Rocque as a traitor, much to the despair of M. de Kerillis, the head of the principal Right-wing propaganda organization, whose chief complaint had always been the absence of a solid Right-wing "front." Actually, if the Croix de Feu lost many sympathizers among the extremist elements on December 6, 1935, they gained many new sympa-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

thizers among moderate conservative elements. More than before, the Croix de Feu promised to become the backbone of all the conservative forces in France. Its vaguely fascist ideology had already made much progress in the two previous years among all the anti-socialist, anti-communist, and, latterly, anti-Front Populaire forces of the country. As for the smaller Leagues, they did not profit as much from La Rocque's "treachery" as they had hoped. Little was heard of them during the subsequent months.

The bill giving the Government authority to dissolve the Leagues, and the bills prohibiting the carrying of arms and imposing penalties for the incitement to murder in the press (a measure directed chiefly against the paper of the Solidarité Française and against the Royalist *Action Française*) were passed by the Senate at the end of December. The Right did not take the bills unduly seriously, and did not think that they would be strictly applied.

On February 14, 1936, Léon Blum, the Socialist leader, driving together with M. Monnet (the present Minister of Agriculture) and Mme. Monnet down the Boulevard St. Germain, was stopped by a crowd of Royalists who had gathered there for the funeral of Jacques Bainville, the Royalist historian. Blum was dragged out of the car and savagely beaten, and would probably have been battered to death but for the timely intervention of a number of workmen. He suffered from severe loss of blood and was ill for several weeks. That night the Sarraut Government dissolved the Camelots du Roi and other Royalist organizations, and action was taken against Charles Maurras, the editor of the *Action Française*, for incitement to murder. The premises of the Camelots du Roi and of the Royalist paper were raided and searched by the police. But except for their paper, which was not forbidden, and which has scarcely diminished in violence, nothing has lately been heard of the Camelots du Roi. No fleur-de-lis badges are worn in the streets any longer. Their dissolution seems to have been sufficiently effective.

As for the Croix de Feu, they became respectable after December 6. At a few meetings he held in the earlier part of 1936 La Rocque no longer spoke of "sport." Instead he said that the rich harvest of ideas which the Croix de Feu had sown was rising luxuriously throughout France. "Our ideas will be in power." Bertrand de Maud'huy remarked that it was poor consolation for

BLIC LIBRARY
ICKA, ILLINOIS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

fellows who wanted to play a part to know that "their ideas" — and not they — would be in power.

I referred earlier in this article to the fiasco of the Croix de Feu "arbitration" in the General Election. What has happened since?

During the great strike epidemic of May–June the Croix de Feu played an ambiguous rôle in encouraging the strikes, and they also attempted to set up — without much success — a network of trade unions of their own in competition with the C.G.T. Then suddenly, towards the middle of June, the Blum Government issued a dissolution decree against the Croix de Feu, the Solidarité, the Jeunesses Patriotes, and the Francistes (an unimportant anti-Semitic organization of "blueshirts"). I saw Colonel de La Rocque on the night of the dissolution. "All great movements," he said, "have to pass through a phase of persecution. But our movement, which corresponds to a vital reflex of this country, cannot die." He was, none the less, visibly embarrassed. "*If we had run candidates in the General Election*," he said, "we would have got two million votes. But what was the good, with that second ballot to falsify the result? Still, we have 38 deputies whom we may count as ours; and we shall see what they can do." The 38 deputies have done nothing.

The Colonel is one of the most charming persons on earth; and to be a successful fascist leader one perhaps ought to be a ruthless thug with a touch of insanity. La Rocque is sane and balanced and anything but a thug. He must hate the idea of bloodshed among Frenchmen — did he not hate it on February 6, when the Croix de Feu failed (though they probably could have succeeded) to break into the Chamber from the back? And perhaps La Rocque also knew in his heart that at no moment — not even under Doumergue — could a fascist coup succeed in France, at any rate not without plunging the country first into a period of deadly civil war.

The Croix de Feu has, nominally, disappeared. But the men who composed it still exist. Like the smaller Fascist Leagues, the Croix de Feu now calls itself a party — the Parti Social Français. La Rocque and his faithful Ybarnégaray go round the country and tell the ex-Croix de Feu members that their time will yet come, that the Front Populaire cannot rule forever and is sure to come to grief. And at the end of the meetings they all sing the Marseillaise. And in the meantime La Rocque has called upon

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

his followers and sympathizers to hang tricolor flags out of their windows as a protest against the dissolution of the Leagues and against the Blum Government generally.

But on July 14 the Front Populaire held its giant demonstration in the east of Paris, and in the west there was no "counter-demonstration." Former Croix de Feu members dropped flowers individually on the Unknown Soldier's grave, and, as on the previous Sunday, there were a few fights with the police in the Champs Elysées, and café tables were upset and soda syphons were thrown about. The number of Croix de Feu members has decreased; but nobody quite knows in what proportion. It is said that they have lost about one-third of their members and have not much more than half a million left. But, above all, they are disorganized and demoralized.

The adherents of the former fascist and semi-fascist leagues are only too well aware that fascism has been well beaten all along the line. Many of them have, in the last two months, developed a sneaking admiration for the Blum Government, which, they realize (and some admit it openly) is the first government for years to be doing something. While the others have been talking, these people have been acting. As for the fascist amateurs of "dynamics" they can find all the dynamics they want among the Communists. And, for that matter, is not the Front Populaire as a whole, with its procession of a million people, sufficiently "dynamic?" Some, indeed, have gone over to the Communists. Others have not joined anything; and like those who still believe in La Rocque, they are waiting patiently in the hope that the Blum "experiment" will fail and that on its ruins new possibilities will open up for some form of fascism.

But what of those who are finally disillusioned in La Rocque, who are not prepared to wait for the collapse of Blum, but who want "dynamics," though not "dynamics" of the Front Populaire variety? An extraordinary amount of publicity — in my view, undeserved — has lately been given to the new party founded by Jacques Doriot, the former Communist leader, and mayor of St. Denis. It is called the Parti Populaire Français.

Doriot, a solidly built man with a strong chin, curly black hair and tortoise-shell glasses, began as a workman and became in time the parliamentary leader of the Communist Party. Then, in 1934, he put forward a proposal for something on the lines of the Front Populaire — a coalition between the Communist, Socialist

UIC LIBRARY
ILLINOIS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

and Radical elements of the country; for (said he) France being only one-fifth proletarian, nothing can be achieved without the support of the *petite bourgeoisie*. He was expelled from the Communist Party as a heretic; though soon afterwards the Communists adopted the idea themselves. Doriot never forgave them. In the Senate elections last autumn he joined forces with Laval; and during the discussion of the Franco-Soviet Pact last February he denounced his former comrades with extraordinary violence. Amid loud cheers from the Right of the Chamber, he accused them of taking money from Moscow and of wishing to drag France into a war against Germany for the benefit of the Soviet Union, with a Bolshevik revolution in France as the ultimate objective. The Left listened to his harangue in contemptuous silence. About the same time he gave a number of interviews to German papers in which he advocated a French rapprochement with Germany against Russia. In the last election he was returned for St. Denis, for years his stronghold, by only a narrow majority of 500 votes over his Communist competitor.

And then, at the end of June, Doriot founded his new party. Its program, rather flimsy, is reminiscent of the so-called "program" of the Croix de Feu. It denounces communism and internationalism as enemies, and demands: a reform of the republican state; the creation of stable government (a phrase reminiscent of Doumergue); the creation of Economic Assemblies representing all the economic forces of the nation; the detachment of Parliament, the Government, the judiciary, the administration, and the press from the influence of the financial oligarchy (which is otherwise, presumably, to remain intact); defense of the workers, artisans, peasants and middle class (whatever that means); stimulation of trade between France and her colonies (an autarchist formula); various reforms concerning education, town-planning, etc., which would tend to make the French "a stronger and healthier race"; and the resurrection of a France capable of playing "her traditional rôle in fostering human progress, justice, peace and the friendship between nations." Such is M. Doriot's "program." Rather thin.

But, unlike La Rocque, Doriot is tough and brutal and is not handicapped by being an aristocrat. He also suffers deeply from thwarted ambition. Many of the people who supported financially and otherwise the Leagues and the Royalists seem to be supporting Doriot now. His paper, *L'Emancipation Nationale*, is sold on

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the boulevards and read by much the same public as the Royalist *Action Française*. De luxe booklets are published full of sentimental pictures of Doriot in his "humble little home" at St. Denis, of his two little daughters, of the sofa he sleeps on, and of his pair of bedroom slippers. The text is provided by people like Pierre Dominique and Bertrand de Jouvenel — the de Jouvenel of the famous "pro-French" Hitler interview a week before Hitler denounced Locarno, a young man with a passion for Hitlerite "dynamics," and a great believer in Franco-German unity at the expense of Russia. Dominique, though older, is of the same mettle. Though nominally a man of the Left, he is a great admirer of Mussolinian "dynamics," and was violently pro-Italian and anti-British during the Abyssinian conflict. Bertrand de Maud'huy has also joined the group. So Doriot has a few "progressive" fascist intellectuals to help him. On the other extreme are his supporters at Marseilles, an altogether disreputable gang associated with the shadiest possible side of the "Tammany Hall" politics of that great city. These people are not without considerable local influence. Meanwhile Doriot's old friend Laval is watching his movement closely; and, if it succeeds, he may associate himself with it openly. But he is not sure yet whether it is a horse worth backing.

For the present, however, the Doriot coterie is hardly an impressive one, still less a coherent one. It does not seem likely to attract a very large number of the respectable middle-class youths of the Croix de Feu movement, still less the proletarian elements of St. Denis or of anywhere else. Even if (as Doriot hopes) there is a breakdown of the Front Populaire, it is still difficult to imagine the French working class flocking into the arms of the "traitor." Above all, there is a widespread suspicion that Doriot is not "genuine." Now he denounces the Communists for being in the pay of Moscow. But for ten years he was a leading Communist himself and thought it all right to take money from Moscow. If he "saw the light," he took an extraordinarily long time to see it, and not until his *fief* of St. Denis was in danger of being captured by the Communists. Nevertheless, Doriot is being supported by a large part of the Right press, who have forgiven him all his past sins and treat him as a possible "man of tomorrow." What his membership is is still uncertain: the highest figure I have seen is that of 50,000 given by Doriot himself in the *Emancipation* of August 1, which is not enormous. As already

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

said, it is doubtful whether he will win over even a large proportion of the Croix de Feu; for there is too much about Doriot that must go against their grain.

The Doriot Party is above all, perhaps, a symptom of the present bewilderment among the forces of the Right in search of new guidance. On the Left, where Doriot is not taken very seriously, his competition with La Rocque is, if anything, welcomed — for it means that the fascist elements, instead of uniting, are being split up. If Doriot builds up in Paris — as he perhaps may — an illegal army of desperadoes, rather after the model of the Marseilles gangs of his friend Sabiani (but on a larger scale), he may become of some nuisance value; but he will scarcely ever become a great popular leader unless he is pushed to the front by some entirely new international situation in which his greatly advertised pro-Germanism and anti-Sovietism might be of use.

Such a situation might occur in the event of a "fascist encirclement" of France resulting from a fascist victory in Spain. The feeling might then gain ground that a normal democratic government was no longer competent to "stand up" to the fascist neighbors of France, and that France could regain diplomatic equality only under some form of authoritarian government, with no League principles to bother it. The encouragement given to the Spanish rebels by the French press of the Right — a violent campaign reminiscent of its pro-Mussolini campaign last year — has been a symptom of this tendency. Fascism in France may also have another chance if the Front Populaire collapses, and if parliamentary government collapses with it. But just at present it is lost and bewildered.

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

REFORMING THE BANK OF FRANCE

By Georges Boris

DURING the few weeks it has been in power, the Blum Government has enacted a broad program of reforms. Certain of these reforms were submitted to and adopted by Parliament under the pressure of immediate circumstances. Others were part of a program which had received careful consideration, which had been the subject of controversy before the election, which were the substance of electoral promises. The reform of the Bank of France belongs to this latter category. In conjunction with the bill for the nationalization of war industries, central banking reform was a subject on which the parties of the Left, unified in the Popular Front, were in complete accord. It was one of the major planks in the Popular Front platform, and it proved to have great propaganda value. It provided the Left with two excellent slogans. "Down with the Regents" implied that the administrators of the Bank of France were an enemy to be conquered. The other — that the Banque de France should become the Banque de *la* France — is difficult to translate. In general it implies that the Bank of France should become the Bank of Frenchmen, that the country's leading financial institution should no longer serve private but national interests.

The extent of the popular support behind the Bank reform is reflected in the vote, 444 to 77, by which the Chamber adopted the bill. Opponents could only muster 77 votes, although the Opposition normally amounts to 220. What happened was that 76 deputies of the Right abstained from voting at all, while some 60 others joined forces with the Left. The Senate, the bulwark of social conservatism, accepted the project, 190 to 74. These figures are significant, for they show the magnitude of the Popular Front's success. They also show the influence which it has acquired over men who, earlier, were either neutral or hesitant.[1]

Victory over the Bank of France is symbolical: it was the assault on the citadel, the fall of the Bastille of the moneyed aristocracy. But it is a very real victory as well. The Bank of France had gradually become the commanding center of all capitalist activity. Those who control this key position determine

[1] Similar non-government support was forthcoming in the vote on the law nationalizing war industries.

PUBLIC LIBRARY
ILLINOIS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ILLINOIS

the course of French politics and economics. They can impose their will, they can dictate laws. In excluding this oligarchy, the new reform bill has eliminated the principal obstacle in the course of French democracy. The country itself now commands the levers which determine the fate of the economic system, of social reforms, and the nature of the political régime. That effective control of the Bank of France does really entail these wide consequences is apparent from the following historical sketch.

II

The Bank of France was founded in 1800 by Napoleon Bonaparte, then First Consul. It secured definite status in the laws of April 14, 1803, April 22, 1806, and the decree of January 16, 1808. The Bank was given the right of issuing the nation's currency — in 1848 this became an exclusive right, and in 1897 the privilege was renewed and extended to 1945. One hundred and thirty years have elapsed since the establishment of the Bank of France. One political régime has followed another; an economic revolution has transformed the country; but through it all the Bank of France remained essentially the same. Small wonder that it appeared extremely archaic and ill adapted to modern ideas and demands. But financial superstitions are deeply rooted in France. An economic crisis of primary magnitude was needed before the shortcomings of the Bank could be altered.

There are some 40,000 shareholders in the Bank of France. Yet in accordance with Bonaparte's laws, only the 200 greatest shareholders had the right of participating in the General Council, *i.e.*, the stockholders' meeting. The General Council chose from among its members the 15 Regents (directors) and 3 Censors (advisers). The state appointed the Governor and two Vice-Governors. The former had to own 100 shares of stock, the latter 50 shares each. Regents, Governors and Censors — the latter had no voting power — constituted the Regency Council which was the real directing body of the Bank. Thus French economic life was dominated by a financial oligarchy. Only the wealthy — and among them only a few — controlled the Bank of France. To be eligible as one of the 200 greatest shareholders presupposed, until very recently, that one had a minimum investment of 2,000,000 francs (about $133,000 at present exchange rates).

The 200 largest shareholders consisted of the leading capitalists, the large corporations, and particularly the 21 big insurance

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

companies. So strong was the element of tradition, that certain seats have been transmitted in hereditary succession for over a century; thus of the 6 bankers who were Regents, 5 were descendants of the great financiers of the First Empire. Outstanding industrialists held 5 other seats. Typical of this group was François de Wendel, president of the Comité des Forges and one of the party leaders of the extreme Right. A memorandum submitted to the Chamber of Deputies during the discussion of the reform bill showed that 12 Regents, either directly or by the intermediary of their sons and nephews, were directors of 95 corporations: 31 private banks, 8 insurance companies, 9 railroads, 8 shipping concerns, 7 metallurgical industries, 8 mines, 6 electric companies, 12 chemical industries and 6 miscellaneous corporations. The Governor, appointed by the state, supposedly reflected the cabinet's views rather than those of the oligarchy. But experience proved that with few exceptions the Governor saw eye-to-eye with the Regents. Thus the Bank escaped from government control and was a law unto itself. Cabinets generally hesitated to dismiss Governors; whenever they did so the Bank gave it the appearance of a quasi-revolutionary act.

LIC LIBRARY
ORA, ILLINOIS

III

Throughout the nineteenth century the Bank of France was virtually a state within a state. It never hesitated to oppose and checkmate the Government whenever the latter's policies were not in harmony with its own. Its opposition was particularly strong if cabinets and popular opinion were liberal rather than conservative. The Second Republic suffered the hostility of the Bank; while Louis Napoleon found it favorable to his *coup d'état* of December 2, 1851, which ended the Republic and created the Second Empire. In 1870, after the surrender of Napoleon III at Sedan, France was invaded by the Prussian army. Gambetta, the organizer of national resistance, threatened to uproot the Bank because of its refusal to give proper financial aid to the cause of national defense.

The intervention of the Bank of France in politics is hardly new. But during the postwar years its power was exercised more frequently and at times decisively. The Bank's influence and means of action increased, for to its old functions it added that of defense of the franc. During the first few years of the postwar period France was governed by the parties of the Right. Cabinets

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS
of the Right have the blessings of the Bank; yet even they have been known to complain of the selfish and unjust demands of the Regents. In an official document dated December 13, 1923 — this was during the second Poincaré ministry — a high ranking official in the finance ministry complained of the unjustified demands made by the Bank and the latter's means of winning its point by a press campaign "created and subsidized by the directors of the Bank." At a time when the Bank was most exacting towards the state — it endeavored to secure advance repayment during a period of financial stress — it indulged in a program of ostentatious extravagance. Throughout France it constructed luxurious offices; it purchased collections of objets d'art for its Paris headquarters. The cost was great enough to make it possible for the Bank not to declare an extra dividend — a certain proportion of which could have been claimed by the state.

The elections of May 1924 brought to power the Left Cartel, dominated by Herriot and the Radical-Socialists. The political quarrel between state and Bank was complicated by the growing chaos in public finances. The Bank of France took a definite stand on both issues. Financially it pretended to oppose inflation and devaluation, although nearly everyone recognized this as inevitable due to tremendous wartime and postwar expenditure. The Bank convinced the Government of the righteousness of its cause; it won public opinion, thanks to a devoted press. Thereafter it had little trouble in making the Government adopt its policies so that in the end the parties of the Left should bear the opprobrium for inflation and devaluation. At the beginning of 1925 the Bank consented to overlook the *fait accompli* of inflation. In return it demanded of Herriot, then Prime Minister, that he abandon measures approved by the Cabinet penalizing fiscal evasion. The Cabinet was under obligation to publish such a list. On April 10, 1925, the Herriot ministry was forced to resign.

From April 1925 to July 1926 the problem of the franc became the major issue of French politics. It cost the lives of several cabinets and ended the tenure of many finance ministers. The latter frequently denounced the Bank's ill-will. Joseph Caillaux, in a letter dated June 1925 and addressed to the Governor of the Bank of France, accused the Governor of "placing his own preferences over general interests" and stated that he, Caillaux, "was reconciled to foregoing a coöperation which the Bank refused him." A year later, Raoul Peret in resigning as Finance Minister

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

gave as his reason "the absence of an essential coöperation which he had every right to expect." Despite the fall of ministries and the decline of the franc, the Bank refused to pledge its gold reserves "until a government of more moderate (conservative) tendencies would guarantee success to technical measures." In such words did one of the principal Regents describe the Bank's policy at a conference at the Finance Ministry in May 1926.

The Left, exhausted by the struggle, and held responsible in the eyes of the public for the fall of the franc, gave way on July 23, 1926, to a government of National Union headed by Raymond Poincaré. A few days previous, during a short term of office at the Finance Ministry, Joseph Caillaux had dismissed the Governor of the Bank of France and appointed a man whose loyalty to the Government and personal authority over the Regents greatly facilitated the subsequent financial recovery with which the name of M. Poincaré is associated. But even Poincaré found that the power of the Bank of France was such that he at times must capitulate. In 1928 the question arose of stabilizing the franc. In replying to certain of his critics, Poincaré remarked that it was with great reluctance that he had been obliged to accept certain clauses of the new agreement between the state and the Bank.

Poincaré's immediate successors remained on good terms with the Regents. Several factors explain this harmony: a period of prosperity dulled the sharp edge of conflict; the cabinets were of Right tendencies and therefore were approved by the Regents; and the ministers themselves were careful not to provoke the Olympian wrath. Take but a single example. In 1931, as the result of the devaluation of the pound sterling, the Bank of France suffered a severe loss in its portfolio holdings of sterling notes. The loss was at least two billion francs ($133,000,000 today). The Laval Cabinet agreed that the state should bear nearly all of this amount. But between 1928 and 1931 the Bank of France had made a considerable profit in the depreciation of the franc in terms of foreign currencies. Hence the opposition in the Chamber of Deputies insisted that these earlier gains be deducted from the subsequent loss before the state be asked for compensation. Such a step was both intelligent and equitable. The Government refused to adopt it. Supported by the press, the Laval Cabinet obtained the approval of the Chamber and the Senate.

The election of May 1932 returned the Left to power and

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

opened a new period of political tension between the Bank and the state. It was complicated by the advent of the depression in France. For four years, from 1932 to 1936, the Bank of France endeavored to prepare the way for political conservatism by making itself the champion of the strictest financial orthodoxy. It utilized all its resources to defend the franc and obtain a deflation of prices. To force successive governments to decrease public expenditure and achieve a balanced budget, the Bank of France refused to offer the Treasury the facilities of an ordinary central bank. Most central banks during the depression have been willing to discount Treasury Notes, thereby ensuring an elastic money market. The Bank of France refused to discount short-term Treasury Notes except to an insignificant degree. At the same time it rigorously limited the amount of such notes it would accept from any one client. Because Treasury Notes were not easily convertible, the Government had difficulty in procuring funds on the money market. Loans were contracted at higher and higher interest rates. Meanwhile the Bank, to check the flight from the franc, raised its discount rate. The dearness of money and the Bank's defense of the franc reduced the country's income and, as a result, tax receipts. The deficit mounted; the state was obliged to make new economies and contract new loans. By the end of 1932, the circle had become vicious.

Confronted with insoluble problems and forced to adopt measures that were both unpopular and inapplicable, ministries fell in rapid succession. The Bank of France remained firm in its adherence to deflation; and it supported its stand by a well-directed press campaign. Subsidies of the press had become one of its regular means of action. A former Governor, testifying in 1931 before the commission investigating the Oustric bank scandal, asserted that the Bank of France had adopted the practice of distributing sums of money to the newspapers. From 1932 to 1935 newspapers published many articles — some were written by the Bank's own functionaries — supporting deflation against the alternatives of devaluation or a cheap money policy. To induce Frenchmen not to imitate the monetary policies of other countries, the French press was deluged with false news concerning the American experience with devaluation. The Belgian experience, according to a cabinet minister of that country, M. Vandervelde, was systematically misrepresented in the French press at the instigation of the Bank of France.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The political crisis, which was nothing but the result of the economic situation, reached its climax in the riots of February 6, 1934. A ministry of National Union (and therefore conservative) was formed by M. Doumergue. In financial matters it followed the Bank's suggestions in a docile spirit. It adopted a deflation more severe than before. But the results were no more satisfactory. In November 1934 the Flandin Cabinet assumed power. It inclined somewhat to the Left and contemplated reversing the economic and financial policies of its predecessors. It hoped to end deflation and create cheaper money, although at the same time maintaining the value of the franc. As a step towards this goal the Cabinet appointed a new Governor of the Bank of France. But the subsequent course of events showed how well the Regents could win a state-appointed Governor to their side. Flandin demanded greater facilities for the discount of Treasury Notes. They were granted in such a niggardly way that the results were negative.

Meanwhile the Bank had decided on a renewed deflation. The policy was announced to the Congress of the Republican Federation held at Nice in April 1935 by François de Wendel, the most influential of the Regents. He insisted that the Government institute drastic economies. The speech [2] was the equivalent of a command. The press made it known that if the Cabinet were not immediately given special powers to cut expenditure, the franc would be endangered. A mild panic occurred. There was a flight of capital and millions of francs in gold left the country. The Bank showed no anxiety to adopt the usual steps capable of stopping the exodus. The newspapers exploited the situation. After a short resistance, the Flandin Cabinet capitulated and asked the Chamber of Deputies for special powers. The Chamber refused Flandin and also his successor, Bouisson. The newspapers merrily continued their course, and the panic with them. Finally Pierre Laval succeeded in forming a cabinet. All became peaceful.

Throughout the crisis, the Governor of the Bank of France had very obviously played a rôle of primary political importance. The parties of the Left protested this intrusion into politics. The same protest was made by various members of the Right, who, no longer sharing the monetary ideas of the Bank, favored devaluation. Meanwhile the Laval Cabinet had carried out the deflation program which M. de Wendel had sketched at Nice. In return

[2] *Le Temps*, April 13, 1935.

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Laval was liberally accorded the rediscount facilities which had been denied his predecessors. The Bank of France made no mystery of its policy. In articles which had appeared in the press during the Flandin crisis, the Bank made it patent that the extent of credit facilities which it would accord the Government depended entirely on the Government's attitude or policy. Thus the Bank appeared openly as the inspirer of ministerial policy. It is not surprising that it should bear the unpopularity of the Laval budget decrees.

One would hardly expect to find the likes and dislikes of the Bank manifesting themselves in the realm of foreign affairs. But high Bank officials disapproved of the League's application of sanctions against Italy, and they manifested this aversion in their actions. Finally, in the period preceding the general election of 1936, the Left accused the Bank of secretly supplying campaign funds to the parties of the Right. The Bank never denied the charge.

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

IV

The victorious Popular Front considered it necessary to deprive of its power an organization which had shown itself, first, to have a political nature, second, to be hostile to its political philosophy. One of the first acts of the Blum Cabinet was to name as Governor a man whose loyalty to the Government could not be doubted, Emile Labeyrie. M. Labeyrie promptly ended the Bank's distribution of secret funds which the Left had always criticized and protested about. As concerns the matter of reform, the Government had at one time considered the possibility of nationalizing the Bank of France. But it became evident that such a draconian measure would encounter so much resistance that the success of any change at all would be compromised. Moreover, the desired end could be achieved by other means. The reform bill, as it was finally adopted by Parliament, was the result of an agreement between the Cabinet and the more moderate elements of the Senate. Outstanding among the latter is Joseph Caillaux, President of the Senate Finance Commission. This elder statesman regards the government of the Popular Front with little favor. But he has not forgotten his many struggles with those whom he calls "the great feudal lords" of finance; and he has remained resolutely hostile to their domination of the Central Bank.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The law of July 25, 1936, stipulates that the Bank shall be governed by a Council consisting of the Governor, two Vice-Governors, 20 Regents and three Censors (advisers). The General Assembly of shareholders — henceforth composed of all shareholders, each having one vote irrespective of his holdings — will as in the past elect the three Censors. It will also choose two Regents from merchants and manufacturers having no official connection with a banking institution. One Regent each will be appointed by: the National Economic Council; the Superior Commission of Savings Banks; the personnel of the Bank of France. The Ministry of Finance will select six Regents from the following associations: the National Federation of Consumers Coöperatives; the National Economic Council; the General Confederation of Labor; the General Federation of Artisans; the Assembly of Presidents of Chambers of Commerce; and the Assembly of Presidents of Chambers of Agriculture. Three Regents will represent the ministries of Finance, National Economy, and Colonies. The remaining six Regents will represent various official and semi-official organizations under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Finance. No parliamentarian may qualify as Regent. Regents will serve a three year term — the Board being renewable by thirds each year.[3] The Governor and Vice-Governors will as in the past be appointed by the Cabinet, though henceforth they need not be shareholders. Thus of the 23 Regents, 12 are representatives of the state. This number does not count the Regents who will tend to support them because of hostility to the old financial oligarchy. No seat has been reserved in the Regency Council for private bankers; and shareholders are even forbidden to elect to the Regency Board a person associated in any way with a private banking establishment. The law provides that the Regency Council may delegate its powers. As the result, the administration of the Bank will be directed by a permanent committee composed of seven members: the Governor, the two Vice-Governors and four Regents, of whom one is to be chosen by the Ministry of Finance. Thus even in the permanent committee the majority will belong to representatives of the State.

One may hope that the new reform bill will attain its object. Certainly it contains all the guarantees which can be embodied in the text of a law. The execution depends upon men. Henceforth

[3] For texts of the laws of 1803, 1806 and 1808, and of the law voted July 24, 1936, see *L'Europe Nouvelle*, August 1, 1936.

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

the Bank of France will be directed in conformity with national interests as interpreted and defended by the Government and its servants. Whatever may happen, the transformed Bank is unlikely to become a center of opposition against a strong, active Government supported by public opinion. Nor will the Bank be able in the future to launch a political offensive under the guise of financial threats and through a subsidized press. Henceforth it will not be able effectively to oppose any reform policy. But it remains to be known whether the Bank will actively support such a policy. This depends on the manner in which it functions. It is generally recognized that the doctrines and methods of the Bank need to be modernized. A clause in the law of July 25, 1936, stipulates that henceforth all certificates of the floating debt, during the three months preceding the date they fall due, will be discounted without limitation by the *Institut d'émission*. This is a reversal of the policy hitherto followed by the Bank. The new policy will protect the Treasury against difficulties which in the past have been exploited — if not deliberately provoked — by the Bank. It also should facilitate the organization of the French money market along British or American lines. The practice of an open market policy, which the old Bank of France had always refused to adopt, is not provided for by the new law. But the Government is contemplating introducing such a measure and M. Caillaux has declared himself in favor of it.

From all points of view the coming months will see a readaptation of the archaic mechanism of the Bank of France so as to bring about an expansion of credit. If circumstances demand, or if the evolution of political opinion permits, the problem of the future of the franc may be discussed. If so, one may reasonably suppose that the Bank of France, instead of creating obstacles, will facilitate the solution. Moreover, a modernization of the Bank's principles and methods will permit it to coöperate with central banks of other countries. This coöperation, which has been lacking on more than one occasion in the past, may facilitate a settlement of the international questions of currencies and prices.

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE INTER-AMERICAN TREATIES OF PACIFIC SETTLEMENT

By Manley O. Hudson

IN PROPOSING a special conference of American states, which as I write in August is scheduled to meet at Buenos Aires in December, President Roosevelt suggested as its general purpose the advancement of "the cause of permanent peace" in the western hemisphere. In many ways, the time seems auspicious for realizing that purpose. Seldom have relations between the twenty-one American Republics been more cordial. Many sources of discord have recently disappeared. The war in the Chaco has been brought to an end; the flare-up between Colombia and Peru over Leticia has died away; a definitive frontier has been established between the Dominican Republic and Haiti; several boundary disputes in Central America have been successfully adjusted; and progress is being made toward fixing the boundary between Ecuador and Peru.

Moreover, the "good neighbor" policy of the United States has borne important results, both tangible and intangible. It has led the United States to withdraw its armed forces from Haiti, and to negotiate new treaties with Cuba, Haiti and Panama; and in some measure it has diminished the suspicion which so often has frustrated Pan-American coöperation in the past. Just at this time, also, some of the American states are seriously disturbed about the progress of events in other parts of the world. Already in 1936, three Central American states have given notice of their intention to withdraw from the League of Nations, and it is no secret that similar action has been contemplated elsewhere. If there is reality in the much-heralded solidarity of the American Republics, the present would seem a favorable time to give it a more durable foundation and to consolidate their joint influence for the maintenance of peace.

Yet it is not easy to envisage the definite lines along which this effort might proceed. The numerous proposals for the agenda of the forthcoming Conference range all the way from the creation of an American League of Nations to measures only remotely connected with the advancement of peace, such as "the civil and political rights of women."

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

In view of the experience of the United States when it suggested one League of Nations, it can hardly have been the President's purpose that the Buenos Aires Conference should create another. The fear of "entangling alliances" seems to inhibit the United States only where Europe is concerned; but even if it were possible for the United States to join an American league there seems little likelihood that one could be created. Equality of states is very precious to the American Republics. Nor is the establishment of an American court of justice, which seems to be favored by no less than seven American states, likely to be achieved, for the reasons stated by Chief Justice Hughes in his lectures at Princeton several years ago. The experience of the Central American Court of Justice which existed from 1908 to 1918 has left an unhappy memory, and the rôle of the United States in the events which led to that Court's demise is still resented in some quarters. The difficulties of setting up any effective organization of the American Republics are illustrated by the history of the Pan-American Union; though every effort has been made to confine its activities to "non-political" matters, the Union, after almost fifty years, has not yet been placed on a conventional basis. As an additional reason for reluctance to launch a new organization, some of the American states may fear that such a step would weaken the international institutions which already exist, and even states which have no share in the maintenance of the League of Nations and the Permanent Court of International Justice may hesitate to take this risk.

If the Buenos Aires Conference should have to content itself with a less ambitious program, it may follow the suggestion of President Roosevelt and seek to safeguard the maintenance of peace in the Americas by some reënforcement of the "peace instruments" already in force among American states. In successive conferences since 1923, these states have been engaged in constructing a more or less schematic system of treaties for the pacific settlement of disputes. In 1889, 1902, 1906, and 1910, earlier conferences had explored the possibility of a multipartite agreement for obligatory arbitration; in 1889, it was declared to be "a principle of American international law" that disputes should be settled by arbitration, but repeated efforts to draft an arbitration treaty which would command general support met with failure. During the period of activity inspired by the Peace Conferences at The Hague, some South American states con-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

cluded very advanced bipartite treaties. It is only since the World War, however, that progress has been made toward developing a general law of pacific settlement.

II. THE SYSTEM OF INTER-AMERICAN TREATIES

Four instruments may be said to embody the distinctly American system of pacific settlement:

(1) The Treaty to Avoid or Prevent Conflicts between the American States, signed at Santiago on May 3, 1923, generally known as the "Gondra Treaty."

(2) The General Treaty of Inter-American Arbitration, signed at Washington on January 5, 1929.

(3) The General Convention of Inter-American Conciliation, also signed at Washington on January 5, 1929, to which a protocol was added by the Montevideo Conference on December 26, 1933.

(4) The Anti-War treaty, signed at Rio de Janeiro on October 10, 1933, generally known as the "Saavedra Lamas Treaty."

All of the American states are not parties to any one of these instruments; but each instrument is in force today for such a large number of states that it may be said to have a place in the system.

Ratifications of the Gondra Treaty have been deposited by eighteen states; the Washington Treaty on Arbitration is now in force among thirteen states, and the Washington Convention on Conciliation among fourteen States. The Saavedra Lamas Treaty was quite recently brought into force, after a delay of two years; up to June 1, 1936, only three of the signatories — the Argentine Republic, Chile, and Mexico — had deposited their ratifications, but at least ten States, some of which are European, had effectively adhered to the treaty.

In 1933 the Montevideo Conference made a serious effort to secure the acceptance by all of the American Republics of these four inter-American instruments and of the Paris Treaty for the Renunciation of War. A resolution to this end was unanimously adopted, and a *procès-verbal* was signed by the delegates of twenty states. As no particular dissatisfaction with any of the instruments was voiced at that time, it then seemed possible to anticipate that such solemn measures would lead to prompt action by the various governments. Yet in the following three years no feverish haste has been manifest. Only the United States, Chile, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Mexico, Nicaragua, and

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PUBLIC LIBRA
AURORA, ILLINO

El Salvador are parties to all five of the instruments listed at Montevideo, while the Argentine Republic is a party to none of them except the Saavedra Lamas Treaty.

The record is not complete, however, without mention of the reservations which some states have made in becoming parties to these instruments. No analysis of these can be attempted here, for they are very numerous (particularly to the Washington Treaty on Arbitration); but we may cite a reservation made by the United States to the Saavedra Lamas Treaty, to the effect that the United States does not thereby "waive any of its rights . . . under international law." Such reservations operate in weasel fashion to take the life out of the instruments to which they are attached.

An understanding of the present situation requires some analysis of the main provisions of each of the four American treaties, and an attempt to discover their relation to more general efforts to build a law for the maintenance of peace.

III. THE GONDRA TREATY OF 1923

The essential features of the Gondra Treaty of 1923 were borrowed from the series of treaties concluded by the United States in 1913 and subsequent years, generally known as the Bryan treaties for the advancement of peace. The central formula of the Bryan treaties had, in turn, grown out of the commission of inquiry provided for by conventions adopted at The Hague in 1899 and 1907, which had proved very useful in the Dogger Bank affair in 1905. Mr. Bryan added the feature of permanent commissions to which disputes might be referred for investigation and report, and he proposed that states should give themselves a "cooling-off" period before any possibility of recourse to arms. Hence the Bryan treaties provided that pending investigation and report by a permanent commission there should be no declaration of war and no resort to any act of force. Some thirty treaties on this model were negotiated by the United States, ten of which are still in force between the United States and other American states. After an interval of twenty years, one may question whether these treaties have had much practical influence on the manner of dealing with disputes; no reference has ever been made to any of the permanent commissions which they establish, and for a good part of the time states have neglected to appoint the personnel of the commissions.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Gondra Treaty provides for the submission to a commission of inquiry of controversies which cannot be settled through diplomatic channels and which are not submitted to arbitration in accordance with existing treaties; but important exceptions are made of disputes involving questions arising out of a national constitution, and of disputes relating to questions already settled by treaty. The competence of the commission is limited to investigation and report, and the latter is not to have the force of a judicial decision or an arbitral award. One year is allowed for the report, dating from the inauguration of the commission, with a possible extension for six months, and the parties to the dispute are to have an additional six months to attempt to reach agreement before they recover their liberty of action. During this period, and from the time steps are first taken looking toward an investigation, the disputants are "not to begin mobilization or concentration of troops" on their frontiers, nor to "engage in any hostile acts or preparations for hostilities."

Most of the Bryan treaties provided for the submission of a dispute by the two parties, but under the Gondra Treaty the submission may be effected by one party. This difference is deceptive, however, for the Gondra Treaty calls not for permanent commissions of investigation, but for commissions to be created *ad hoc;* hence the coöperation of the disputants is required. Elaborate provision is made for the selection of the five members of each commission from among the nationals of American states. The only permanent feature of the scheme is that two diplomatic committees are established at Washington and Montevideo, consisting of the three American diplomatic agents longest accredited in these capitals. The sole function of these diplomatic committees is to receive and to transmit requests for the establishment of *ad hoc* commissions of inquiry.

The Gondra Treaty is but a partial adaptation of the Bryan model. In calling for the creation of a commission *ad hoc* for each dispute, it presupposes a situation where all of the disputing states will seriously desire to obtain an elucidation of the facts and will be willing to abstain from resort to force during a period of possibly several years' duration. If it is thought that governments stumble into war as a result of their own hot-headed and precipitate action, then the value of the Gondra Treaty is to be rated very high; but the eleven years that the Treaty has been in force have not given occasion for testing its worth.

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

IV. THE ARBITRATION TREATY OF 1929

When the Conference of American States met at Havana in January of 1928 the minds of men engaged in the conduct of international affairs were preoccupied with the subject of pacific settlement. Very naturally, therefore, American statesmen turned their attention to measures which might be taken to supplement the Gondra Treaty. But the atmosphere at Havana did not prove favorable for the discussion of pacific settlement, and after affirming the loyalty of the American Republics to obligatory arbitration for differences of a juridical nature, the Conference had to content itself with providing for a later special conference to deal with arbitration and conciliation.

The special conference assembled at Washington at the close of the same year, with all the American states represented except the Argentine Republic. It labored in the fresh flush of the enthusiasm engendered by the Paris Treaty for the Renunciation of War and the Geneva General Act, and it produced a general treaty on arbitration, with an annexed protocol on progressive arbitration, and a general convention on conciliation. These instruments now constitute the central part of the inter-American system of pacific settlement.

The arbitration treaty adopts a formula which had been employed in the Franco-American treaty of February 6, 1928, and which has found place in the numerous bipartite treaties concluded by the United States since that date. The parties agree to submit to arbitration "all differences of an international character," of past or future origin, which depend upon a claim of right. Two conditions are set: the difference must be one which it has not been possible to adjust by diplomacy, and it must be juridical in its nature "by reason of being susceptible of decision by the application of the principles of law." In other words, the treaty applies only to so-called *legal* disputes, as distinguished from *non-legal* or possibly *political* disputes. It offers some guides for the application of this distinction, borrowing for this purpose phraseology in Article 13 of the Covenant and Article 36 of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice.

Significantly, however, two categories of disputes are expressly excluded from the obligation to arbitrate: (1) those relating to domestic questions and "not controlled by international law;" and (2) those affecting the interest or referring to the action of a

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

state which is not a party to the treaty. As no non-American state may become a party to the Washington Treaty, disputes involving the Monroe Doctrine are excluded.

With reference to the agency to conduct the arbitration, the treaty takes no account of the existence of the Permanent Court of International Justice, nor does it require employment of members of the Permanent Court of Arbitration. The tribunals provided for are to be created for each dispute after it has arisen. Failing agreement by the parties on some other course, each party is to name two arbitrators, of whom only one may be its own national but both must have the nationality of some American state. The president of the tribunal, who may be a national of a non-American state, is to be chosen by the four arbitrators, or, if this proves impossible, according to a prescribed procedure.

The statement of the question to be arbitrated is to be established by a special agreement of the parties. An artificial provision is added that if this agreement is not concluded within three months "reckoned from the date of the installation of the court," it shall be formulated by the court itself. It is rather fantastic to imagine that two states would be able to create an arbitral tribunal without having been able to agree upon the precise question to be arbitrated, and this provision can serve no other purpose than to still the apprehensions of undiscriminating laymen who may happen to read it. Unfortunately, such provisions are too frequently included in agreements for pacific settlement.

Certainly the Washington Treaty does not carry far along the road toward obligatory arbitration. In fact, it is only an agreement to agree to arbitrate. Each party has kept control of the reference of its disputes, for it is the master of its own rôle in the coöperation required for setting up a tribunal and effecting a submission to it. Even so, however, it was anticipated when the treaty was drafted that some states might find reservations to be necessary. And in fact reservations were made by thirteen of the twenty signatories. For the most part, these reservations relate to the application of the treaty to disputes which are thought to be within the exclusive competence of national courts; as it was phrased by the delegation of El Salvador, "pecuniary claims against the nation shall be decided by its [own] judges and courts, since they have jurisdiction thereof, and recourse shall be had to international arbitration only in . . . cases of denial of justice or unusual delay in the administration thereof." This doctrine in

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

some form is very dear to certain states of Latin America, and allowance for it must be made in any agreement for pacific settlement to which they will be parties. The reservations also show a fear on the part of some states that previous arbitral awards might be disturbed. In one case, disputes which directly or indirectly affect the integrity of the national territory are reserved.

The United States included in its ratification of the Washington Treaty an "understanding" that no special agreement would be made on behalf of the United States except with the advice and consent of the Senate. As this refers to a distribution of governmental power within the United States itself,[1] it does not diminish the international obligation assumed; yet it may serve to render performance of the obligation difficult.

The protocol of progressive arbitration annexed to the Washington Treaty serves the sole purpose of enabling a party to the treaty to abandon any reservations it may previously have made or any of the exceptions contained in the text itself. This privilege has not been exercised, and one may doubt whether it is of much significance.

V. THE CONVENTION OF CONCILIATION OF 1929

The Washington Conference followed a tendency current at the time in drawing a sharp distinction between arbitration and conciliation. While it sought within narrow limits to make the former process obligatory for legal disputes, it envisaged a procedure of conciliation to be applicable to all disputes, legal and non-legal. The Gondra Treaty precluded an approach to the subject of conciliation *de novo*. Hence the Conference blessed the effort of 1923 as a "notable achievement," and sought to give it "additional prestige and strength."

To this end, the Convention which it adopted invests the commissions of inquiry provided for by the Gondra Treaty with the character of commissions of conciliation. They may attempt to conciliate the parties to a dispute at any time, during the progress of the inquiry into the facts or during the six-month period allowed by the Gondra Treaty for the parties' consideration of the report of a commission. In this latter period, a commission also has the duty of undertaking a conscientious and impartial ex-

[1] On various occasions in the past, claims against other states have been referred to arbitration by the President of the United States without the advice and consent of the Senate, *e.g.* the Pius Fund claim against Mexico. The "understanding" tends to limit the President's exercise of power which he unquestionably possesses.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

amination of the issues of the dispute, and of proposing "the bases of a settlement for the equitable solution of the controversy." A period of time not exceeding six months is to be fixed by the commission, within which the parties are to "pass upon" the bases of settlement proposed. Thereafter the commission is to draw up a final act recording the decisions of the parties and any terms of settlement accepted by them. During this additional period, the obligation to refrain from a resort to force is to be operative.

The permanent diplomatic committees established by the Gondra Treaty at Washington and Montevideo are also invested with conciliatory functions, to be exercised either at the request of a party to a dispute, or, if it appears that peaceful relations may be disturbed, on their own motion; but such competence is limited to the interim period before the parties have created an *ad hoc* commission. The Convention also provides for the creation of *ad hoc* commissions even when the Gondra Treaty is not applicable to a dispute.

It was subsequently recognized that the system of conciliation thus organized was weak in that it depended upon the action of *ad hoc* bodies. In 1933, therefore, the Montevideo Conference drew up an additional protocol designed to give a more permanent character to the commissions of inquiry and conciliation. The protocol purports to be an addition to the Washington Convention on Conciliation, but it is as much an addition to the Gondra Treaty. It envisages a series of bipartite agreements, in the form of exchanges of notes, by which the parties to the Gondra Treaty would constitute permanent commissions of investigation and conciliation. Apparently each state would be represented by the same persons on its commissions with all other states. The choice of a fifth member of each of the commissions would be made by the Governing Board of the Pan-American Union. The protocol is such a tangle that it is not surprising that few states have authorized its signature.

Even with this addition, the Washington Convention on Conciliation can hardly be called satisfactory. Perhaps the difficulty is implicit in the attempt to engraft a procedure of conciliation onto that of investigation as outlined in the Gondra Treaty. Still more fundamental is the objection that reliance is placed so largely on *ad hoc* agencies, for meeting whose expenses no provision is made in advance.

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PUBLIC LIBRARY
ARDMA, ILLINOIS

VI. THE SAAVEDRA LAMAS TREATY OF 1933

Unlike the Gondra Treaty of 1923 and the Washington instruments of 1929, the Saavedra Lamas Treaty, signed on behalf of six American states on October 10, 1933, was designed to be universal. It was opened to accession by all states. Several European states have already acceded to it definitively, and some others have indicated intention to do so. Yet most of the parties are American states, and it is a part of the schematic American approach to the problem of pacific settlement.

Dr. Saavedra Lamas borrowed the dominating theme of his proposal from the Paris Treaty for Renunciation of War, but he made some departures from the Briand-Kellogg text. His treaty contains not a condemnation and a renunciation, but only a condemnation; it applies not to war as an instrument of national policy, but to "wars of aggression;" it is not limited to a war of aggression with another party, but it applies to such a war with any state of the world; it prescribes for the settlement of disputes not merely "pacific means," but "pacific means which have the sanction of international law." In line with the policy adopted by many states with reference to the Manchurian dispute, and with the declaration made by nineteen American states with reference to the Chaco dispute on August 3, 1932, the treaty creates an obligation to refrain from the recognition of any territorial arrangement brought about by force of arms.

Sanctions to follow any violation of the treaty's basic provisions are adumbrated, but feebly. The signatories are to endeavor to maintain peace by adopting a common and solidary attitude "in their character as neutrals," and they are to "exercise the political, juridical and economic means authorized by international law;" they are to "bring the influence of public opinion to bear," but they agree in no case to "resort to intervention either diplomatic or armed." This self-denying ordinance is saved from actual conflict with the Covenant of the League of Nations, if not with the Treaty of Paris, only by the limitation that the obligation is "subject to the attitude that may be incumbent" on the signatories by virtue of other collective treaties.

Eleven articles of the Saavedra Lamas Treaty are devoted to the subject of conciliation, and as a contribution to the American system of pacific settlement they constitute the more interesting part of the treaty for present purposes. A procedure of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

conciliation is prescribed for all disputes, but at the time of signature, ratification or accession, any state may except from its obligation any or all of four listed categories of disputes. These categories throw light on the current thought of American states with respect to pacific settlement; they stress the view held in some quarters that a state's own constitution may preclude its assumption of any obligation with respect to certain kinds of disputes. It is extraordinary that the draftsmen of the treaty should have bestowed such care on the framing of provisions designed to facilitate extensive exemptions from an obligation to do no more than to submit to a procedure designed to lead to a report which would have no final or binding character.

The procedure outlined contemplates the functioning of *ad hoc* conciliation commissions only, and it adds little to the provisions of the Gondra Treaty and the Washington Convention. One innovation appears, however, in the very indefinite provisions for the possible substitution of one or more national supreme courts for the international conciliation commission. It may require a stretch of imagination to see how two or more parties to a serious international dispute can agree upon conciliation by the national supreme court of one of them.

The chief significance of the Saavedra Lamas Treaty is not its contribution to the inter-American system of pacific settlement. It may serve as a guide for the application of the elementary principles proclaimed in the Treaty of Paris of 1928, however, and in the event of the violation of those principles it may have influence on the conduct of states which would seek to vindicate international law and order.

VII. THE RÔLE OF THE BUENOS AIRES CONFERENCE

The forthcoming Conference must first of all shape its course after making some evaluation of the system of pacific settlement established by treaties already in force. It may content itself with a renewal of the effort made at Montevideo three years ago to secure a universal acceptance of the existing system; it may endeavor to supplement that system by the addition of still another instrument of pacific settlement; it may attempt a fresh beginning by the creation of new agencies and new methods of dealing with disputes. The considerations bearing upon the choice to be made may be weighed without any attempt to prophesy which course will be adopted.

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

As a means of summarizing the existing American system, let it be supposed that a dispute has arisen between two American states, both of which have signed and ratified without reservation the Gondra Treaty, the Washington Treaty on Arbitration, the Washington Convention on Conciliation and the Saavedra Lamas Treaty.[2] Let it be supposed also that both disputants are entirely disposed to abide by the provisions of these instruments. What will be their obligations with reference to the dispute? By what method will the solution be sought?

The disputants will be bound to refrain, each as respects the other, from a war of aggression, and to effect a settlement only by the pacific means which have the sanction of international law. If they cannot agree upon a settlement by diplomatic means, they must submit the dispute to inquiry and conciliation, but to some extent at least their collaboration will be necessary for this purpose. If they are parties to the 1933 additional protocol to the Washington Convention on Conciliation, they may have a permanent commission in existence; otherwise, they will have to create an agency *ad hoc*. Meanwhile, however, some initiative may be taken by one or both of the permanent diplomatic committees at Montevideo and Washington, within the narrow limits of their authority. If inquiry and conciliation do not lead to a settlement, an obligation to arbitrate may become applicable. Yet arbitration will be possible only if the dispute relates to what both parties consider a claim of right "susceptible of decision by the application of the principles of law," if it does not relate to what either party considers a "domestic question," and if it does not affect the interest or refer to the action of a non-American state. For any arbitration, the two parties must coöperate both in the creation of a tribunal *ad hoc* and in drawing up the statement of the issues to be arbitrated.

Several observations may be made as to the efficacy of this system. *First*, the treaties establishing it are confused, and it always may be possible to play off one instrument against another. *Second*, the system can work only with the utmost of good will and determination on the part of all the states engaged in a dispute. *Third*, the coöperation demanded of the disputants is so extensive that it offers abundant opportunity for disaccord which, at almost any stage, would entail a breakdown of the system. The creators of the system have neglected the primary lesson of the

[2] It must be added that few if any states are in this position.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

experience of the past fifty years, *viz.*, that effective dealing with disputes requires the previous existence of an authoritative agency which may be seized of the difference by any interested state.

On paper, the existing American treaties leave much to be desired; in practice, they have yielded little. Yet in spite of the defects of the existing system the Conference at Buenos Aires may hesitate to undertake a fresh start. Experience both in the American conferences and in the League of Nations has shown the great difficulty of procuring numerous ratifications of multipartite international instruments, and emphasis will be placed on the advantage of ratifying the instruments on pacific settlement which have already been deposited. This may lead to renewed efforts to universalize the system by inducing all American states to become parties to all of the existing treaties. It cannot be a reason, however, for a failure to make an effort to register some further advance.

It is not easy to say what steps can be taken to supplement the existing treaties, as long as effort is confined to the establishment of a purely American system, unrelated to the more nearly universal League of Nations and Permanent Court of International Justice. Some improvement could be made in the provisions for the creation of permanent conciliation commissions. It hardly seems possible to move far along the road to really obligatory arbitration, for neither in North nor in South America is there much willingness to sacrifice special points of view to this end.

Elsewhere in the world very notable progress has been made in recent years in extending the law of pacific settlement. Numerous bipartite treaties, to some of which American states are parties, have developed standards which are much in advance of those with which the American conferences have had to be content. With the exception of the United States, all of the American states have at one time or another been parties to the Covenant of the League of Nations and to the system of permanent agencies which it creates; eighteen of them are now members of the League. Twelve American Republics share in the maintenance of the Permanent Court of International Justice, and nine of them are bound by declarations conferring on the Court a large measure of obligatory jurisdiction. Seventeen of the twenty-one — the exceptions are the Argentine Republic, Bolivia, El Salvador and Uruguay — are parties to the Paris Treaty for the Renuncia-

PUBLIC LIBRARY
ILLINOIS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tion of War. In other words, the efforts of the American conferences have not precluded American coöperation in the building of a general law of pacific settlement. It is somewhat surprising, however, that so little account has been taken of this coöperation in the course of the efforts which have produced the American system of treaties.

The delegates who will assemble at Buenos Aires may be faced with a more fundamental question than any involved in the effort to perfect details of the existing treaties. That question goes to the *raison d'être* of the inter-American effort in this field. Is law and order in the twentieth-century to be safeguarded on a universal or on a continental basis? Dissatisfaction may be felt with the recent attempts to apply the system which was designed to be universal; but it cannot be outbalanced by satisfaction with what the American states have accomplished, and it should not lead to any false appraisal. The Buenos Aires Conference has a responsibility which cannot be met by a mere tinkering with existing texts. It must determine whether and how far regionalism is to be the order of the day in the extension of the reign of law.

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

GERMAN AUSTRIA AND NAZI GERMANY

By Joseph Redlich

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

EVERYBODY who knows the history of modern Europe is well aware that for centuries the dynamic forces centering in the Hapsburg dominions have affected the peace and political progress of the whole continent. Curiously — but undeniably — the little federal state of Austria created by the Paris peace treaties continues, despite its political, economic and military weakness, to occupy this pivotal position.

In 1919 the peacemakers laid down a veto against the union of the German Reich with small but purely German Austria. This veto went against the desire of seemingly strong currents of popular opinion in both countries. Consequently, during the first decade after the World War the problem of the "Anschluss" of the old Austrian "hereditary lands" with the German national empire preoccupied the cabinets both of the Great Powers and of the new Succession States. It became, in fact, a crucial problem in Central European politics. The transformation of Germany into the National Socialist "Third Empire" and Hitler's tremendous propaganda for the outright annexation of Austria changed the situation, but it did not diminish the importance of the Austrian question in European politics.

The successful defense of Austria against the attempts of Hitler's Austrian adherents to get into power and effect annexation was to a large extent the work of two men: Chancellor Ignaz Seipel and Engelbert Dollfuss, his successor and faithful disciple. Their clear vision and energy changed the course of postwar Austrian and German history. And in the decisive hour a third man, the President of the Republic, Wilhelm Miklas, acted judiciously for the safeguarding of Austrian independence.

The defense of that independence during the first years of the peace had been the coöperative work of the two great parties inherited from the old imperial Parliament, the Social Democratic Party and the Christian Social (or Catholic) Party. There is no doubt that the political craft of Dr. Seipel as the leader of the Christian Social Party was the chief factor in maintaining order and peace and in bringing about the financial regeneration of the country. This latter was a very difficult task indeed. It was highly

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PUBLIC LIBRARY
ILLINOIS

interesting to watch this former professor of moral theology solving the intricate social and economic problems of an impoverished country. The League of Nations loan marked the success of his endeavors to promote the recovery of Austria's productive forces on a sound money basis.

From the moment the Nazi movement began to grow in Germany, Chancellor Seipel realized the danger it meant for Austria. Yet in spite of his opposition, groups of Nazis came together with the remnants of the German nationalist parties left from the Hapsburg era. These leftovers hoped that in the continual scramble for power to which Austrian parliamentary life had degenerated they would be able, with the support of their Nazi friends, to outbid both the Marxists and the Catholics. The ceaseless fights of the two big parties and of all the smaller political groups during the years of 1926–1931 produced parliamentary paralysis.

Meanwhile a new feature which began to be visible in Austrian political life was a forecast of greater events to come: the formation in the different provinces of organized military bodies called "home defense corps," or *Heimwehr*. It was in this guise that the idea of fascism took hold in Austria. In 1931 the Styrian home defense corps attempted a march against Vienna to make their leader the master of all the country. This "putsch" the government easily stopped. Yet the *Heimwehr* continued to strengthen its position and became increasingly popular throughout the country by virtue of its strong appeal to "provincial patriotism."

The peasantry stood behind the *Heimwehr* like a wall, and so did the landed aristocracy and a great part of the lower middle classes in the small towns. Step by step the organization grew, helped by former army officers. Prince Starhemberg became its leader and spent large sums of his own money on equipping the soldiers with arms and other military necessities. Chancellor Seipel aided the movement both morally and materially. When the Social Democrats organized a special military body for the protection of the Republic, the Chancellor said ironically: "Creating a defense corps is a very good idea, but the radicals forget that we, the conservatives, understand these things better!" He foresaw a conflict between the Christian Socialists and the Marxists.

In the meantime the continuous rise of Hitler's popularity and power in Germany stimulated the growth of the Nazi movement in Austria. The growing Nazi threat during the years 1930–1932

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

met an astounding lenience from weak Austrian ministries and from the courts, particularly in the provinces. There were many plots, both large and small, against the Austrian Government. Many agents were sent from Germany to help their Austrian party friends, smuggling explosive materials across the border to destroy state railroads and bridges. It was again Dr. Seipel who felt that a very strong man should lead Austria through these critical times. He therefore insisted on the appointment of Dr. Dollfuss as Chancellor.

From that moment came a great change, for ever since his entry into politics Dollfuss had been the vigorous embodiment of the idea of Austrian independence. He proceeded to show that he possessed a far-seeing political mind when in many public speeches he repeated that Austrian sovereign independence was based on the old Germanic conception of the state and was therefore opposed to the totalitarian system of Hitler. The German Nazi leaders soon began to recognize that his courage and sincerity were a force to be reckoned with. They therefore concocted plots against his person. On July 25, 1934, a "putsch" was carried out by Viennese Nazis, mostly mutinous soldiers and policemen. Dollfuss fell a victim of the traitors and died at his office in the Chancery. He was rightly lamented as a martyr who had sacrificed himself for the independence of his country.

The assassination of Dollfuss stimulated in all classes the feeling that the great cause of Austrian independence must be defended at all costs. This setback for Hitlerism was followed by the speedy appointment of a new ministry under a young Tyrolese, Dr. Schuschnigg.

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

II

This short survey indicates that, quite apart from the personal merits of Chancellors Seipel and Dollfuss, deep historic forces were imbedded in the political character of the German Austrian people and that they were working for the resurrection of full Austrian independence.

The Austrian has a strong feeling for the historic individuality and political autonomy of his tribe. It is a general characteristic of all the German tribes that from the moment of their entry into history they possessed a very outspoken tribal pride that prompted them to preserve their specific differences in customs, law, language and ways of life. The curious fact is that the Teu-

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PUBLIC LIBRARY AURORA, ILLINOIS

tons never lost this tendency in their later development and have always endeavored to maintain their tribal and local historic groups as separate entities. As a result, the German language is not an amalgamation of the vernacular idioms of the prominent national tribes. On the contrary, the written German *Schriftsprache* arose in the sixteenth century in the chancery of the Elector of Saxony and was adopted by the chanceries of the other German governments. This is a characteristic feature of the very slow and partly artificial manner in which the German feeling for national unity developed in spite of the strength of local and tribal particularism. At present no German speaks the *Schriftsprache* without immediately showing by his accent and expression to which "tribe" he belongs. That is as true of the Low Germans in the north as of the Alpine Germans in Austria and Switzerland.

The history of German political unification shows how slow was the process of creating a strong national feeling in German life. This is to a certain extent the consequence of the fact that the old German empire as instituted by Charlemagne was not conceived as a centralized national state, but was the Roman Empire, which included in the east, south and west manifold non-Teutonic races and political units. The feudal system as it developed among the Germans further strengthened the power of territorial particularism. Luther's Reformation created for the first time the beginnings of a strong German national feeling. Yet the resistance of the Hapsburg emperor, as well as of Bavaria and of many clerical territorial magnates, produced a permanent division of Germany into two halves, expressed by the difference in Christian faith. The Thirty Years' War and the continuance of the "Empire" (Reich) as an administrative and judicial system, forming a kind of super-state over all the German states, large and small, confirmed this religious division.

In the eighteenth century, the successful attacks of Frederick the Great of Prussia against Maria Theresa, ruler of the Hapsburg dominions, strengthened for a time the idea of a political union of all Germany. But it was Napoleon who by his victories over both Prussia and Austria and by the abdication of Kaiser Franz, the last Roman Emperor of Germany, ultimately destroyed the old empire and thereby caused the rise of a strong movement in favor of the union of all German states in a new national empire.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The French Revolution made France the first modern national state in Europe and thereby set up a nationalist ideal for all European peoples. In combination with the conception of liberal democracy this ideal made the nineteenth century the great period for rising nationalism and democracy (exemplified in the French revolutions of 1830 and 1848). This meant for the Germans and Italians that the endeavor to secure national unification coalesced with the endeavor to create a new system of political life. The Austrian Empire, a multi-national structure, was threatened with disruption. Even after 1867, when dualism was created in favor of the Magyars, the Germans were still a numerical minority in the part of the empire that continued to be directly administered from Vienna. The question of German nationalism both in Germany and Austria unavoidably became a decisive factor in the relations between the two governments. But Franz Josef's fears that his empire might fall prey to the Pangerman movement were quieted by the Austro-German Dual Alliance of 1879 and by the Iron Chancellor's repudiation of any kind of Pangermanism.

During the nineteenth century national feeling throughout Europe showed a certain tendency to emotional exaggeration. That it was carried to the utmost in the case of modern Germany is illustrated by the fact that from the beginning it found expression in a very curious and reckless political philosophy which rested on the assumption that the Teutonic race towered above all others in the world. This led to the modern theory of the unique superiority of the Nordic race from which the Germans derived their special title to European leadership. The first to follow this way of thinking was J. G. Fichte, who laid down his ideas in famous speeches addressed to the German nation during its struggle against Napoleon. Fichte's almost megalomaniac philosophy remained a permanent source for the education of subsequent German generations. Yet so long as Bismarck was in power this political philosophy did not produce a popular movement; it remained a kind of sectarianism for middle-class idealistic intellectuals.

After their incomparable military success and the creation of the Reich in 1871, the German people made rapid progress in agriculture, trade and industry. Their technical and scientific ability, supported by increasing wealth, fostered the utilization of the nation's entire productive forces and made them the most powerful nation in Europe.

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

This development deeply affected the German Austrians. They became very proud of the achievements of their brothers in warfare, in politics, and in business. Nobody admired Prussianized Germany more than the average German Austrian. True, he very often did not like that German brother as an individual, nor his manners; and when he was in Germany he did not always feel at home, except in Bavaria or on the Rhine. Though he felt proud to be a German by race, he loved his Alpine homeland more than the large plains of northern and eastern Germany. But his constant obligation to wage political warfare against the Slavs, Italians and other races to protect what he felt was his birthright gradually transformed him into a nationalist, though not a rabid one. The Viennese continued to regard himself as a citizen of the real imperial city — the *Kaiserstadt*.

From 1875 to the end of the century the Austrian Germans had to fight more and more fiercely with the other nationalities in the Hapsburg Empire. In this period, too, Pangermanism and union with the German Empire became for the first time a political issue in Austria. Georg von Schoenerer, who had early become a member of parliament, did much to make it the gospel of the German Austrian youth, particularly in the universities, where he was regarded as the herald of a great national future. Yet from the very beginning Pangermanism was flatly rejected by the ordinary Austrian when he voted on candidates for the Diet or for the central Parliament. And from the time that Schoenerer combined his agitation with a crude campaign against Catholicism, calling it the "away from Rome movement" — "*los von Rom*" — Pangermanism in Austria was doomed to fail, except in a few districts of Bohemia near the German frontier.

III

This examination of the bald facts of the relations of the Austrian Republic and the Nazi Reich has led us straight to the decisive point. German nationalism was first developed in the old Austrian Empire as a doctrine of Pangermanism. This doctrine was created as a political weapon to destroy the Hapsburg Empire, out of the wreck of which the German hereditary lands were to be salvaged and united with the Prussianized German Empire. When this scheme had failed, nothing hindered the young Austrian Adolf Hitler from adopting the doctrine of Schoenerer, whose weekly review he had avidly read and whose speeches he

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

had listened to fervently while he was living as a youth in Vienna. Indeed, in his famous autobiography Hitler recites how in his teens he had been an ardent disciple and follower of Schoenerer. When, following the defeat of 1918, German nationalism began to manifest its revival in a diffuse but copious literature addressed to youth, he dedicated his immense force as a public speaker and indefatigable propagandist to teaching Schoenerer's doctrine of Pangermanism to the masses in Germany, making it the program of the National Socialist Party he had founded in Munich.

In Austria this doctrine, now re-imported from Germany, had no popular success. It was on the whole indigestible to the Austrian stomach. The great parliamentary parties of the Austrian Republic had not put up a strong fight against the veto of the victorious Allies against Austrian union with Germany. They could not be expected now to work for the Pangermanism of Schoenerer, which had made no headway among the Austrian masses in the old days. Hitler revived Pangermanism as a weapon in his fight against the democratic German Republic. He had high hopes of easily winning Austria, where all social classes were struggling against the terrible misery of the postwar years. But he soon saw his hopes frustrated; neither the Alpine farmer nor the city tradesman nor the workman believed in his messages and his promises. *Nemo propheta in patria sua.* Only among the half intellectuals and the lower middle class, particularly the lower ranks of the public officials, was there to be found a certain admiration for Hitler's force and courage.

The mind and soul of the German masses were largely dominated by bitter resentment against the victorious nations. Their pride and self-respect were deeply hurt. To see Germany recover her old glory of the imperial era became their great aim. Hitler by his vision and immense activity gave them new hope. But the German Austrian could neither join in these hopes nor in these hatreds. He knew that his country and its people were, as a result of the war, among the weakest in Europe, that they had no possibility of recovering at all without the good will and help of all the other nations. He desired nothing but to preserve the independence of his own beloved home by maintaining its good traditions, in peace with all other nations and undisturbed by any of the new doctrines that promised everything to everybody. Above all, he feared a huge centralized power that might seek to impose

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PUBLIC LIBRARY AURORA, ILLINOIS

upon all the German tribes a uniform rule of life and a doctrine equalizing them in all things human and divine.

It was the profound and healthy conservatism of this, one of the oldest branches of the German race, which rejected Hitler's Pangermanism just as an earlier generation had rejected Schoenerer's Pangermanism. The Austrians knew that their own ideas about the federative character of their state coincided with the old German conception of the national political order, and they continued to believe that nothing should be substituted for that old wisdom.

Moreover, Hitler's outspoken anti-Christian attitude, and particularly the open enmity of the Nazis for the Catholic Church, provoked the deepest indignation in Austria, not only in the rural masses but also in the middle and upper classes of the urban population. Also, in spite of the fact that the German Austrian's opposition to the political aspirations of the Slavs and Italians in the old empire had made him a staunch nationalist in Franz Josef's time, he had never accepted the radical theory of the superiority of race that forms the core of Pangerman and Nazi ideology. This was a curious by-product of Protestant Germany, as is illustrated by the fact that Paul Lagarde, one of the great scholars of Protestant theology and a leading German nationalist writer in the seventies of the last century was, as it were, the teacher of Georg von Schoenerer.

On the other hand, we must never forget that a moderate German national feeling has been one of the fundamental elements in the whole social, political and cultural life of German Austrians ever since 1848. German Austrian men and women of all classes have recognized that the reunion of their country with the German nation forms the great future aim of Austrian policy. They simply do not believe that Hitler's "totalitarian" state can be regarded as the realization of the national ideal cherished during at least four generations. They feel instinctively that incorporation in that state would entail suffering for hundreds of thousands of good Austrians. They know that it would mean a surrender of the old Austro-German culture and political spirit.

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE SOVIET UNION AND THE INDUSTRIALIZATION OF ASIA

By Violet Conolly

THE revolution which precipitated Russia's industrialization coincided with the opening of an equally new phase in the history of the neighboring Asiatic countries: Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, Sinkiang (Chinese Turkistan) and Outer Mongolia. The transformation that took place in these countries during the decade following the Soviet Revolution greatly facilitated contacts between them and the new Russia. Strongly nationalistic governments with a taste for westernization stepped into the shoes of the Sultan, the Shah and the Amir.

Turkey, for example, under Mustafa Kamâl Atatürk has initiated a Five Year Plan of Industrialization which is no less a reality than the more widely advertised and portentous Five Year Plan of Soviet Russia. Iran has sent a hundred students abroad annually for the last seven years to absorb western science and technology and like Turkey has undertaken schemes of industrialization. Changes in Afghanistan also show which way the wind is blowing in that part of the world. The fanatical opposition which wrecked Amanullah's progressive plans in 1928–1929 has now abated and the present rulers of the country are carrying through more discreetly a number of interesting reforms. Important public works, including a wireless station expected to cost £29,000, are being constructed near Kabul;[1] while the commercial activities of the recently founded Afghan National Bank will undoubtedly revolutionize the country's mediæval trading methods.

And so Soviet Russia, though scarcely passed beyond the apprentice stage herself, now finds conditions extremely propitious for participating in the economic development of her southern and eastern neighbors. Her trump card in these contacts is geography, save where political considerations happen to be adverse.[2] A glance at the map shows how comparatively easy communications are between Asiatic Russia and many points in non-Soviet

[1] *Oriente Moderno*, April 1935, p. 170; May 1935, p. 221.

[2] The Afghan Government has, for instance, entrusted the execution of its big irrigation schemes, the building of dikes, roads and bridges throughout the country, the instruction in the artillery school and the technical supervision of the arsenal, to Italian engineers and not to experts from nearby British India or Soviet Russia. *Oriente Moderno*, April 1935, p. 170.

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

Asia otherwise difficult of access, such as northern Afghanistan, northern Iran (pending the completion of the Trans-Iranian railway) and Sinkiang via the Ili Pass.

A study of Soviet policy in this region will reveal its great adaptability to the particular conditions encountered across each sector of the frontier.

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

II. TURKEY

In general, economic questions were not of primary importance to the Ottoman Government; consequently, under the rule of the Sultans neither the agricultural nor mineral wealth of Turkey was exploited and the country remained almost entirely undeveloped industrially. Before the War political mistrust barred the way to any coöperation with Russia in the utilization of Turkey's raw materials. But today the Angora Government is actively engaged in the development of Turkish resources and a Five Year Plan of Industrialization has been in operation since 1932.[3] As a result the country has in a short time become self-sufficient in coal, sugar and cement, all formerly on the import list. She has also taken steps to produce her entire domestic demand for cotton textiles. The establishment of this Turkish cotton industry is one of the leading achievements of the Five Year Plan, and in this Soviet technical experts coöperated. A Turkish economic mission visited the U. S. S. R. in 1933 to inspect Soviet factories and to purchase the necessary machinery for the new Turkish textile combine. A group of Soviet textile experts returned to Turkey with this mission to supervise the execution of these plans, and the first factory equipped with Russian machinery was erected in 1934 at Kayseri in the heart of Anatolia. This factory employs about 1,500 workers and has 33,000 spindles and 1,080 looms. The second Turkish textile mill to be equipped with Soviet machinery is in the town of Nazilli, southeast of Smyrna. It is to be opened in 1937 and will specialize in making the finer grades of cloth. These factories use an increasing amount of home-grown cotton, the quality of which is being greatly improved by the American-directed Cotton Research Institute near Adana.

Cotton is not the only field of development in which Turkey has sought the coöperation of the U. S. S. R. A special sum of

[3] Gerhart Bartsch: "Die Industrialisierung der Türkei," *Geographische Wochenschrift*, July 28, 1935, p. 665–672.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

£T550,000 was set aside in the Turkish Five Year Plan of Industrialization for the training of technical experts in Russia. It may be assumed that when these specialists return to Turkey they will give preference to Russian machinery. The willingness of the Soviet Government to accommodate Turkey by accepting a semi-barter basis of payments for these contracts has been, of course, a prime factor in Russia's favor, in view of the extremely tight exchange restrictions which in recent years have strangled Turkey's foreign trade with other countries. The Soviet Government was quick to realize that the best means of increasing its share in Turkey's trade would be to offer her a better bargain than she could obtain elsewhere. On the occasion of General Ismet Pasha's visit to Moscow in May 1932, the Soviets offered Turkey a credit of $8,000,000 to purchase Russian agricultural and industrial machinery (an innovation in Soviet foreign trade technique, as the U. S. S. R. is usually the debtor in such transactions). The Turkish mission was also presented with 10 tractors, 5 tanks, 2 trucks and a motorbus.[4] No interest was required on the loan, which is to be liquidated over a period of twenty years by Turkish produce. This is not bad business for the Turks, provided the Soviet machinery stands up better in Turkey than it has often done at home.

A note of extreme cordiality runs through all official Soviet references to Turkey, evidently as the result of deliberate policy. There have been moments of tension between the two governments, arising in many cases out of trade disputes between Turkish merchants and the Soviet trading organs. Turkey has never hesitated to air these disagreements, though they have always been glossed over in the Soviet press.

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

III. IRAN

Since the present Shah came to the throne in 1925, the idea of industrializing Iran on the basis of her own raw materials has gone steadily ahead. The rôle of Soviet Russia in the early industrial development of Iran has been quite different from that played by her in Turkey. Memories of Tsarist penetration are still very fresh in Teheran. Russia, Sovietized or not, remains for Iran the big bad bear across the Caspian exploiting to the utmost her dependence on the Russian market and waiting for the opportunity to seize one of her defenseless provinces. After many

[4] London *Times*, April 20, 1932.

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

trade disputes in recent years, it is perhaps an earnest of better days to come that she sent a commercial and economic mission to the U. S. S. R. in 1935. A new Soviet-Iranian treaty was signed in August of that year, in place of the former commercial treaty which had just expired. At the same time measures were taken for the organization of through rail connections between the two countries and negotiations were opened with the Soviet Trade Delegation concerning various industrial contracts.

The immediate trend of industrialization in Iran will eventually play havoc with the traditional currents of her trade with Russia. The principal Russian exports to Iran have always been cotton textiles, sugar, oil products and matches; yet these are the first goods which the latter is manufacturing by machinery. Furthermore, according to the terms of the new Anglo-Iranian oil concession, the sale of native oil products is being vigorously pushed in Mazanderan, Gilan, Azerbaijan and Khorasan, where formerly only Russian oil penetrated. As a result, imports of Soviet oil fell from 65,426 tons in 1932 to 32,801 tons in 1935. On the other hand, a new market for industrial equipment and automobiles is growing up in Iran. The Soviets have not yet secured much of it but their share is increasing. Imports from Russia now include manufactured iron and steel, sewing machines, scales, agricultural machinery of various kinds (excluding tractors), tin plates, iron bars, etc. Thus the value of Soviet technical exports to Iran, a new feature in this trade, increased from 376,000 rubles in 1933 (when the commercial deadlock between the two countries occurred) to 980,500 rubles in 1934. If rails are included, these exports amounted to 2,799,700 rubles in 1933 and 2,221,400 rubles in 1934.[5]

In the Caspian provinces nearest to Russia, machinery has been imported from England, Germany, Czechoslovakia and France for the silk, cotton, sugar, jute and tobacco factories now being established there. Steel for the local bridges has come all the way from Sweden. Only in the case of the rails for the Trans-Iranian railway has Russia's favorable geographical position been adequately capitalized. The Soviets are reported to have refused to supply the northern sector of the railway, where owing to the distance from the Gulf they were the most favored competitors, unless they got the contract for the entire line of 950 miles. Iran

[5] *Economic Survey of the U. S. S. R.*, U. S. S. R. Chamber of Commerce, November–December 1935, p. 18.

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

attaches great value to this line as a means of conveying the products of her northern provinces to other markets besides the Russian, though a sober analysis of the situation points to Russia as the only stable outlet for her surplus wool, rice and cotton, railway or no railway. On this account, it would seem as if in the future Iran will tend more and more to increase her purchases of Soviet machinery and industrial equipment in place of her diminishing imports of Russian oil products, cotton textiles, matches, etc. In fact, this is confirmed by the first fruits of the new agreement made with Russia in August 1935. Shortly after this convention had been signed, the contract for the large food combine to be established near Teheran was secured by the Soviet *Exportstroi*. This combine will contain a grain elevator, a flourmill with a capacity of 200 tons of flour per day, a mechanized bakery, a macaroni factory and an animal feed station. All the plans for this scheme are being prepared by the Soviet All-Union Food Machinery Works. At the same time *Exportstroi* secured other contracts for the erection of 20 grain elevators, 5 rice-cleaning and 2 wool-washing factories during the next two years. These enterprises will be planned, built and put into working order by Soviet engineers, and the equipment will be made entirely in Soviet factories. The agricultural implements generally used by Iranian peasants are extremely primitive. The Soviet Union has had unique experience in putting modern agricultural machinery into the hands of millions of scarcely literate peasants and teaching them to use it. This experience might be useful in Iran. At all events the Russians keenly desire to supply their southern neighbor with tractors, threshing machines, etc. The widespread familiarity of the people of northern Iran with the Russian language ought to facilitate technical coöperation in this field.

Nevertheless, fear of Soviet political propaganda is likely to jeopardize any such plan. Few places in the world have a more miserable, fever-ridden population than that which works the lush rice and cotton fields of northern Iran and which is now being drawn into the new factories along the Caspian Sea. These budding industries are essentially capitalistic ventures of the oldest school, where the social claims of labor are ignored. A spark from across the Soviet frontier might in time easily start trouble among the industrial proletariat which must soon evolve in Iran. As yet the factory workers are mostly peasants with one foot well planted on the land, and are much too backward to have any

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

inkling of the revolutionary movement as such. But if the Soviets succeed during their second decade of power in raising the standards of living of their agricultural and industrial workers as efficiently as they eliminated the old régime during their first, such a change cannot fail to influence the status of the masses in the border provinces of Azerbaijan, Gilan and Mazanderan.

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

IV. AFGHANISTAN

It is a sign of the times in Central Asia that the big international oil companies have now installed gasoline stations in Afghanistan.[6] It is also a tribute to the good work done on the main arterial roads by the Afghan Government. But Afghanistan still is essentially an agricultural and pastoral country, producing a surplus of cotton, wool, hides and valuable karakul skins, fashionably known as Persian lamb.[7] Minerals have been located in a number of districts: iron in Afghan Turkistan, oil near Herat, copper and gold near Bamian. These deposits are now being worked only for local needs, but the Government has consulted foreign experts regarding them and seems to be planning to exploit them soon either on a concession basis or independently.

As early as 1924, the Soviet Government showed its economic interest in Afghanistan by dispatching a commercial mission, which remained there until 1927. Its chief results were a considerable improvement in Soviet-Afghan trade[8] and an air convention for the operation of a line from Tashkent to Kabul.

The beginnings of industrialization in Afghanistan go back to 1885–1887, when an arsenal was established in Kabul by British engineers. This arsenal has meanwhile grown into the largest factory in the country, a heterogeneous state enterprise turning out firearms, military supplies, clothing, soap — all under the same roof. In the neighborhood of Kabul, cement, matches and glass are also manufactured. Scattered throughout the country are a number of small power-driven plants. There are machine-

[6] G. F. Strickland: "The Economic Development of Afghanistan," *The Contemporary Review*, June 1933, p. 716–722.

[7] Karakul skins represent in value half the total exports of Afghanistan. This trade is a semi-government monopoly. By virtue of an agreement signed in 1934 between the National Afghan Bank and *Sov-Afghantorg*, the former agreed to import 15,000 tons of Soviet sugar during 1934 and 1935, to be paid for in karakul skins. *Cf. Oriente Moderno*, May 1934, p. 231. Afghanistan has to thank the Soviets for this fortuitous source of wealth, since the Turkomen who owned the best flocks of karakul lambs fled to Afghanistan from Russian Turkistan after the outbreak of the Bolshevik Revolution.

[8] For details of Soviet-Afghan trade see the author's "Soviet Economic Policy in the East." London: Oxford University Press, 1933.

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

repair shops attached to the arsenals at Herat, Masar-i-Sherif and Kandahar. Herat has a cotton-ginning mill, Masar-i-Sherif an oil press and soap factory, Kandahar an ice factory, and Jalalabad a small sawmill. The Government takes an active part in fostering and subsidizing these small industries. Foreign capitalists may participate in commerce and industry provided they submit to the same laws, taxation and legal procedure as Afghan citizens.

As a result of vigorous salesmanship, the quantity and variety of Soviet goods sold in Afghan bazars have very greatly increased since the war. Formerly, British India had a virtual monopoly of the southern Afghan trade and prewar imports from India were almost double those from Russia. Now British and Russian imports are nearly equal:

	1914	1932
Afghan imports from India	£1,300,000	£1,600,000
Afghan imports from Russia	£ 700,000	£1,500,000

The Soviet Central Asian railway system touches the northern Afghan frontier at Kuskha and Termez, while several new roads traversing the mountainous regions have greatly assisted Soviet economic penetration into the southern parts of the country. The railhead of the British-Indian railways is at Peshawar, on the southern frontier of Afghanistan. King Amanullah's projects included an agreement with a French financial group (in which German capital participated) for a trans-Afghan railway. This plan was shelved when the King fell, leaving a broad gap between two hostile railway systems — and a provoking challenge to international railroad firms seeking new worlds to conquer. When the time comes to build this railway, the Soviets will certainly be as keen competitors for the contracts as they now are in Iran.

PUBLIC LI
AURORA, ILL

V. SINKIANG

Though it is very doubtful if even one percent of the inhabitants of Sinkiang feel any need to alter their ancient habits, Soviet political economists long ago made up their minds that far-reaching changes are necessary there and that they are the people to make them. In fact, if change is to come, it is unlikely that it can come from any other quarter. China is too preoccupied to mother a province over a thousand miles from Peiping.[9] The only other

[9] With a view to improving communications between the capital and Sinkiang, the Chinese National Government in 1935 entrusted the famous Swedish explorer Sven Hedin with the task of mapping a motor road from Peiping to Kashgar. As a result of his investigations, all the data necessary to build such a highway are now available, though it is extremely problematic that such an expensive project will materialize.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

close neighbor is British India; but direct interference with the economic affairs of Sinkiang is not her business. Moreover, the mountain frontier would be, as in the past, an effectual barrier to large imports of British industrial equipment.[10]

During 1934 frontier markets were opened in Soviet Kazakstan for trade with merchants from Sinkiang.[11] The traders bring to these markets various Sinkiang products, including wool, sheepskins and cattle, and exchange them for Soviet manufactures. There is, of course, nothing comparable to this on the Indian frontier. As a further lever to economic and political influence in Sinkiang, the Soviets have greatly improved the roads between it and their Central Asian territory. In 1930, for the first time, a regular Soviet motor truck service started running between Sergiopol, on the Turk-Sib Railway in central Kazakstan, and Chuguchak, whence the journey by road to Urumchi, the chief town in northern Sinkiang, takes about 48 hours. In the same year the Russians built a road up the Ili Pass leading from south central Kazakstan to central Sinkiang, and another along a higher pass further south leading directly to Kashgar. Branch lines of the Turk-Sib are also planned from Alma-Ata to Kuldja and from Sergiopol to Chuguchak, but how far they have progressed is not accurately known.[12]

Soviet economic studies of Sinkiang emphasize the primitive character of its production of cotton, silk and wool, as well as its undoubted resources of oil. They therefore urge that Sinkiang be developed on the lines of the contiguous republics of Soviet Central Asia, where industrialization is now proceeding rapidly. According to the secret commercial agreement concluded (but never published) in October 1932 between the Soviet Government and the Governor of Sinkiang: (a) Soviet experts were to have the right to investigate the province's mineral and oil resources; (b) the Soviet Government promised to coöperate with Sinkiang in developing its natural resources. The Soviet cotton and wool-

[10] In spite of the natural limitations to this trade, it was evidently a matter of concern to H. B. M. Counsellor of Embassy, Sir Eric Teichmann, during his recent journey from Peiping to India via Kashgar. On this occasion the London *Times* remarked: "It is to be hoped that the British diplomatist's enterprising journey will bear fruit in the removal of the unnecessary and often illegal obstacles which are placed in the way of British-Indian trade by the local Chinese authorities while Russian traders have no such handicaps. The relative proximity of the Russian railroads in Central Asia to Kashgar and Urumchi would give advantages to Russian importers of the cheaper varieties of goods even if the political influence of Soviet Russia were less potent in Chinese Turkistan." *Times Weekly Edition*, January 16, 1936.

[11] *Economic Survey of the U. S. S. R., loc. cit.*, p. 45.

[12] Walter Duranty: "Russia watches East as well as West," *Asia*, February 1936, p. 85.

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

cleaning establishments at Kashgar, the first machine-run plants in the country, are a step towards this economic coöperation. Apart from any political aims, the Russians will have a fertile field for action in Sinkiang if they merely confine themselves to familiarizing the Turkis with modern agricultural machinery for preparing fruit, wool, cotton, silk, etc. Cotton ginning equipment is, in fact, now being supplied to Sinkiang as well as to Iran and Afghanistan by the Voroshilov Works in Tashkent.

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

VI. OUTER MONGOLIA

Since the day a revolutionary government was set up in Outer Mongolia by the Soviets, its frontiers have been difficult to penetrate. The few people who can claim to know anything at first hand about what is happening there assert that the "young Mongols" are strongly supporting the Moscow-inspired government, and that the army is entirely Mongolian.[13] It should be noted, however, that the Mutual Assistance Pact signed by the two countries in March 1936 materially alters the independent status of the new Mongolian Army because in case of attack the direction of operations may be entrusted to the Red Army staff. Some interesting information concerning the Mongolian Government and its aims was recently disclosed in the Mongolian Prime Minister's report to the Great Hural — of which a Russian translation was published in the Moscow review, *Tikhii Okean* (*Pacific Ocean*).[14] According to this document the country is now "a national-revolutionary, anti-imperialistic, anti-feudal, bourgeois-democratic republic of a new type."

The report goes on to describe the industrial progress achieved in Outer Mongolia with the assistance of the U. S. S. R. "The chief progress in industry," it states, "was the construction (with the coöperation of the U. S. S. R.) of the industrial combine at Ulan-Bator and the steam wool-cleaning plant at Chat Chil. These enterprises, especially the industrial combine, lay the veritable foundation-stone of our national industry, so that raw materials and goods can be prepared and worked up at home." Practically the entire foreign trade of the country is with Soviet Russia, as the British, American and other commercial agents who used to deal in Mongolian wool, furs, hair, skins, etc., have long since been forced out. In the words of the Mongolian Prime

[13] Owen Lattimore: "On the Wickedness of being Nomads," *Asia*, October 1935, p. 605.
[14] January–March 1935, p. 250–267.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Minister, "thanks to the Soviet Union, our country is supplied with the necessary goods. . . . We benefit greatly from this, as we are thus not exposed to capitalistic exploitation. Our exports to the U. S. S. R. have not corresponded to our imports. We ought to take steps to rectify this lack of balance by increasing our exports of cattle, raw materials, etc." The substitution in 1934 of the gold ruble for the commodity ruble may in itself automatically reduce the volume of Soviet exports which for several years poured over the frontier. The Russian trade statistics for 1935 show, in fact, a very considerable decline in this trade:[15]

	1934	1935
Soviet exports to Mongolia (in rubles)	44,410,000	11,633,000
Soviet imports from Mongolia (in rubles)	20,561,000	7,911,000

However enthusiastic certain sections of the "young Mongols" may be for the development of their country, it will not be even remotely possible to consider any far-reaching industrialization there for years to come. The country is adapted to the production of a limited number of manufactures based on its pastoral products, such as rough woolen cloth, shoes and boots, soap, sausages.[16] The geological resources of Mongolia are still shrouded in mystery and mining is in its infancy. Coal is worked at Nalaicha near Ulan-Bator. Gold is mined by the Mongolor Company. There are also valuable virgin forests in the region between the Selenga and the Orkhon Rivers which may eventually be a new source of wealth to the country in the form of lumber, pulp, and cellulose. When the Mongolians come to utilize their forests, they will have excellent technical advisers within easy reach in Siberia.

The Soviets have been in control of Mongolia since they engineered a revolution there in 1921. Their policy in that country, unlike their action in Soviet Central Asia, has shown considerable elasticity and intelligence. The manner in which they handled the situation arising from the 1930–31 revolts indicates that they do not intend to ride rough-shod over the Mongols as they have frequently done with dissenting Khirghizi and Turkomen inside the U. S. S. R. itself. Owen Lattimore, an acute observer of affairs in this part of the world, believes that under Soviet auspices Outer Mongolia can go far. "It may yet be," he says, "that we shall see a Mongolia in which the Mongols are restored to the

[15] *Vneshniaia Torgovlia* (Foreign trade statistics of the U. S. S. R.) for 1934–35.

[16] I. I. Serebrennikov: "A Soviet Satellite: Outer Mongolia Today," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, April 1931, p. 513.

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PUBLIC LIBRA
AURORA, ILLINOI

control of their own destiny; in which the old nomadic collectivism has evolved into a new but still Mongol collectivism and in which the new economic forces of mines and industry, railways and machines will be manned, not by alien conquerors who have reduced the Mongols to an American-Indian degradation, but by free Mongols. It is this possibility which is today the one valid standard of reference for comparing the relations between the Soviet Union, the Mongols and China, or the Mongols and Japan." [17]

When the Soviets intervened in Outer Mongolia, Chinese sovereignty there was little more than a legal formula and in any case the Chinese were interested only in promoting their extortionate trade. Had Japanese domination been imposed, Mongolia's natural resources would undoubtedly have been developed and industrialization would have begun; but the Mongols would have been reduced to political ciphers in their own country, like the Koreans and Manchurians. All things considered, then, Lattimore's dream of a "liberally" collectivized Mongolian Mongolia is probably the best fate that could befall her, for at present there can be no question of her independence.

There also, of course, is an energetic process of industrialization under way in Russia's own backward Asiatic territories. The boldness and scope of Soviet plans in the republics of Central Asia recall the magician's wand of old. Tashkent, for instance, has become a cotton manufacturing center, while on the uninhabited shores of Lake Balkhash a huge copper combine is being built. In the enormous but sparsely inhabited territory of some 900,000 square miles that compose the Soviet Far Eastern Region, the severe climate, lack of men and equipment, and the dependence on outside food supplies, have hitherto checked the development of valuable natural resources. But despite the many difficulties industrialization is forging ahead.

This industrialization of Asiatic Russia has not, however, led to Soviet commercial expansion in the Pacific. Trade with China, Japan and the Dutch Indies is relatively insignificant. The efforts of Soviet Russia in the East are for the present being concentrated on the development of her fisheries, forests, mines and oil fields. These treasures form the basis of her future power on the Pacific — and they were never more prized in the Orient than today.

[17] "On the Wickedness of being Nomads," *loc. cit.*, p. 605.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE STRAITS AFTER THE MONTREUX CONFERENCE

By Harry N. Howard

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

WHEN on April 10, 1936, the Turkish Government requested a revision of the Lausanne Straits Convention, it focused attention on a problem almost as old as history itself. The issue involved the narrow body of water between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, about 235 miles long, made up of the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmora and the Bosphorus. The modern question dates essentially from 1774 when Russia won commercial access to the Straits, a right later extended to other Powers. But the waterway remained closed to warships according to the "ancient rule" of the Ottoman Empire, of which England became a guarantor in 1809. During the nineteenth century the struggle for control of the Straits was waged primarily between Russia and England: Russia wanted them open to her warships alone, while England wished them closed to all warships and open only to commerce. If, however, they must be opened to warships, the English desired that their vessels be permitted to enter the Black Sea. Russia, for a brief period, obtained access to the Straits by the Treaty of Unkiar Eskelessi in 1833. But the conventions of 1840 and 1841 closed them again to non-Turkish war vessels. This rule of closure remained the law until 1923. The treaties of 1856, 1871 and 1878 made no essential changes in the legal status of the Straits, though Germany's penetration of the Ottoman Empire in the years before the World War altered fundamentally the political situation.

The war brought the Straits an entirely new status. The Armistice of Mudros (October 31, 1918) gave Great Britain a controlling influence over the Ottoman territories, while the Treaty of Sèvres (1920) was to have sealed British dominance. Though Constantinople remained technically Turkish, a rigid "international" control was set up over the Straits, which were to "be open, both in peace and war, to every vessel of commerce or of war and to military and commercial aircraft, without distinction as to flag." But the revolt of the Turks under Mustafa Kamâl Atatürk and his subsequent victory over the Greeks in 1922 ended the Sèvres settlement.

The Treaty of Lausanne (1923) terminated the Greco-Turkish struggle, recognized the complete independence of Turkey, and provided a new Convention for the Straits. It guaranteed their commercial freedom with certain restrictions in time of war. The warships which any one Power in time of peace might send through the Straits were not to exceed the strength of the most powerful Black Sea fleet, *i.e.*, the Russian. The Powers reserved the right "at all times and under all circumstances" to send not more than three warships into the Black Sea, none to exceed 10,000 tons each. The zone of the Straits was demilitarized, though Constantinople was allowed a garrison of 12,000, a naval base and an arsenal. To enforce these provisions an International Commission under the League of Nations was organized. Turkey's desire for an individual and collective guarantee was refused; instead the Powers offered to act together under the League in case the security of the zone were menaced. Nevertheless

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

both Russia and Turkey considered the Straits provisions as inadequate for the security of the region. Fundamentally Lausanne did not solve the problem.

Turkey's continued protests against the Lausanne Convention did not become especially audible until the breakdown of the League system in the years following 1931. It was at the Geneva Disarmament Conference in 1933 that the Turkish Government requested the removal of the Lausanne clauses on the grounds that they were "incompatible with the right of legitimate defense," and she insisted that "if the military clauses in the various peace treaties [were to be eliminated] the military clauses in the Lausanne Treaty [should be] treated in the same way."

Meanwhile, Turkey had become a stabilizing factor in the Near East. Her friendship with Russia dates from 1921. In 1932 she became a member of the League of Nations. In 1933 she signed a close alliance with Greece. She took a leading part in the Balkan Conferences and with Greece, Jugoslavia and Rumania became a member of the Balkan Entente of 1934. She therefore was in a good position to work for the revision of the Straits Convention.

The diplomatic preparation for revision was thorough. During the Ethiopian crisis, Turkey, in return for assuming her full obligations under Article XVI of the League Covenant, received "reciprocal assurances" from Great Britain and France, possibly concerning the Straits. But it was not until the spring of 1936 that a formal request for revision of the régime was made. On March 7 Germany remilitarized the Rhineland in violation of both the Versailles and Locarno treaties. On April 10 the Turkish Government requested the Lausanne signatories and the Secretary-General of the League to call a conference to revise the Straits Convention. The note declared that at the time the Lausanne Convention was signed the European situation presented "a totally different aspect from that of today." Then the League seemed strong and its guarantees effective, the future looked peaceful, and there was a prospect of arms reduction. This was no longer true. International guarantees had failed elsewhere — Turkey must rely on her own strength. Both the British and the Russian Governments replied on April 16 accepting the convocation of a conference "without delay," and the latter thoroughly supported the Turkish desire for remilitarization of the Straits. At the end of April France fell into line. The Balkan Entente was likewise favorably disposed. The Bulgarian Government, not a member of the Balkan Entente, did not feel that it could oppose the conference and announced that it would not oppose remilitarization. Japan was sympathetic; only Italy disapproved.

The conference for revision met at Montreux, Switzerland, on June 22. All the Lausanne signatories were represented except Italy, who refused to send a delegation as long as sanctions prevailed and Great Britain kept her mutual assistance agreements in the eastern Mediterranean. It was understood from the beginning that there would be a new convention, that commercial freedom would be guaranteed, and that Turkey would have the right to remilitarize the Straits; but there was fundamental disagreement, particularly between Great Britain and the continental Powers, concerning the Turkish right to close the Straits. When the conference began, Tevfik Rushdi Aras, the Turkish Foreign Minister, presented a draft which abolished the Commission of the Straits and placed the zone definitely under complete Turkish sovereignty,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

with the right of closure. The project guaranteed freedom of commerce, but remilitarized the Straits. Non-riverain Powers were limited to 14,000 tons of warships in the Straits and 28,000 tons in the Black Sea. Submarines and civil and military aircraft were completely excluded from the Straits.

The other Powers challenged the Turkish project though they agreed in principle that a change was necessary. Even Turkey's ally, Soviet Russia, attacked those features which would have limited the right of Soviet warships to pass to and from the Mediterranean. Moscow's aim was to make the Black Sea a *mare clausum* to all except Soviet men-of-war. The British counter-project, presented on July 6, raised the tonnage limitations in the Straits and in the Black Sea (the latter to 45,000 tons of warships for non-riverain states), and provided that in case of war belligerents could pursue their enemies through the Straits into the Black Sea — an obvious threat both to Turkey and to Russia. Moreover, the Turkish right to close the Straits was to be decided by a two-thirds vote of the League Council. The British proposal further provided for a Commission of the Straits.

Naturally the British draft aroused the opposition of the Turkish and Russian delegations, not to mention the states of the Balkan Entente. Some observers thought that London had been instigated into taking its position by Berlin, who for obvious reasons desired to handicap Russia. So incensed were the Russians that they were prepared to leave the conference. Rumania, now in close alliance with Turkey through the Balkan Entente, had revised her own Straits policy and came out strongly against England. M. Titulescu, the Rumanian Foreign Minister, accused the British of duplicity — of supporting collective security and regional pacts at Geneva and then sabotaging them at Montreux. By July 15 Great Britain changed her position. The announcement of the Austro-German accord entered into July 11 under Italian auspices may have had something to do with the shift. Throughout this phase M. Paul-Boncour of France acted as the mediator between the British and the Russo-Turkish positions. The result was the conclusion of the new convention on July 20, which on the whole recognized the thesis upheld by Soviet Russia, France and the Balkan Entente.

The new Convention reëstablishes Turkish sovereignty over the Straits, with full right to remilitarize the zone. The Commission of the Straits ceases to exist after October 1, 1936. The Convention guarantees freedom of commerce, both in peace and war, even if Turkey is a belligerent, provided the commercial vessels do not commit acts of war. Warships are subject to very strict regulations both in peace and war. In war, belligerents are forbidden to use the Straits, except when acting under the authority of the League, or when acting in accordance with a regional pact to which Turkey is a party and which is registered at Geneva under Article XVIII of the Covenant. Turkey has the right to close the Straits in case of threat of war or aggression, subject to a two-thirds vote of the League Council. The Convention is to last for twenty years, unless denounced, and may be revised every five years.

While Japan and Bulgaria accepted the Convention, they made reservations, the former as to the participation of the League and the latter as to the regional pacts. Italy neither signed nor approved.

The Montreux Convention is the first formal revision of a postwar treaty

IC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

by peaceful means. It is also a clear victory for Turkey, for her friends in the Balkan Entente, and for the policy of regional pacts. But there are gains also for Soviet Russia, closely associated with Turkey, and now allied to both France and Czechoslovakia. In many respects the Convention is a reversion to Russia's position under the Treaty of Unkiar Eskelessi. The Soviets may now send their fleet into the Mediterranean in peacetime without restriction, while non-riverain Powers are limited to 45,000 tons in the Black Sea. Should Turkey adhere to the Franco-Russian pact, the French and Russian fleets might utilize the Black Sea as a base for naval operations in the Mediterranean. The League, too, has won a theoretical victory, since its members are assured access to the Straits when acting against an aggressor, and Article XVIII of the Covenant is specifically applied for the first time. Germany, and particularly Italy, are losers, since the anti-Italian group in the Mediterranean seems definitely strengthened. Great Britain, having lost her real control over the Straits and having been weakened at Suez by Italy, may discover that the fate of her influence in the Near East is sealed unless she assists the formation of a Near Eastern Entente in much the same way that France and Soviet Russia have fostered the Balkan Entente.

It may be suggested that the Montreux Convention is a reversion to the prewar status of the Straits, and is not in a fundamental sense a genuine solution of the problem. A few days after the close of the conference, Turkish troops once more took their stations along the Bosphorus and Dardanelles. The Montreux Convention, it is true, means the end of an experiment in the internationalization of waterways. But there would seem to be no real international solution of the problem without general naval and military disarmament and without a strong international organization that can guarantee security. Further, an attempt to reach a genuine international solution would seem to imply that such waterways as the Suez Canal, the Panama Canal and the Straits of Gibraltar should also be placed in the same category with the passage to the Black Sea.

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

SOME RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

NOTE — FOREIGN AFFAIRS will supply its readers, *post free*, with any book published in the United States, at the publisher's regular list price. Send orders, accompanied by check or money order, to Book Service, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 45 East 65 Street, New York City.

General: Political and Legal

DOCUMENTS ON INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 1935. Volume I. EDITED BY JOHN W. WHEELER-BENNETT AND STEPHEN HEALD. New York: Oxford University Press, 1936, 318 p. $6.00.

This standard source book appears this year, for the first time, in more than one volume. The present volume concerns Europe in general, with special reference to Germany.

COLLECTIVE SECURITY. EDITED BY MAURICE BOURQUIN. Paris: International Institute of Intellectual Coöperation, 1936, 514 p. $4.00.

The reports of the seventh and eighth International Studies Conferences.

ABRÜSTUNG UND SICHERHEIT. Volume II. BY KARL SCHWENDEMANN. Berlin: Weidmann, 1936, 799 p. M. 12.50.

A very useful compilation of source and reference material concerning disarmament and security questions between September 1932 and the attainment of German "freedom" in the spring of 1935.

LA RECONSTRUCTION DU DROIT DE LA GUERRE. BY ALBERT DE LA PRADELLE, J. VONCKEN AND FERNAND DEHOUSSE. Paris: Éditions Internationales, 1936, 147 p. Fr. 15.

Suggestions of means for obtaining more humane treatment of the wounded and of civilians in the next war.

SUPPLEMENT TO THE LAW AND PROCEDURE OF INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS. BY JACKSON H. RALSTON. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1936, 231 p. $4.00.

Embraces the important decisions made during the last decade.

THÉORIE JURIDIQUE DE LA RÉVISION DES TRAITÉS. BY GEORGES SCELLE. Paris: Sirey, 1936, 97 p. Fr. 10.

A much-discussed question examined from the legal point of view.

NEUTRALITY, ITS HISTORY, ECONOMICS AND LAW. EDITED BY PHILIP C. JESSUP. Volume III: THE WORLD WAR PERIOD. BY EDGAR TURLINGTON. Volume IV: TODAY AND TOMORROW. BY PHILIP C. JESSUP. New York: Columbia University Press, 1936, 267 p. $3.75 and 237 p. $2.75.

Mr. Turlington's close analysis of the experience of neutral nations in the last war is especially good for its tentative figures on the losses incurred through contraband seizures, blockades, embargoes, etc. In general, neutral losses were more than offset by the profits from expanded exports. In the other volume, Professor Jessup summarizes the conclusions to be drawn from the history of neutrality in modern times. He points out that the World War did not raise any fundamentally new problems of neutrality. He also insists that in spite of the many violations of neutral rights in war time, international law is far from useless as a protection for neutrality. His discussion of the alternative policies intended to keep America out of future wars deserves careful study. He makes it perfectly clear that peace can be maintained only at a high price.

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

AURORA, ILLINOIS

NEUTRALITÄTSRECHT. By Eduard von Waldkirch and E. Vanselow. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1936, 355 p. M. 21.

The first part covers land war, the second sea war.

LES SANCTIONS INTERNATIONALES. By Achille Mestre, Louis le Fur, and Georges Scelle. Paris: Hartmann, 1936, 54 p. Fr. 3.

The opinions of three legal experts, published for the Centre d'Études de Politique Étrangère.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION IN EUROPEAN AIR TRANSPORT. By Laurence C. Tombs. New York: Columbia University Press, 1936, 219 p. $3.00.

A survey of the coöperative measures which the European states have been obliged to adopt despite their exaggerated tendencies toward national exclusiveness, by a member of the Communications and Transit Section of the League of Nations Secretariat.

HUMANITY, AIR POWER AND WAR: AN ESSAY UPON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. By Philip S. Mumford. London: Jarrolds, 1936, 252 p. 12/6.

The first step towards solving the problems created by man's conquest of the air should be, according to Captain Mumford, the establishment of an International Air Police Force.

POLITISCHE VERTRÄGE, Volume I. Edited by Viktor Bruns. Berlin: Heymanns, 1936, lii+636 p. M. 33.

A valuable collection of documents, conceived as a continuation of the editor's "Fontes Juris Gentium." It contains the texts of some 200 post war treaties of guarantee, alliance, political collaboration, non-aggression and neutrality, selected and annotated by Georg von Gretschaninow.

YES AND ALBERT THOMAS. By E. J. Phelen. London: Cresset, 1936, 287 p. 10/6.

A sympathetic portrait of the man to whom the International Labor Organization owes its present position.

MUST WAR COME? By John Eppstein. London: Burns, Oates, 1936, 127 p. 3/6.

The international situation viewed in the light of Papal teachings and action.

THEY THAT TAKE THE SWORD. By Douglas Jerrold. London: Lane, 1936, 247 p. 6/.

An outspoken challenge to many postwar assumptions. The author is hostile to the League, feeling that there exists no common world morality on which to base its action.

LA POLÍTICA EUROPEA Y LA SOCIEDAD DE LAS NACIONES. By Simón Planas-Suárez. Barcelona: Gili, 1935, 535 p. Pes. 20.

A learned but far from objective attack on the League. The Latin-American nations have gained nothing from it, the author holds, and they had best set up a substitute in the Western Hemisphere.

ON THE RIM OF THE ABYSS. By James T. Shotwell. New York: Macmillan, 1936, 400 p. $3.00.

A readable and authoritative history of the League's rôle as an instrument of collective security and peace by one of its most consistent defenders, who however does not hesitate to admit its failures. Professor Shotwell believes that the best method for preserving peace is to develop a system of regional security arrangements within the League framework, whereby each nation, including the United States, will assume responsibility in proportion as its interests are directly affected in a particular crisis.

PROPAGANDA AND DICTATORSHIP. Edited by Harwood L. Childs. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1936, 153 p. $2.00.

Four of the six political scientists who contribute to this valuable symposium treat the operation of the propaganda machines in Russia, Germany, Italy and the Danubian countries. The other two discuss propaganda under dictatorships in general and the function of propaganda under democratic governments. This is a book which anyone interested in government processes cannot afford to neglect.

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ANTI-SEMITISM THROUGHOUT THE AGES. By Count Heinrich Coudenhove-Kalergi. Edited by Count Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi. London: Hutchinson, 1935, 288 p. 18/.

The thesis of this book is that anti-Semitism is caused by religious differences. There can be no question that a great deal of study went into its composition, but it is not arranged in a systematic manner.

WHAT WILL HAPPEN TO THE JEWS? By Joseph Leftwich. London: King, 1936, 268 p. 7/6.

The author's premise is that the Jews are not a people apart with needs so special that they should be dealt with independently of other great economic and social problems. He opposes segregating the Jews in a single homeland.

A PREFACE TO RACIAL UNDERSTANDING. By Charles S. Johnson. New York: Friendship Press, 1936, 206 p. $1.00.

A vigorous study of contemporary Negro life and inter-racial problems.

MISSIONS TOMORROW. By Kenneth Scott Latourette. New York: Harper, 1936, 220 p. $2.00.

A painstaking history of Christian missions, largely during the last century. With this experience in mind, the author, who is Professor of Missions and Oriental History at Yale, maps out a program for missionary work in the future.

THE SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT. By Thurman W. Arnold. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1935, 278 p. $2.50.

A penetrating and entertaining analysis of the springs of mass political faith and action. The proposition is developed that though human beings insist on acting according to "principles," it is easy to persuade them to accept any number of contradictory or meaningless ones.

THE DISCUSSION OF HUMAN AFFAIRS. By Charles A. Beard. New York, Macmillan, 1936, 131 p. $1.75.

In his usual sprightly manner, Mr. Beard asks how rhyme and reason can be injected into the discussion of current problems. He finds that historiography's chief contribution can be in helping distinguish between fact and opinion.

MILLIONS OF DICTATORS. By Emil Lengyel. New York: Funk, 1936, 296 p. $2.00.

The idea underlying this delightfully written book is that the real dictator in any country is the average man. Armed with first-hand impressions, the author portrays this "dictator" in the United States, France, Germany, Italy, Russia and England.

MARXISM AND THE NATIONAL AND COLONIAL QUESTION. By Joseph Stalin. New York: International Publishers, 1936, 304 p. $2.00.

Pronouncements by the Soviet dictator made between 1913 and 1934. Very little concerns "colonial" matters as we understand that term.

THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. By Frank M. Russell. New York: Appleton-Century, 1936, 659 p. $4.00.

This volume was incorrectly ascribed to another author in the last issue.

THE STATESMAN'S YEAR-BOOK: 1936. Edited by M. Epstein. New York: Macmillan, 1936, 1493 p. $5.50.

The latest edition of an indispensable reference book.

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

General: Economic

A PLACE IN THE SUN. By Grover Clark. New York: Macmillan, 1936, 250 p. $2.50.

There has been an obvious need for a comprehensive study on the value of colonies. Mr. Clark has to a large extent stopped that gap. He proves that, by and large, the col-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

AURORA, ILLINOIS

ony-holding nations have not got their money's worth from their overseas possessions, either as markets for manufactured goods, as sources of raw materials, or as outlets for surplus population. Trade, he demonstrates, seldom follows the flag. He tends to ignore, however, that certain colonies have paid richly, and that though the colonizing nations may on the whole have gained few calculable economic advantages from their empires, certain individuals or social groups in those nations have profited. He also fails to give proper weight to the intangible but very important political factor in modern imperialism. He concludes by suggesting that a form of the mandate system be extended to the administration of all colonies.

THE BALANCE SHEETS OF IMPERIALISM. By Grover Clark. New York: Columbia University Press, 1936, 136 p. $2.75.

This companion volume to the preceding book contains the statistical tables upon which the author has based his conclusions. The compilation of these figures, which the author does not pretend are definitive, was in itself a considerable feat. The introduction contains a brief summary of the thesis developed in "A Place in the Sun."

RAW MATERIALS AND COLONIES. New York: Oxford University Press, 1936, 68 p. 85¢.

Probably the most comprehensive survey of the relevant facts and figures. Compiled by the Royal Institute of International Affairs.

THE THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE. By Gottfried von Haberler. London: Hodge, 1936, 423 p. 21/.

A fundamental treatise by an Austrian authority, at present a member of the Financial and Economic Intelligence Service of the League.

MARKETS AND MEN. By J. W. F. Rowe. New York: Macmillan, 1936, 259 p. $2.00.

An analysis of the principal attempts in recent years to impose artificial control schemes in the production of coffee, wheat, sugar, cotton, rubber and tin.

THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CENTRAL BANKING. By Henry Parker Willis. New York: Harper, 1936, 488 p. $5.00.

An analytical study of the underlying ideas of central banking here and abroad. The author, who was one of the architects of the Federal Reserve System, gives especial attention to that institution.

THE DOWNFALL OF THE GOLD STANDARD. By Gustav Cassel. New York: Oxford University Press, 1936, 262 p. $2.25.

The Swedish economist reëxamines post war monetary history and concludes that the old "automatic" gold standard is gone forever. He holds that the chief hope for the future lies in the creation of a new international monetary system independent of gold. He approves the present experiment with managed currency by the sterling area as a step in the right direction.

IS THERE ENOUGH GOLD? By Charles O. Hardy. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1936, 212 p. $1.50.

A general discussion of the relation between gold supply and prices in recent years. The conclusion is that in the near future we need not fear a gold shortage so much as a surplus, which may lead to an over-expansion of money.

ZINN. By Josef Wollnik. Leipzig: Bibliographisches Institut, 1936, 224 p. M. 10.

A thorough study of postwar changes in the production and marketing of tin.

SILBER. By Herbert Wegner. Leipzig: Bibliographisches Institut, 1936, 176 p. M. 7.50.

The same for silver.

LE CONFLIT CONTEMPORAIN DES HOUILLÉRES EUROPÉENES. By Jean Dubosq. Paris: Librairie Technique et Économique, 1936, 264 p. Fr. 30.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The situation of Europe's coal exporters and importers, and the possibility of an understanding between them.

RIKTLINJER I INTERNATIONELL OCH NORDISK HANDELSPOLITIK. By Hj. J. Procope. Helsingfors: Soderstrom, 1936, 139 p. F.M. 30.

The former Foreign Minister of Finland discusses modern trade policies with special regard to the position of the four Northern countries.

SECURITY AGAINST SICKNESS. By I. S. Falk. New York: Doubleday, 1936, 423 p. $4.00.

A comparison of the American and European systems of health insurance.

WORLD IMMIGRATION WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE UNITED STATES. By Maurice Rea Davie. New York: Macmillan, 1936, 588 p. $5.00.

Immigration viewed in all its important aspects, both from the sending and the receiving ends. Special attention is given to American immigration, but other parts of the world, especially the British dominions, are treated adequately.

PUBLIC LIBRARY AURORA, ILLINOIS

International Relations of the United States

THE FAR EASTERN CRISIS. By Henry L. Stimson. New York: Harper, published for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1936, 293 p. $3.75.

Mr. Stimson was Secretary of State when Japan inaugurated her venture in Manchuria, and he therefore speaks with the fullest authority on the events with which this volume deals. He gives a straight-forward analysis of the reasons determining the American attitude toward Japanese policy in the Far East in 1931–1932 and describes in detail his efforts, both independently and in coöperation with other Powers, to halt military aggression on the Asiatic mainland. With restraint, but nevertheless clearly enough, Mr. Stimson discusses Sir John Simon's lukewarm support of his efforts to arrive at collective action and expresses his conviction that Anglo-American coöperation is indispensable in any effective program for preventing war. Especially informative is his account of the origin of what he calls the doctrine of non-recognition, but what the world knows as the Stimson Doctrine. He also gives an interesting account of his visit to President-elect Roosevelt and the obtaining of assurances that the incoming administration would carry on the Far Eastern policy he had developed.

THE DEVIL THEORY OF WAR. By Charles A. Beard. New York: Vanguard, 1936, 124 p. $1.50.

In view of recent revelations such as those of the Nye Committee, Mr. Beard believes that our safest protection against being involved in the next war is a mandatory embargo on the sale of munitions and the extension of credits to belligerents, as well as a restriction of trade with neutrals who resell to belligerents.

THE NEUTRALITY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES. By Julia Emily Johnsen. New York: Wilson, 1936, 267 p. 90¢.

A bibliographical and source book.

LA CONCEPTION AMÉRICAINE DE LA NEUTRALITÉ. By Charles Marie Chaumont. Paris: Rousseau, 1936, 277 p. Fr. 30.

An examination of the current literature from the legal point of view.

M-DAY. By Rose M. Stein. New York: Harcourt, 1936, 398 p. $2.50.

M-Day is the War Department's term for the first day of mobilization. The author was closely associated with the Senate Munitions Committee and much of her book is an exposé of its findings. She performs a useful service in calling attention to the implications of the National Defense Act and the Industrial Mobilization Plan. In world politics, however, she is on shaky ground and makes dubious generalizations.

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

[illegible] ILLINOIS

WHOSE CONSTITUTION? By Henry A. Wallace. New York: Reynal, 1936, 336 p. $1.75.

The Secretary of Agriculture pleads for a liberal interpretation of the "general welfare" clause in the Constitution as the best means for coping with problems of the machine age which the founding fathers did not envisage.

AFTER THE NEW DEAL, WHAT? By Norman Thomas. New York: Macmillan, 1936, 244 p. $2.00.

The Socialist candidate for the presidency finds little to choose between the two old parties. Under either, he believes, we shall drift toward new economic catastrophies and war, which in turn will lead to fascism.

A PROGRAM FOR MODERN AMERICA. By Harry W. Laidler. New York: Crowell, 1936, 517 p. $2.50.

A comprehensive view of the social and economic ills of America, with a program for their amelioration. This excellent book, with the preceding one by Norman Thomas, may be regarded as the platform of American socialism.

WHO OWNS AMERICA? Edited by Herbert Agar and Allen Tate. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1936, 342 p. $3.00.

A group of nineteen writers seek a path for America midway between fascism and communism. Their plea for a return to the good old days of small-scale production and laissez-faire individualism will to some seem unrealistic.

AN AMERICAN EXPERIMENT. By E. M. Hugh-Jones and E. A. Radice. New York: Oxford University Press, 1936, 296 p. $2.50.

A view of the New Deal by two Englishmen well-acquainted with America.

JEWS IN AMERICA. By the editors of "Fortune." New York: Random House, 1936, 104 p. $1.00.

Proof that the Jews are a long way from controlling business, the professions and the organs of public opinion in the United States.

HEARST: LORD OF SAN SIMEON. By Oliver Carlson and Ernest Sutherland Bates. New York: Viking, 1936, 347 p. $3.00.

A forthright biography of one of America's most powerful men, giving chapter and verse on the thoroughly irresponsible manner in which he has exercised his power.

WAR IN THE PACIFIC: A STUDY OF NAVIES, PEOPLES AND BATTLE PROBLEMS. By Sutherland Denlinger and Lieutenant-Commander Charles B. Gary. New York: McBride, 1936, 346 p. $3.00.

A description of the operation of the American fleet in relation to the geography and politics of the Pacific. The book closes with an interesting account of an imaginary naval war between the United States and Japan.

AMERICAN DIPLOMACY: POLICIES AND PRACTICE. By Benjamin Harrison Williams. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1936, 517 p. $4.00.

American foreign policies analyzed from the point of view of political science.

STATE INTERESTS IN AMERICAN TREATIES. By Nicholas Pendleton Mitchell. Richmond: Garrett & Massie, 1936, 220 p. $3.00.

A scholarly examination of the national government's right to encroach by international treaty upon the constitutional powers of the states.

WHAT THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION MEANS TO AMERICA. Edited by Spencer Miller, Jr. New York: Columbia University Press, 1936, 108 p. $1.50.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Addresses by business, labor and academic leaders before the University of Virginia Institute of Public Affairs in July 1935.

THE PRESIDENT'S CONTROL OF THE TARIFF. By John Day Larkin. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1936, 219 p. $2.00.

A careful study of the executive's discretionary powers, greatly enlarged under recent tariff legislation.

PUBLIC LIBRARY
URBANA, ILLINOIS

The World War

DOCUMENTS DIPLOMATIQUES FRANÇAIS. Series III, Volumes IX and X. Paris: Costes, 1936, 639 p. 832 p., Fr. 60 each.

These two volumes of French documents cover the periods January 1 to March 15 and March 17 to July 23, 1914, respectively.

IM KAMPF GEGEN DIE KRIEGSSCHULDLÜGE. By Alfred von Wegerer. Berlin: Quader, 1936, 178 p. M. 3.60.

A collection of 32 articles from *Die Kriegsschuldfrage*, and its successor, the *Berliner Monatshefte*, of which the author is editor.

THE CAREER OF THÉOPHILE DELCASSÉ. By Charles W. Porter. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1936, 356 p. $3.50.

A scholarly study of the career of the French statesman largely instrumental in creating the prewar entente with England.

DIE VORBEREITUNG DES WELTKRIEGES DURCH DIE FRANZÖSISCHE PRESSE. By Paul Hugendubel. Munich: Hugendubel, 1936, 153 p. M. 6.

A study of 20 Parisian papers during the summer of 1914.

GLI ACCORDI DI SAN GIOVANNI DI MORIANA. Volume II. By Mario Toscano. Milan: Giuffrè, 1936, 362 p. L. 35.

A thoroughly scholarly piece of research, forming part of a series on Italy's intervention in the World War. The author is perhaps too partial to Sonnino.

THE RÔLE OF BRITISH STRATEGY IN THE WORLD WAR. By C. R. M. F. Cruttwell. New York: Macmillan, 1936, 99 p. $1.60.

A succinct, well-reasoned summary of Britain's part in the Allied victory. Though she contributed little to land strategy, her policy was virtually decisive on the sea. The omission of any consideration of the air arm is notable.

THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND. By Holloway Halstead Frost. Annapolis: U. S. Naval Institute, 1936, 571 p. $4.50.

The result of eighteen years of diligent research, this treatise should be the definitive work on the subject. It is a technical account with an exhaustive bibliography and some sixty figures indicating every move before, during and after the battle.

FOCH ET LA VICTOIRE DES ALLIÉS: 1918. By General René Tournès. Paris: Payot, 1936, 359 p.

An important book, the first of a series of four volumes entitled "Histoire de la Guerre Mondiale." Grounded on an extensive examination of the sources, it is an authoritative work. The style is precise and vigorous. The author naturally emphasizes the action of the French armies.

UN CHEF: LE GÉNÉRAL MANGIN 1866–1925. By Paul Moreau-Vauthier, Paris: Lavauzelle, 1936, 130 p. Fr. 6.

The biography of a French officer who distinguished himself both in the colonies and during the World War.

LA MARINA ITALIANA NELLA GRANDE GUERRA. Volume I. Florence: Vallecchi, 1935, 469 p. L. 15.

An official history of the activities of the Italian fleet from the end of the Tripolitan War to Italy's entrance into the World War in May 1915.

PUBLIC LIBRARY
URBANA, ILLINOIS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

IL GENIO NELLA GUERRA 1915–1918. By P. Lucchi. Bologna: Galleri, 1936, 306 p. L. 14.

The rôle of the engineers in Italy's war on Austria-Hungary.

LES TROIS BATAILLES DE LA PIAVE. By Enrico Caviglia. Paris: Nouvelle Revue Critique, 1936, 254 p. Fr. 25.

An Italian marshal describes three crucial battles of 1917 and 1918.

EIN GENERAL RETTET SEINE ARMEE. By Otto Flechsig. Oldenburg: Stalling, 1936, 188 p. M. 4.80.

How Mackensen withdrew his army from the Balkan front after its collapse in the fall of 1918.

THE LEGION OF MARCHING MADMEN. By W. J. Blackledge. London: Sampson Low, 1936, 244 p. 12/6.

An account of the British expeditionary force in Mesopotamia.

AMERICAN SOLDIERS ALSO FOUGHT. By General Robert Lee Bullard. New York: Longmans, 1936, 118 p. $1.00.

A high officer in the A. E. F. describes America's part in the war.

KRIGSÅR OG GULLFLOM. By Knut Utstein Kloster. Oslo: Gyldendal, 1935, 185 p. Kr. 6.50.

An objective history of Norwegian shipping during the war.

Western Europe

EUROPE AND EUROPEANS. By Count Carlo Sforza. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1936, 326 p. $2.75.

The point of view of the former Italian Foreign Minister is, of course, that of a sincere democrat and idealist. It is refreshing to have it restated today, and there are useful lessons to be drawn from the personal experiences and observations which form the basis for Count Sforza's analysis of the historical psychology of the various European peoples. As a trained diplomat, his interpretations tend to be mainly political, though the chapters on postwar Germany show a grasp of the social bases of political events.

THE RISE OF LIBERALISM. By Harold J. Laski. New York: Harper, 1936, 327 p. $3.00.

A masterly piece of historical prose. Liberalism is interpreted, from its rise in the Reformation to the present day, as the social philosophy whereby the middle class has sought to insure its own political and economic dominance.

WALKS AND TALKS ABROAD. By Sir Arnold Wilson. New York: Oxford University Press, 1936, 292 p. $2.50.

Superficial observations on continental affairs between 1934 and 1936.

EUROPE UNDER THE TERROR. By John L. Spivak. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1936, 251 p. $2.50.

A journalist's sensational report after an investigation of Left movements in Italy, Germany, Poland, Austria and Czechoslovakia. Probably not always accurate but never dull.

WELTGESCHICHTE DER GEGENWART IN DOKUMENTEN 1934–35. By Michael Freund. Essen: Essener Verlagsanstalt, 1936, 511 p. M. 12.50.

Source material for the diplomatic history of two troubled years.

LE BILAN DU CORPORATISME. By Roland Pré. Paris: Librairie Technique et Économique, 1936, 218 p. Fr. 25.

A comparative study made after visits to Italy, Austria, Portugal and Germany. The author finds corporatism only a new name for "étatisme."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ITALIA, FRANCIA, INGHILTERRA NEL MEDITERRANEO. By Pietro Silva. Rome: Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, 1936, 120 p. L. 8.

A brief historical treatment by an authority on Mediterranean history.

LOCARNO: EINE DOKUMENTENSAMMLUNG. Edited by Dr. Fritz Berber. Berlin: Junker und Dünnhaupt, 1936, 407 p. M. 6.50.

A useful collection of 76 documents covering the period 1919–1936.

LA RÉFORME GOUVERNEMENTALE. By Léon Blum. Paris: Grasset, 1936, 224 p. Fr. 15.

A new edition, with added chapters, of an interesting book that first appeared in 1918, in which the present Socialist premier of France set forth his program for making the French governmental machinery more responsive to democratic control.

FRANCE TODAY AND THE PEOPLE'S FRONT. By Maurice Thorez. New York: International Publishers, 1936, 255 p. $1.75.

The Secretary-General of the French Communist Party gives his version of the Popular Front's program for the social betterment of France's working class and for the struggle against fascism.

ALERTE AUX FRANÇAIS. By André Tardieu. Paris: Flammarion, 1936, 47 p. Fr. 1.

In staccato terms the former French Premier continues in this pamphlet his campaign against what he regards as the degradation of French political and intellectual life.

THE FIERY CROSS. By Colonel de la Rocque. London: Dickson, 1936, 216 p. 2/.

The leader of the fascist "Croix de Feu" presents his program.

WHITHER FRANCE? By Leon Trotsky. New York: Pioneer, 1936, 160 p. $1.00.

Writings on French economics and politics since 1934.

LA POLITIQUE FRANÇAISE DU BLÉ DEPUIS LA GUERRE. By Robert Groisne. Paris: Librairie Technique et Économique, 1936, 208 p. Fr. 25.

An attempt to prove that the French government's costly intervention in the field of wheat production has not given satisfactory results.

PARIS AS A FINANCIAL CENTRE. By Margaret G. Myers. New York: Columbia University Press, 1936, 192 p. $3.00.

A careful study, based on personal interviews and research in Paris, concerning the position of that city in the financial world, principally since 1928.

THE GERMAN MINORITY IN SOUTH JUTLAND. Copenhagen: The Danish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 1936, 22 p.

An official summary of the Danish legislation, with maps.

UTRIKESPOLITISK PASSIVETET ELLER AKTIV FREDSPOLITIK. By Victor Törnblom. Stockholm: Bröderna Siösteens Boktryckeri, 1935, 97 p. Kr. 2.

A clear analysis of Swedish foreign policy with Soviet Russia as the chief enemy, against whom Sweden's best protection is an active policy on behalf of general peace.

MONETARY POLICY AND CRISES. By Brinley Thomas. London: Routledge, 1936, 247 p. 7/6.

The development of Swedish economic thought since 1914.

HITLER. By Rudolf Olden. New York: Covici Friede, 1936, 349 p. $3.00.

The author was once political editor of the *Berliner Tageblatt*, and is now in exile. In this book he seeks to interpret Hitler's character and actions in the light of his early environment in Austria. Being fundamentally a psychological study, it is somewhat weak on the general political and social background of National Socialism. In so far as there is a thesis, it is that Hitler has always been the tool of the Reichswehr.

GESTALTUNG DER IDEE. REDEN UND AUFSÄTZE VON 1933–1935. By Alfred Rosenberg. Munich: Eher, 1936, 400 p. M. 4.50.

The pronouncements of the official philosopher of National Socialism.

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LIBRARY
ILLINOIS

THE NEW GERMANY: NATIONAL SOCIALIST GOVERNMENT IN THEORY AND PRACTICE. By Fritz Ermarth. Washington: Digest Press, 1936, 203 p. $2.00.

A sober, concise survey of the fall of the Republic and the rise of the Nazi state. The section on "The Economic State" is especially to be recommended.

LEITFADEN DER DEUTSCHEN FINANZPOLITIK. By Fritz Terhalle. Munich: Duncker und Humblot, 1936, 198 p. M. 4.20.

A well-organized introduction to Germany's present financial policy.

LA POLITIQUE ÉCONOMIQUE ET FINANCIÈRE DU TROISIÈME REICH. By Maurice de Saint-Jean. Paris: Alcan, 1936, 474 p. Fr. 50.

A lucid description of how Schacht has managed to keep Germany economically and financially afloat these last three years in spite of the voracious demands of rearmament, public works, etc. The drastic, and sometimes novel, methods pursued by Germany's financial pro-dictator are clearly explained and the steps yet to be taken to fulfill the Nazi program are outlined.

UNDER THE SWASTIKA. By John B. Holt. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1936, 261 p. $2.50.

Philosophizings on the rise of Nazism by an observant young American.

HITLER'S FIRST FOES. By John Brown Mason. Minneapolis: Burgess, 1936, 118 p. $1.75.

A history of the conflict between National Socialism and Catholicism.

THE JEWS OF GERMANY. By Marvin Lowenthal. New York: Longmans, 1936, 444 p. $3.00.

A simple but powerful record of the relations between Jew and Gentile during the last sixteen centuries. Anti-semitism is seen to be practically the normal state of affairs through Germany's history, lightened only occasionally by periods of tolerance.

GERMANY'S WAR MACHINE. By Albert Müller. London: Dent, 1936, 235 p. 7/6.

Especial attention is given to the army's mechanization and motorization. Hitler's armament program has moved with such rapidity that this book has inevitably been in part outdated.

LE VRAI "COMBAT" D'HITLER. By E.-N. Dzelepy. Paris: Vogel, 1936, 319 p. Fr. 12.

Revelations said to be based on documents given the author by a member of the Herrenklub, a certain Baron von G. S.

DER MARSCH DURCH ZWEI JAHRZEHNTE. By Theodor Wolff. Amsterdam: de Lange, 1936, 383 p. M. 4.50.

Further reminiscences by the former editor of the *Berliner Tageblatt*.

DEATH OF AN EMPIRE: LIFE OF KARL IV. By Imre Balassa. London: Hutchinson, 1936, 285 p. 18/.

A sentimental biography of the last Habsburg emperor.

THE FASCIST GOVERNMENT OF ITALY. By Herbert W. Schneider. New York: Van Nostrand, 1936, 173 p. $1.25.

An outline, useful for reference but not very critical. The author might have looked further below the surface to see how the fascist organs actually work in practice.

ITALIA E ITALIANI NELL' ORIENTE VICINO E LONTANO. By Corrado Masi. Bologna: Cappelli, 1936, L. 24.

A careful study of the expansion of the Italian people, their commerce and their political influence throughout Asia and Australia.

L'ORDINAMENTO CORPORATIVO. By Giuseppe Bottai. Milan: Mondadori, 1936, 132 p. L. 6.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A bird's-eye view of the historical development and present functioning of the corporative state, by a former Minister of Corporations.

GIL ROBLES — LA ESPERANZA DE ESPAÑA! By Adelardo Fernández Arias. Madrid: Ibiza, 151 p. Pes. 2.50.

A Spanish admirer's eulogy of the youthful head of the conservative Catholic Agrarian Populist Party and one of the important leaders directing the present fascist revolt.

Eastern Europe

JOSEF PILSUDSKI: ERINNERUNGEN UND DOKUMENTE. Edited by Waclaw Lipinski. Essen: Essener Verlagsanstalt, 1936, 2 v. M. 14.40.

Volumes III and IV of the authorized German edition of the late Polish dictator's papers and speeches. A fundamental source for the history of the postwar period.

PILSUDSKI: BUILDER OF POLAND. By Grace Humphrey. New York: Scott and More, 1936, 301 p. $3.25.

A popular biography that is also a summary of Polish history since 1863.

THE DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION OF THE BORDER STATES. Part I: FINLAND. By Malbone W. Graham. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1936, 152 p. $1.50.

A significant chapter in the history of the war and postwar period, written by an authority on Eastern Europe.

FINLAND THE NEW NATION. By Agnes Edwards Rothery. New York: Viking, 1936, 267 p. $3.00.

More than the usual travel book in that it presents a clear picture of the country's economic and social conditions. Like Sweden, Finland has found the middle way.

POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF RUSSIA. By George Vernadsky. Boston: Little, Brown, 1936, 508 p. $4.00.

A competent narrative, following in general the conservative pattern.

THE THIRD INTERNATIONAL AFTER LENIN. By Leon Trotsky. New York: Pioneer, 1936, 357 p. $3.00.

The first edition in English of Trotsky's famous memoranda to the Sixth Congress of the Communist International, written while he was in exile at Alma Ata in 1928. Time has borne out many of his predictions with startling accuracy.

THE SOVIET UNION TODAY. Edited by P. Malevsky-Malevitch. New York: Paisley Press, 1936, 102 p. $1.00.

A statistical comparison of Tsarist with Communist Russia, based on Soviet figures, written by a non-communist. There is also a chapter on Soviet culture by Max Eastman.

THE RED ARMY. By A. W. Just. London: Figurehead, 1936, 123 p. 2/.

This little book is devoted largely to a discussion of the army's part in the Five-Year Plans and in Soviet foreign policy.

SOVIET MONEY AND FINANCE. By L. E. Hubbard. New York: Macmillan, 1936, 339 p. $4.50.

A scientific description of the operations of the Soviet financial system. A good book for those interested in the effects of governmental planning.

18 JAHRE SOWJETHERRSCHAFT. By Olga Dimitriewna. Leipzig: Braumüller, 1936, 224 p. M. 3.

A hostile account inspired by eight years in Soviet prisons and labor camps.

I SEARCH FOR TRUTH IN RUSSIA. By Sir Walter Citrine. London: Routledge 1936, 368 p. 10/6.

AURORA ILLINOIS
RARY
ILLINOIS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

This English labor leader was given freedom of movement by the Soviet Government and he tries to be fair in his criticisms of what he found. His chief interests were real wages, housing and sanitation, and trade-union organization.

LE PAYS DE TESCHEN ET LES RAPPORTS ENTRE LA POLOGNE ET LA TSCHÉCOSLOVAQUIE. By Victor-L. Tapie. Paris: Hartmann, 1936, 96 p. Fr. 5.

An impartial analysis written for the Centre d'Études de Politique Étrangère.

LA RUTHÉNIE SUBCARPATHIQUE. By René Martel. Paris: Hartmann, 1935, 188 p. Fr. 15.

A description of the strategically important eastern end of Czechoslovakia.

DEFENDER OF DEMOCRACY. By Emil Ludwig. New York: McBride, 1936, 278 p. $3.00.

Conversations with President Masaryk, elucidating his philosophy rather than giving a connected story of his life.

DIE DEUTSCHEN KULTURAUFGABEN IN DER TSCHECHOSLOWAKEI. By Konrad Henlein. Karlsbad: Frank, 1936, 38 p. Kc. 2.

The program of the Sudeten Party in Czechoslavakia, by its chief.

SUDETENDEUTSCHTUM IM KAMPF. Karlsbad: Frank, 1936, 186 p. Kč. 6.

An official statement on behalf of Henlein's party.

ENCYCLOPÉDIE BALKANIQUE PERMANENTE. Edited by Léon Savadjian. Paris: Société Générale, 1936, 81 p. Fr. 30.

The first volume of a new reference work covering the six Balkan countries. Each volume is to contain authoritative articles regardless of alphabetical considerations. This first one contains contributions on foreign affairs, the Balkan Entente, Balkan armies, etc.

THE BALKAN STATES. I. ECONOMIC. New York: Oxford University Press, 1936, 154 p. $2.00.

A review of the economic and financial development of Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Rumania and Jugoslavia since 1919, prepared by the Royal Institute of International Affairs. There are numerous useful statistical tables.

THE BALKAN CONFERENCES AND THE BALKAN ENTENTE, 1930–1935. By Robert Joseph Kerner and Harry Nicholas Howard. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1936, 271 p. $3.00.

A useful and solid study which demonstrates that it is possible to write respectable diplomatic history about matters of contemporary importance. Besides maps and a bibliography there are a number of pertinent documents.

DIE JUGOSLAWEN EINST UND JETZT. Volume II. By Gilbert in der Maur. Vienna: Günther, 1936, 619 p. M. 15 for both volumes.

This second volume of a reliable work gives a detailed description of Jugoslavia's foreign policy.

KÖNIG FERDINAND VON BULGARIEN. Berlin: Phönix-Verlag Siwanna, 1936, 99 p. M. 4.50.

The career and character of the ex-king treated from many angles by fourteen authors, including former Foreign Secretary Zimmermann, Field Marshal Mackensen, etc.

The British Commonwealth of Nations

LONG LIVE THE KING. By Eric Acland and Ernest H. Bartlett. Philadelphia: Winston, 1936, 375 p. $1.50.

A popular biography of the late king and his successor.

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

BRITISH ECONOMIC FOREIGN POLICY. By John Henry Richardson. New York: Macmillan, 1936, 250 p. $3.00.

A study of Britain's experience with devalued currency, protection, imperial preference and other policies that interfere with foreign trade. Professor Richardson feels these emergency measures have done their work and that henceforth every effort must be made to increase international commerce and foreign investment.

THE KING AND HIS DOMINION GOVERNORS. By Herbert Vere Evatt. New York: Oxford University Press, 1936, 324 p. $5.00.

The scientific study of an important problem in the administration of the British Empire: the Crown's reserve powers in Great Britain and the dominions. The author is a Justice of the High Court of Australia.

GREAT BRITAIN AND EGYPT 1914–1936. New York: Oxford University Press, 1936, 67 p. 75¢.

The best short treatment of the postwar relations between the two countries. Prepared by the Royal Institute of International Affairs.

LORD KITCHENER. By Arthur Hodges. London: Butterworth, 1936, 320 p. 15/.

A readable biography that adds little to our knowledge.

CONFERENCE ON CANADIAN AMERICAN AFFAIRS. Edited by Walter W. McLaren, Albert B. Corey and Reginald G. Trotter. New York: Ginn, 1936, 301 p. $3.00.

Addresses and discussions on economic, political and cultural relations of Canada and the United States, at a conference held at St. Lawrence University in June 1935.

THE UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA. By L. C. A. Knowles and C. M. Knowles. London: Routledge, 1936, 356 p. 10/6.

Volume III in the series, "The Economic Development of the British Overseas Empire." A competent survey, especially full on agriculture.

CENTRAL AUSTRALIA. By C. T. Madigan. New York: Oxford University Press, 1936, 267 p. $5.00.

A careful report on one of the world's least explored regions.

THE STORY OF CONSCRIPTION IN AUSTRALIA. By Leslie C. Jauncey. London: Allen and Unwin, 1935, 365 p. 10/6.

The history of compulsory military service in Australia, a controversial issue for more than twenty years, is here narrated by an opponent of conscription.

JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY. By Jawaharlal Nehru. London: Lane, 1936, 618 p. 15/.

An honest and powerful self-portrait of the Indian Socialist leader, probably the second best known figure in Indian politics. This book was written while the author was in prison.

THE HINDU-MUSLIM PROBLEM IN INDIA. By Clifford Manshardt. London: Allen and Unwin, 1936, 128 p. 5/.

A concise explanation by an American long resident in India.

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

Near East

WESTERN CIVILIZATION IN THE NEAR EAST. By Hans Kohn. New York: Columbia University Press, 1936, 329 p. $3.50.

A non-technical description of the transformations wrought in the Levant by contact with the exuberant civilization and culture of modern Europe. This book first appeared in Germany in 1934, but the English translation has been brought up to date.

DIE MODERNE TÜRKEI. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1936, 103 p. M. 1.50.

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

AURORA, ILLINOIS

Fifteen Turkish and German writers contribute to this symposium which appeared as a supplement to the *Europäische Revue*.

THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE BAGDAD RAILROAD. By John B. Wolf. Columbia: University of Missouri, 1936, 107 p. $1.25.

A reconsideration of the problem in the light of material which has become available since Earle's work on "Turkey, the Great Powers, and the Bagdad Railway" was published in 1923.

ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION OF SYRIA. Edited by Sa'id B. Himadeh. Beirut: American Press, 1936, 467 p. $3.75.

A comprehensive coöperative study of Syria's population, resources, agriculture, finances, trade, etc.

IL CANALE DI SUEZ E IL SUO REGIME INTERNAZIONALE. By Giorgio Molfino. Genoa: Emiliano degli Orfini, 1936, 160 p. L. 8.

A legal and political study by a Fascist Party official.

RESA SCHAH. DER AUFSTIEG IRANS UND DIE GROSSMÄCHTE. By Herbert Melzig. Stuttgart: Union, 1936, 159 p. M. 5.80.

The regeneration of Iran under its dictator-king.

MY LIFE: FROM BRIGAND TO KING. By Amir Habibullah. London: Low, 1936, 288 p. 12/6.

An Oriental success story that ended in sudden failure.

LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

Africa

THE AFRICAN BACKGROUND OUTLINED. By Carter Godwin Woodson. Washington: The Association for the Study of Negro Life and History, 1936, 486 p. $3.25.

A useful guide for the study of the Negro both in Africa and America.

LA FRANCE ÉQUATORIALE AFRICAINE. By Georges Bruel. Paris: Larose, 1936, 560 p. Fr. 120.

A full compendium of information on French Equatorial Africa and Cameroun by a high colonial administrator. The book covers the geography, economics, social organization and government of the region. There are numerous illustrations, diagrams, maps.

LES ISRAÉLITES ALGÉRIENS. By Claude Martin. Paris: Héraklès, 1936, 390 p. Fr. 35.

A fundamental, dispassionate work on a problem of recurring importance, by one who has long lived in Algeria.

L'AFRICA ORIENTALE. Bologna: Zanichelli, 1935, 408 p. L. 30.

Contributions by four recognized authorities on the resources, peoples, cultures, etc. of Italian East Africa, including Ethiopia, published under the auspices of the Reale Società Geografica Italiana.

A BIBLIOGRAPHY OF ITALIAN COLONISATION IN AFRICA WITH A SECTION ON ABYSSINIA. Compiled by Douglas H. Varley. London: The Royal Empire Society and the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1936, 92 p. 2/6.

An excellent compilation, topically arranged.

IL CONFLITTO ITALO-ETIOPICO. Rome: Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, 1936, 700 p. L. 70.

This first volume of a projected series is devoted to the relevant documents.

A. O. IL "POSTO AL SOLE." By L. Federzoni. Bologna: Zanichelli, 1936, 271 p. L. 15.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A collection of writings and speeches on colonial questions by one of the leaders of fascism, formerly Minister of Colonies.

UAL-UAL. By Roberto Cimmaruta. Milan: Mondadori, 1936, 244 p. L. 15.

An illustrated and circumstantial account of the engagement that served as a pretext for the Italian invasion of Ethiopia, by the Italian officer in charge at Ual-Ual.

A WOMAN AT THE ABYSSINIAN WAR. By Muriel Currey. London: Hutchinson, 1936, 266 p. 18/.

A pro-fascist English lady observes the war on the northern front during the first three months.

BLOOD AND INK. By W. W. Chaplin. New York: Telegraph Press, 1936, 205 p. $2.00.

An American correspondent's diary during the first part of the war.

SEI MESI SUL FRONTE NORD-ETIOPICO. By B. V. Vecchi. Milan: Bietti, 1936, 248 p. L. 15.

A trained observer reports the war from the Italian side in Tigré.

DA UAL-UAL ALLA VITTORIA DELL'ENDERTÀ. By F. M. Della Torre and F. Santagata. Genoa: Pagano, 1936, 305 p. L. 15.

This narrative carries the war almost to its conclusion.

LA SOMALIA ITALIANA. By Cesare Cesari. Rome: Palombi, 1936, 207 p. L. 12.

A documented history by a recognized authority.

ETHIOPIA. By John H. Shaw. New York: the author, 1936, 95 p. $1.50.

A description of Ethiopia by that country's Consul-General in New York.

HAILE SELASSIE. By the Princess Asfa Yilma. New York: Appleton-Century, 1936, 305 p. $4.00.

A sympathetic portrait of the emperor before his defeat and exile.

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

Far East

FOREIGN POLICY IN THE FAR EAST. By Taraknath Das. New York: Longmans, 1936, 272 p. $2.00.

An Indian interpretation, critical of Britain, tolerant of Japan and the United States.

ATLAS OF CHINA. By A. Herrmann. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1935, 112 p. $5.00.

Everyone interested in the Orient will welcome this excellent collection of maps depicting China's history, ethnography, resources, etc. There is a bibliography, an index of geographical and proper names, and a list of Chinese characters.

THE SYSTEM OF CHINESE PUBLIC FINANCE. By Chou-Ying Lee. London: King, 1936, 256 p. 12/.

The Chinese public financial system compared with Western systems, with suggestions for the better adjustment of China's financial institutions to local circumstances.

THE MANCHU ABDICATION AND THE POWERS. By John Gilbert Reid. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1936, 497 p. $5.00.

A thorough piece of historical scholarship, with exhaustive bibliography, notes and index.

LA VÉRITÉ SUR LA MANDCHOURIE. By P. Wou. Paris: Pedone, 1936, 291 p. Fr. 45.

The Manchurian problem treated in its historical, economic and political phases, with special attention to the question of immigration.

THE NEW MONGOLIA. By Joseph Geleta as told to Ladislaus Forbath. London: Heinemann, 1936, 276 p. 15/.

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

AURORA, ILLIN

An account of nine years spent in Outer Mongolia by a Hungarian engineer. A picture of life and politics in an important but inaccessible region.

EYES ON JAPAN. By Victor A. Yakhontoff. New York: Coward-McCann, 1936, 329 p. $3.50.

A good popular description of Japan's history and current social and economic problems, by a former Russian military attaché at Tokyo.

JAPAN UND DEUTSCHLAND, DIE BEIDEN WELTRÄTSEL. POLITISCHE, WIRTSCHAFTLICHE UND KULTURELLE ENTWICKELUNG. By Eduard von Pustau and Dr. Okanouye-Kurota. Berlin: Deutscher Verlag für Politik und Wirtschaft, 1936, 223 p. M. 5.

An attempt to point out the common characteristics of the two nations.

LE PROBLÈME DE LA POPULATION AU JAPON. By Georges Kiss. Paris: Librairie des Sciences Politiques et Sociales, 1936, Fr. 15.

A handy little volume summarizing the facts about a controversial question.

PACIFIC ADVENTURE. By Willard Price. New York: Reynal, 1936, 317 p. $3.00.

Though written with journalistic breeziness, this delightfully illustrated book is important because it gives us an intimate picture of the strategically significant islands of Micronesia — under Japanese mandate save for Guam — about which very little has been written.

PHILIPPINE INDEPENDENCE. By Grayson L. Kirk. New York: Farrar, 1936, 278 p. $2.50.

An intelligent analysis of the forces which produced the independence act and of the problems now facing the commonwealth. The author believes the Islands headed for economic disaster.

PUBLIC LIBRARY AURORA, ILLINOIS

Latin America

MEXICO'S ATTITUDE IN ITS INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. By José Angel Ceniceros. Mexico City: Ministry of Foreign Relations, 1935, 53 p.

Statements by the former Mexican Under-Secretary of Foreign Relations.

PRESIDENT TRUJILLO: HIS WORK AND THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC. By Lawrence De Besault. Washington: Washington Publishing Co., 1936, 344 p.

A quite uncritical paean of praise for the current Dominican dictator.

MIGRATION OF INDUSTRY TO SOUTH AMERICA. By Dudley Maynard Phelps. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1936, 335 p. $4.00.

A study of the tendency of American corporations to establish subsidiary manufacturing facilities in Argentina, Chile, Uruguay and Brazil. The question is considered primarily from the standpoint of business policy.

CHILE: LAND AND SOCIETY. By G. M. McBride. New York: American Geographical Society, 1936, 408 p. $4.00.

A fundamental study, up to the usual high standards of the American Geographical Society. It is especially valuable for the attention given to agriculture, upon which Chile must more and more depend for prosperity.

ECONOMIC LITERATURE OF LATIN AMERICA: A TENTATIVE BIBLIOGRAPHY. Volume I. Compiled by the staff of the Bureau for Economic Research in Latin America. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1936, 315 p. $4.00.

A very valuable compilation, filling a lacuna of long standing. There are over six thousand entries, arranged topically under each of the ten South American republics.

WHO'S WHO IN LATIN AMERICA. Edited by Percy Alvin Martin. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1936, 438 p. $6.50.

Biographical sketches of some thirteen hundred outstanding Latin American men and women in all walks of life.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

SOURCE MATERIAL

By Denys P. Myers

PUBLIC DOCUMENTS OFFICIALLY PRINTED

Documents may be procured from the following: *United States:* Gov't Printing Office, Superintendent of Documents, Washington, D. C. *Great Britain:* British Library of Information, 270 Madison Ave., New York. *France:* Gerda M. Anderson, 12 Ave. Ernest Reyer, Paris XIV°. *League of Nations, Int. Labor Office. Perm. Court of Int. Justice* and *Int. Institute of Agriculture:* World Peace Foundation, 40 Mt. Vernon St., Boston. Washington imprints are Government Printing Office and London imprints are His Majesty's Stationery Office, unless otherwise noted. Since 1928 a list of Government documents has been printed in the *Monthly List of Books Catalogued in the Library of the League of Nations.*

ANTI-WAR TREATY

ANTI-WAR, Nonaggression and Conciliation. Treaty between the United States of America and Other American Republics. Signed at Rio de Janeiro, October 10, 1933. Washington, 1936. 18 p. 23 cm. (Treaty Series, No. 906.) 5 cents.

BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS

BANK for International Settlements. Sixth Annual Report, 1st April 1935–31st March 1936. Basle, 1936. 79 p. +/l., [17] p. incl. charts, tables. 29½ cm.

CLEARING AGREEMENTS

CLEARING Agreements. [Paris] International Chamber of Commerce, 1936. 38 [1] p. incl. tables. 27½ cm.

A list of these agreements, some of which have been published in League of Nations *Treaty Series.*

CLEARING OFFICES

15TH ANNUAL Report of the Controller of the Clearing Office, The Administrator of German, Austrian, Hungarian and Bulgarian Property and the Director of the Russian Claims Department. London, 1936. 11 p. incl. tables. 24½ cm.

COOPERATIVES

INTERNATIONAL DIRECTORY of Co-operative Organisations. Ninth Edition. Geneva, 1936. xii, 190 p. 24 cm. (At head of title: International Labour Office.)

COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE, PERMANENT

THE LOSINGER & CO. Case (Preliminary Objection). Permanent Court of Internationa Justice. Order of June 27, 1936. Leiden, 1936. double p. 15–25. 24 cm. (Series A./B., No. 67.) In French and English.

THE PAJZS, CSÁKY, ESTERHÁZY Case (Preliminary Objection). Permanent Court of International Justice. Order of May 23, 1936. Leiden, 1936. [3] double p. 4–10. 24 cm. (Series A./B., No. 66.) In French and English.

STATUTE and Rules of Court and other Constitutional Documents, Rules or Regulations. Third Edition (March 1936). [With Annex] Leiden, [1936] 79 double p. 24½ cm. (Series D, No. 1.) In French and English.

Annex: Tables of Concordance with the Rules as Previously in Force.

CUSTOMS FORMALITIES

APPLICATION of the International Convention Relating to the Simplification of Customs Formalities Signed at Geneva on November 3, 1923. Measures Taken by the Governments to Give Effect to the Provisions of the Convention. Summaries communicated by the Governments Parties to the Convention in Execution of Article 9. Ninth Series. Geneva, 1936. 20 p. 33 cm. (League of Nations, C.226.M.138.1936.II.B.2.)

DENMARK

THE GERMAN MINORITY in South Jutland, A summary of the Danish Legislation. Copenhagen, Published by the Danish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 1936. 22 p., maps. 25 cm.

DIPLOMATIC PERSONNEL

DOCUMENTS relating to the Admission of Women to the Diplomatic and Consular Services July 30, 1934–April 1936. London, 1936. 38 p. 24½ cm. (Miscellaneous No. 5 (1936) Cmd. 5166.) 9d.

PUBLIC LIBRARY
AURORA, ILLINOIS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PUBLIC LIB
AURORA, ILLIN

DOUBLE TAXATION

DOUBLE TAXATION and Fiscal Evasion. Collection of International Agreements and Internal Legal Provisions for the Prevention of Double Taxation and Fiscal Evasion. Volume VI. Geneva, 1936. 119 p. 25 cm. (League of Nations, C.118.M.57.1936.II.A.10.)

ECONOMIC SITUATION

MONEY and Banking, 1935/36. Geneva, 1936. 2 vols. $2.50. (League of Nations, 1936. II. A.7/I–II.)
Vol. I, Money and Banking; vol. II, Commercial Banks.

ETHIOPIAN-ITALIAN WAR

JOURNAL of the Sixteenth Session of the Assembly. Nos. 24–29. June 30–July 5, 1936. Geneva, 1936. 32½ cm.
Covers the 18th to 25th plenary meetings; preceded by the 92d session of the Council and followed by decisions of the Coördination Committee.

Addis Ababa — Occupation

REPORTS and Correspondence regarding the Rescue and Relief of British and Foreign Nationals at Addis Ababa during the Disturbances of May 2 to 6, 1936. London, 1936. 19 p. 24½ cm. (Ethiopia No. 5 (1936) Cmd. 5213.) 4d.

Italian Methods of Warfare

CORRESPONDENCE exchanged with the Italian Government regarding the Bombing by Italian Military Aircraft of the British Red Cross Ambulance No. 1 in Ethiopia. March-April 1936. London, 1936. 8 p. 24½ cm. (Ethiopia No. 4 (1936) Cmd. 5160.) 2d.
DISPUTE between Ethiopia and Italy. Communication from the Ethiopian Delegation. Geneva, 1936. 39 p. 33 cm. (League of Nations, C.201.M.126.1936.VII.4.)
DISPUTE between Ethiopia and Italy. Communication from the Swedish Government. Letter addressed to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations by the Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs. Geneva, 1936. 8 p. 33 cm. (League of Nations, C.207.M.129.1936.VII.5.)
DISPUTE between Ethiopia and Italy. Communication from the Italian Government. Geneva, 1936. 3 p. 33 cm. (League of Nations, C.225.M.137.1936.VII.6.)
DISPUTE between Ethiopia and Italy. Communication from the Italian Government. Use of Dum-Dum Bullets by the Ethiopian Troops. Protest by the Italian Government to the League of Nations. Geneva, 1936. 24 p. photos. 33 cm. (League of Nations, C.242.M.140.1936.VII.7.)

Sanctions — Effect

DISPUTE between Ethiopia and Italy. Co-ordination of Measures under Article 16 of the Covenant. Co-ordination Committee. Statistics of Trade with Italy and the Italian Colonies. III. December 1935–March 1936. Geneva, 1936. 60 p. 33 cm. (League of Nations, Co-ordination Committee 125.1936.Gen.4.)

EUROPEAN SETTLEMENT — RHINELAND

CORRESPONDENCE with the Belgian and French Ambassadors relating to "Text of Proposals drawn up by the Representatives of Belgium, France, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Italy. London, March 19, 1936, Cmd. 5134," London, April 1, 1936. London, 1936. 6 p. 24½ cm. (Miscellaneous No. 4 (1936) Cmd. 5149.) 1d.
CORRESPONDENCE with the German Government regarding the German Proposals for an European Settlement March 24–May 6, 1936. London, 1936. 16 p. 24½ cm. (Miscellaneous No. 6 (1936) Cmd. 5175.) 3d.

FINLAND — SWEDEN

MEMORANDUM rörande Sveriges Politik i Förhallände till Finland under Tiden från Finlands Självständighetsförklaring till det Finska inbördeskrigets Slut. Utarbetat av Förutv. Ministern för Utrikes Ärendena, F. Justitierådet Joh. Hellner. Stockholm, P. A. Norstedt & Söner, 1936. 44 p. 24 cm. (At head of title: Aktstycken Utgivna av Kungl. Utrikesdepartementet.)

HOURS OF WORK

REDUCTION OF HOURS of Work in the Building and Civil Engineering Industry. International Labour Conference, Twentieth Session, Geneva, 1936. Fourth Item on the Agenda. Report IV. Geneva, 1936. 117 p. 24 cm.
——— Supplement. Geneva, 1936. 6 p. 24 cm.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

REDUCTION OF HOURS of Work in Coal Mines. International Labour Conference, Twentieth Session, Geneva, 1936. Sixth Item on the Agenda. Report VI. Geneva, 1936. 83 p. 24 cm.
——— Supplement. Geneva, 1936. 3 p. 24 cm.
REDUCTION OF HOURS of Work in Iron and Steel Works. International Labour Conference, Twentieth Session, Geneva, 1936. Fifth Item on the Agenda. Report V. Geneva, 1936. 109 p. 24 cm.
——— Supplement. Geneva, 1936. 3 p. 24 cm.
REDUCTION OF HOURS of Work in the Textile Industry. International Labour Conference, Twentieth Session, Geneva, 1936. Item VII on the Agenda. Report VII. Geneva, 1936. 173 p. 24 cm.
REDUCTION OF HOURS of Work on Public Works undertaken or subsidized by Governments. International Labour Conference, Twentieth Session, Geneva, 1936. Third Item on the Agenda. Report III. Geneva, 1936. 131 p. 24 cm.
——— Supplement. Geneva, 1936. 7 p. 24 cm.

LABOR CONFERENCE AND ORGANIZATION

CONSTITUTION and Standing Orders of the International Labour Organisation. Conference Edition. Geneva, 1936. [3] 4–52 double p. 21½ cm. In French and English.
HOLIDAYS with Pay. International Labour Conference, Twentieth Session, Geneva, 1936. Second Item on the Agenda. Report II. Geneva, 1936. 147 p. 24 cm.
——— Supplement. Geneva, 1936. 20 p. 24 cm.
INTERNATIONAL Labour Conference. Twentieth Session, Geneva, 1936. REPORT of the Director. Geneva, 1936. 91 p. incl. tables, charts. 24 cm.
——— Appendix. Tables Showing the Situation of the States Members in Respect of the Conventions and Recommendations adopted by the International Labour Conference. Geneva, 1936. 50 p. 32 cm.
INTERNATIONAL Labour Conference. Twentieth Session, Geneva, 1936. Summary of Annual Reports Under Article 22 of the Constitution of the International Labour Organisation. Geneva, 1936. 394 p. 33 cm.
——— Appendix. Report of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions. Geneva, 1936. 24 p. 33 cm.
INTERNATIONAL SURVEY of Legal Decisions on Labour Law 1934–35 (Tenth Year). Geneva, 1936. li, 347 p. 24 cm.
REGULATION of Certain Special Systems of RECRUITING Workers. International Labour Conference, Twentieth Session, Geneva, 1936. First Item on the Agenda. Report I. Geneva, 1936. 153 p. 24 cm.
——— Supplement. Geneva, 1936. 8 p. 24 cm.
SAFETY PROVISIONS for Workers in the Building Industry with reference to Scaffolding and Hoisting Machinery. International Labour Conference, Twentieth Session, Geneva, 1936. Item VIII on the Agenda. Report VIII. Geneva, 1936. xv, 379 p. 24 cm.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

REPORT of the Committee Appointed to Study the Composition of the Council (Adopted by the Committee on April 28, 1936). Geneva, 1936. 5 p. 33 cm. (League of Nations, A.9.1936.V.3.)
REPORT on the work of the League 1935/36. Part I. Geneva, 1936. 247 p. 24 cm. (League of Nations, A.6.1936.Gen.5.)

LEGAL PROCEEDINGS

CONVENTION between His Majesty in respect of the United Kingdom and the President of the FRENCH Republic Supplementary to the Convention of February 2, 1922, to facilitate the conduct of Legal Proceedings (with Protocol of Signature) Paris, April 15, 1936. London, 1936. 13 p. 24½ cm. (France No. 1 (1936) Cmd. 5182.) 3d.
CONVENTION between His Majesty in respect of the United Kingdom and the President of the FRENCH Republic providing for the Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters with Protocol, Paris, January 18, 1934. London, 1936. 27 p. 24½ cm. (Treaty Series No. 18 (1936) Cmd. 5235.) 6d.
CONVENTION between His Majesty in respect of the United Kingdom and His Majesty the King of the HELLENES regarding Legal Proceedings in Civil and Commercial Matters, London, February 27, 1936. London, 1936. 29 p. 24½ cm. (Greece No. 1 (1936) Cmd. 5146.) 6d.
CONVENTION between His Majesty in respect of the United Kingdom and the Regent of the Kingdom of HUNGARY regarding Legal Proceedings in Civil and Commercial Matters (with a note) Budapest, September 25, 1935. London, 1936. 22 p. 24½ cm. (Treaty Series No. 11 (1936) Cmd. 5190.) 4d.
CONVENTION between His Majesty in respect of the United Kingdom and the President of LITHUANIA regarding Legal Proceedings in Civil and Commercial Matters, Kovno, April 24, 1934. London, 1936. 21 p. 24½ cm. (Treaty Series No. 14 (1936) Cmd. 5197.) 4d.

PUBLIC LIB
AURORA, ILLIN

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PUBLIC LIBR
AURORA, ILL

CONVENTION between His Majesty in respect of the United Kingdom and His Majesty the King of YUGOSLAVIA regarding Legal Proceedings in Civil and Commercial Matters, London, February 27, 1936. London, 1936. 23 p. 24½ cm. (Yugoslavia No. 1 (1936) Cmd. 5161.) 4d.

MARITIME BUOYAGE

ORGANISATION for Communications and Transit. Uniform System of Maritime Buoyage. Report by the Small Committee. Geneva, 1936. 34 p. incl. diagrs. 33 cm. (League of Nations, C.128.M.67.1936.VIII.6.)

ORGANISATION for Communications and Transit. Uniform System of Maritime Buoyage. Texts of Draft Agreement and Rules Drawn up by the Small Committee in London, February 1936. Geneva, 1936. 15 p., diagrs. 33 cm. (League of Nations, C.128(a).M.67(a). 1936.VIII.7.)

MEXICO — RELIGION

THE RELIGIOUS QUESTION. — The President's Reply to the Memorial from the Employers. — Mexico's Economic Situation Rapidly Improving. Mexico City, Press of the Ministry of Foreign Relations, 1936. 48 p. 22½ cm. (The Mexican Government in the Presence of Social and Economic Problems, 2.) At head of title: Ministry of Foreign Relations. Issued in English and Spanish.

NUTRITION

THE PROBLEM of Nutrition. Volume I. Interim Report of the Mixed Committee on the Problem of Nutrition. Geneva, 1936. 98 p. 24 cm. (League of Nations, A.12.1936.II.B.3.)

To be continued: Vol. II. Report on the Physiological Bases of Nutrition, contains a report drawn up by the Technical Commission of the Health Committee; Vol. III. Nutrition in Various Countries; Vol. IV. Statistics of Good Production, Consumption and Prices.

PAN AMERICAN CONFERENCE

DRAFT of a Convention for the Maintenance of Peace. A Contribution to the Labors of the Forthcoming Inter-American Peace Conference by His Excellency the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Argentine Republic Dr. Carlos Saavedra Lamas. Washington, D. C. May 1936. n.p., n.d. 47 p. 23 cm.

STEPS Taken by the Pan American Union in Fulfillment of the Conventions and Resolutions adopted at the Seventh International Conference of American States (Montevideo, December 3–26, 1933). Report submitted to the Members of the Governing Board by the Director General June 30, 1936. Washington, Pan American Union, 1936. 29 numb. l. 27½ cm. (Congress and Conference Series No. 21.)

SLAVERY

SLAVERY. Report of the Advisory Committee of Experts. Third (Extraordinary) Session of the Committee. Held in Geneva, April 15 to 24, 1936. Geneva, 1936. 99 p. 33 cm. (League of Nations, C.189(1).M.145.1936.VI.B.1.)

SOUTHERN RHODESIA

DESPATCH from the Governor of Southern Rhodesia relating to the Proposed Amendment of the Southern Rhodesia Constitution. London, 1936. 62 p. 24½ cm. (Cmd. 5218.) 1s. 0d.

TRADE AGREEMENTS — UNITED STATES

RECIPROCAL TRADE. Agreement between the United States of America and GUATEMALA. Signed at Guatemala, April 24, 1936. Washington, 1936. 25 p. 23 cm. (Executive Agreement Series, No. 92.) 5 cents.

RECIPROCAL TRADE. Agreement between the United States of America and the Dominion of CANADA. Signed at Washington, November 15, 1935. Washington, 1936. 30 p. 23 cm. (Executive Agreement Series, No. 91.) 5 cents.

TRADE AGREEMENT with Canada. Washington, 1936. vi, 135 p. 23 cm. (United States Tariff Commission, Report No. 111, Second Series.) 15 cents.

RECIPROCAL TRADE. Agreement between the United States of America and COLOMBIA. Signed at Washington, September 13, 1935. And Joint Declaration. Washington, 1936. 45 p. 23 cm. (Executive Agreement Series, No. 89.) 5 cents.

CHANGES IN IMPORT DUTIES Since the Passage of the Tariff Act of 1930 and Items on which Rates of Duty or Duty-Free Status are Bound in Trade Agreements. Miscellaneous Series, 2d ed., June 1, 1936. Washington, 1936. iii, 44 p. 23 cm. At head of title: United States Tariff Commission, Washington. 10 cents.

PUBLIC LIBR
AURORA, ILL

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED